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This	   study	   will	   assess	   whether	   there	   is	   sufficient	   surviving	   source	   material	  
from	  the	  reign	  of	  Philip	  II	  of	  Macedon	  for	  the	  modern	  scholar	  to	  reasonably	  attempt	  
a	  full-­‐length	  study.	  It	  will	  do	  this	  through	  three	  separate	  case	  studies.	  
	  
The	   first	   is	   ‘The	  Military	  Transformation	  of	  Macedon.’	  This	  will	  examine	  the	  
nature	   of	   the	   threats	   that	   Philip	   faced	   upon	   becoming	   king	   in	   359	   BC,	   and	   his	  
achievement	   in	  overcoming	   them.	   It	  will	   attempt	   to	  understand	  his	   impact	  on	   the	  
growth	   in	   size	   of	   the	   Macedonian	   army,	   and	   thirdly	   the	   significance	   of	   his	  
introduction	  of	  the	  sarissa,	  his	  most	  celebrated	  military	  innovation.	  
	  
The	  second	  section	  is	  ‘Philip	  and	  Athens:	  War	  and	  Peace.’	  This	  will	  attempt	  to	  assess	  
Philip’s	   intentions	   in	   his	   dealings	   with	   the	   Greek	   city	   by	   studying	   his	   and	   Athens’	  
approach	  to	  the	  treaty	  that	  ended	  a	  decade	  of	  warfare	  between	  the	  two.	  
	  
The	  third	  section,	  ‘The	  Murder	  of	  Philip	  II’	  will	  examine	  the	  circumstances	  of	  
Philip’s	   assassination.	   Although	   the	   assassin	   is	   known	   to	   have	   been	   a	   bodyguard,	  
Pausanias,	   rumours	   abound	   in	   the	   sources	   of	   the	   involvement	   of	   Philip’s	   wife,	  
Olympias,	   his	   son	  Alexander,	   and	  of	   a	   conspiracy	   involving	  nobles	   from	   the	  Upper	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Various	   efforts	   have	   been	  made	   to	   directly	   examine	   the	   life	   of	   Philip	   II	   of	  
Macedon,	   although	   the	   achievements	   of	   his	   son,	   Alexander	   the	   Great,	   have	  
inevitably	  drawn	  greater	  attention	  from	  ancient	  and	  modern	  scholars.	  In	  addition	  to	  
the	   limited	   attention	  his	   reign	  directly	   receives	   in	  most	   studies	  of	  Alexander’s	   life,	  
several	   full	   biographies	   of	   Philip	   have	   been	   published.	   However,	   the	   level	   of	  
attention	  has	  ultimately	  been	  low.	  Undoubtedly	  one	  of	  the	  main	  reasons	  for	  this	   is	  
the	  relative,	  at	  times	  near	  complete,	  dearth	  of	  evidence	  for	  large	  periods	  of	  his	  reign.	  
	  
It	  is	  this	  point	  that	  provides	  the	  main	  inspiration	  for	  this	  work.	  In	  theory,	  one	  
can	  draw	  certain	  conclusions	  from	  even	  the	  sparsest	  collection	  of	  information.	  Thus	  
an	  archaeologist	  can	  make	  certain	  basic	  assumptions	  about	  the	  date	  and	  provenance	  
of	   a	   handful	   of	   stone	   bricks	   he	   finds	   in	   a	   field.	   If	   pressed	   to	   offer	   a	   wider,	   more	  
detailed	   theory	   on	   the	   structure	   they	   formed	   part	   of’s	   size,	   colour	   and	   layout	  
however,	   he	   could	   not	   be	   expected,	   given	   the	   limited	   nature	   of	   the	   evidence	  
available,	  to	  offer	  an	  opinion	  that	  was	  not	  overwhelmingly	  conjectural.	  In	  the	  same	  
way,	  one	  can	  attempt	  to	  piece	  together	  a	  sequence	  of	  events	  from	  references	  and	  
descriptions	   in	   source	   material.	   However,	   if	   the	   references	   are	   scarce	   or	   poorly	  
informed,	   such	   overall	   reconstructions	   begin	   to	   rely	   overly	   on	   conjecture	   and	  
theorising.	  Therefore	  this	  study	  will	  not	  attempt	  to	  offer	  a	  full	  biographical	  study	  of	  
Philip,	   but	   instead	   an	   analysis	   of	   whether,	   given	   the	   considerable	   lack	   of	   source	  
material	  for	  various	  aspects	  of	  his	  reign,	  such	  a	  full-­‐length	  evaluation	  can	  realistically	  
be	   completed	   at	   all.	   This	  will	   be	   attempted	   through	   the	   division	   of	   the	   study	   into	  
three	  separate	  essays,	  each	  of	  which	  will	  focus	  on	  a	  particular	  aspect	  of	  Philip’s	  rule	  
as	  a	  case	  study	  for	  how	  full	  a	  picture	  can	  be	  drawn	  of	  Philip’s	  time	  as	  king.	  
	  
The	   first	   of	   these	   studies	   will	   examine	   aspects	   of	   Philip’s	   effect	   on	   the	  
Macedonian	  army.	  This	   is	  of	  particular	  significance	  as	  almost	  all	  descriptions	  of	  the	  






of	   in	   Asia.	   Little	   material	   is	   available	   for	   Philip’s	   reign	   itself	   beyond	   narrative	  
references	   to	  his	  use	  of	   the	  army,	  meaning	   that	  his	   improvements	  must	  be	   largely	  
inferred	  from	  the	  disparity	  between	  Alexander’s	  forces	  and	  the	  few	  hazy	  details	  that	  
survive	   of	   military	   forces	   in	   pre-­‐Philippic	   Macedon.	   That	   improvements	   occurred	  
seems	  very	   likely	  as	  descriptions	  of	  Macedon	   in	  359	  depict	  a	  state	  on	  the	  verge	  of	  
collapse,	  and	  one	  that	  had	  for	  some	  time	  been	  without	  any	  real	  military	  forces.	  Thus	  
the	  study	  will	  be	  as	  much	  an	  investigation	  of	  the	  accuracy	  of	  such	  early	  depictions	  as	  
of	  the	  changes	  that	  followed.	  
	  
The	   second	   study	   will	   focus	   on	   Macedon’s	   relations	   with	   Athens.	   Philip’s	  
involvement	  with	  the	  various	  Greek	  city-­‐states	  and	  the	  frequently	  changing	  factions	  
they	   made	   up	   is	   far	   too	   lengthy	   and	   complicated	   to	   address	   in	   its	   entirety.	  
Consequently	   his	   relations	   with	   Athens	   will	   be	   used	   as	   a	   case	   study	   of	   Philip’s	  
involvement	   in	   Greek	   politics;	   whether	   his	   entry	   marked	   the	   beginning	   of	   a	  
concerted	   plan	   to	   manoeuvre	   into	   a	   position	   of	   eventual	   superiority	   by	   careful	  
exploitation	   of	   political	   divisions,	   or	   was	   more	   the	   result	   of	   his	   reacting	   to	  
circumstances	  and	  opportunities	   that	  occurred	   largely	  without	  his	  encouragement.	  	  
Athens	  offers	   the	  best	  chance	   for	  such	  a	  study,	  as	   it	  was	  at	  war	  with	  Macedon	  for	  
much	  of	  Philip’s	  reign,	  and	  throughout	  the	  period	  a	  crucial	  record	  of	  Athenian	  views	  
on	  Philip’s	  intentions	  are	  offered	  in	  the	  speeches	  of	  Demosthenes	  and	  Aeschines.	  
	  
The	  third	  essay	  will	  investigate	  the	  fascinating	  and	  confusing	  affair	  of	  Philip’s	  
murder.	   Although	   the	   assassin,	   one	   Pausanias,	   is	   known,	   the	   surrounding	  
circumstances	  are	  far	  from	  clear.	  Almost	  all	  ancient	  sources	  allege	  the	  involvement	  
of	  his	  wife,	  Olympias,	  and	  in	  some	  cases,	  Alexander,	  due	  to	  events	  shortly	  before	  the	  
murder	  offending	  the	  former	  and	  apparently	  throwing	  doubt	  on	  the	  latter’s	  position	  
as	  heir.	  To	  this	  modern	  scholars	  have	  added	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  conspiracy	  involving	  
brothers	   from	   the	   Upper	   Macedonian	   state	   of	   Lyncestis.	   Although	   sources	   for	  
Philip’s	   death	   are	   for	   once	   not	   lacking,	   most	   are	   considerably	   removed	   from	   the	  






through	  Greek	  eyes.	  The	  result	  is	  that	  matters	  such	  as	  polygamy	  and	  kingship	  are	  at	  
times	  misunderstood	  and	  confusingly	  presented.	  
	  
By	   nature	   ancient	   historical	   scholarship	   is	   little	   more	   than	   speculation,	  
inference	   and	   assumption,	   its	   conclusions	   almost	   always	   comprising	   what	   is	  most	  
likely	   rather	   than	  what	   is	   certain.	   Thus	   it	  would	  be	  misguided	  and	   foolish	   to	  hope	  
that	   together	   these	   studies	   will	   definitively	   indicate	   whether	   or	   not	   the	   surviving	  
source	   material	   for	   Philip’s	   reign	   is	   sufficient	   for	   lengthier	   studies	   to	   deliver	  
conclusions	  with	  findings	  of	  near-­‐certain	  levels	  of	  reliability.	  However,	  given	  that,	  as	  
has	  been	  said,	  individual	  conclusions	  can	  arguably	  be	  drawn	  from	  the	  slightest	  pieces	  
of	   circumstantial	   evidence,	   these	   studies	  will	   seek	   to	   evaluate	  whether	   the	   source	  
material	   for	   Philip’s	   reign	   is	   sufficient	   to	   allow	   for	   any	   lengthier	   studies	   to	   deliver	  
reasonable	  levels	  of	  genuine	  insight	  rather	  than	  being	  forced	  to	  resort	  overly	  to	  pure	  










































Frustratingly,	   none	   of	   the	   histories	   involving	   Philip	   written	   contemporarily	  
survive	   intact.	  Only	  a	  series	  of	  fragments	  remain	  where	  subsequent	  writers	  quoted	  
the	  authors’	  works.	  Foremost	  among	  these	  is	  Theopompus	  of	  Chios,	  from	  whose	  58-­‐
book	  Philippica	  over	  200	  fragments	  survive.	  Writing	  in	  the	  late	  330s	  and	  early	  320s,	  
Theopompus	   visited	  Macedon	   during	   Philip’s	   reign,	   and	  met	   the	   king	   himself.1	   He	  
famously	  opened	  his	  work	  with	  the	  remark	  that	  “Europe	  had	  never	  produced	  such	  a	  
man	  as	  Philip,	  son	  of	  Amyntas,”2	  but	  surviving	  fragments	  suggest	  this	  was	  not	  meant	  
well;	   Theopompus’	   depiction	   of	   Philip	   is	   characterised	   by	   excess,	   particularly	  with	  
regard	   to	   drink	   and	   sexual	   appetite.	   He	   disregards	   his	   friends	   and	   allies,	   spends	  
money	  he	  does	  not	  have,	  and	  owed	  his	  success	  to	  luck,	  and	  his	  dishonourable	  ability	  
to	  exploit	  a	   similar	  moral	  decline	  amongst	   the	  Greeks.3	  For	   this	  he	  drew	  the	   ire	  of	  
Polybius,	   who	   was	   particularly	   incensed	   by	   Theopompus’	   undermining	   his	   own	  
opening	  statement,	  as	  it	  was	  this	  that	  suggested	  why	  he	  chose	  to	  write	  about	  Philip	  
in	  the	  first	  place:	  
	  
“Everyone	  must	  disapprove	  of	  such	  bitter	  feeling	  and	  lack	  of	  restraint	  on	  the	  part	  of	  this	  
writer.	   For	   not	   only	   does	   he	   deserve	   blame	   for	   using	   language	   which	   contradicts	   his	  
statement	   of	   the	   object	   he	   had	   in	   writing,	   but	   for	   falsely	   accusing	   the	   king	   and	   his	  
friends,	   and	   especially	   for	   making	   this	   false	   accusation	   in	   coarse	   and	   unbecoming	  
terms.”4	  
	  
Theopompus’	  Philippica	   is	   the	  work	  of	  a	  conservative,	  whose	  observations	  at	  
the	   Macedonian	   court	   apparently	   confirmed	   in	   his	   mind	   many	   traditional	   Greek	  
prejudices	   regarding	   ‘uncivilised’	   Macedonians.	   So	   appalled	   was	   he	   by	   Greece’s	  
falling	  to	  the	  worst	  of	  such	  men,	  he	  concluded	  that	  it	  was	  essentially	  as	  corrupt	  and	  
uncivil,	  and	  deserved	   its	   fate.	  Away	   from	  his	   fiercely	  opinionated	  depictions	  of	  key	  
figures	   however,	   Theopompus	   appears	   largely	   reliable.	   Various	   fragments	   give	  
important	   information	   on,	   amongst	   other	   things,	   the	   scale	   and	   location	   of	   the	  
                                         
1	  On	  Theopompus,	  see	  esp.	  Flower	  1994,	  19f,	  and	  chap	  3;	  Shrimpton	  1977,	  123-­‐44	  and	  1991.	  
2	  Theop.	  FGrH	  n.	  115	  F27.	  
3	  Polyb.	  8.11.5-­‐13	  =	  FGrH	  n.	  115	  F225a.	  Ath.	  4.166F	  –	  7C	  =	  F224;	  620D	  –	  1A	  =	  F225b.	  






Thracian	   kingdom	  of	   Cotys5,	   Athenian	   attempts	   to	   secure	  Amphipolis	   from	  Philip,6	  
and	  the	  king’s	  activities	  during	  the	  siege	  of	  Olynthus.7	  Although	  in	  several	  cases	  he	  is	  
the	  only	  source	  available,	  there	   is	  no	  obvious	  need	  for	  him	  to	  have	  exaggerated	  or	  
invented	   circumstances.	   The	   fact	   that	   many	   of	   the	   fragments	   survive	   through	  
quotation	   by	   later	   authors	   supports	   the	   idea	   that	   his	   work	   was	   trusted	   in	   this	  
respect.	  
	  
Many	   of	   the	   other	   fragmentary	   contemporary	   sources	   are	   best	   approached	  
through	   an	   examination	   of	   the	  Historical	   Library	   of	   Roman	   Diodorus	   Siculus,	   who	  
wrote	   in	   the	   first	   century	   BC.8	   A	   universal	   history	   running	   down	   to	   the	   time	   of	  
Caesar,	  only	  15	  of	  its	  40	  books	  survive.	  Book	  16	  is	  concerned	  with	  the	  reign	  of	  Philip,	  
and	   provides	   the	   first	   continuous	   narrative	   of	   Philip’s	   reign.	   To	   fit	   the	   ‘universal’	  
nature	  of	  his	  work	  Diodorus	  frequently	   jumped	  between	  different	  narratives.	   In	  his	  
‘The	  Sources	  of	  Diodorus	  XVI,’9	  N.	  G.	  L.	  Hammond	  conducted	  a	  detailed	  assessment	  
of	  which	  sources	  Diodorus	  had	  used	  at	  which	  points,	  and	  concluded	  that	  the	  chapter	  
could	  be	  divided	  into	  three	  groups.	  Down	  to	  340,	  his	  source	  was	  Ephorus	  of	  Cyme,	  in	  
Asia	  Minor.	   Living	   in	   the	   fourth	   century,	   Ephorus	   apparently	   enjoyed	   a	   reputation	  
amongst	  ancient	  writers	  for	  accuracy	  and	  clarity.	  A	  pupil	  of	  Isocrates,	  he	  shared	  with	  
his	   teacher	   a	   view	   of	   Philip	   as	   unifier	   of	   Greece.10	   Diodorus	   states	   however	   that	  
Ephorus’	  account	  did	  not	   include	  the	  Third	  Sacred	  War	   (357/6-­‐347/6),	  and	  that	  his	  
source	  for	  such	  matters	  was	  instead	  Ephorus’	  son	  Demophilus,	  who	  filled	  the	  gap	  in	  
his	   father’s	  work.	  Diodorus	  also	   states	   that	   the	   first	   volume	  of	   the	  Syntaxis	   by	   the	  
fourth	  century	  Diyllus	  of	  Athens	  began	  at	  the	  same	  point.11	  Hammond’s	  conclusion	  
was	  that	  Demophilus’	  work	  informed	  Diodorus’	  account	  of	  the	  Sacred	  War,	  and	  the	  
Syntaxis	   other	   events	   in	  Greece	   and	  Macedon.	   Similarly,	   Diodorus’	   announcement	  
that	  Ephorus’	  account	  ended	  in	  340,	  and	  that	  the	  second	  volume	  of	  Diyllus’	  Syntaxis	  
began	  at	  that	  point	  was	  taken	  to	  indicate	  that	  having	  reverted	  to	  Ephorus’	  account	  
                                         
5	  Theop.	  FGrH	  n.	  115	  F31.	  
6	  ibid,	  30A	  &	  B.	  
7	  ibid,	  F137	  &	  8.	  
8	  On	  Diodorus,	  see	  esp.	  Sacks	  1990	  and	  1994,	  213-­‐32;	  McQueen	  1995.	  
9	  Hammond	  1937,	  79-­‐91	  and	  1938,	  37-­‐51.	  
10	  Hammond	  1994,	  15.	  






for	  347/6-­‐340,	  he	  was	  returning	  to	  Diyllus’	  text	  for	  that	  point	  onwards.12	  Little	  can	  be	  
said	  of	  Demophilus	  other	   than	   it	  would	  seem	  that	  ancient	  writers	  viewed	  his	  work	  
with	  a	  similar	  level	  of	  approval	  to	  that	  of	  his	  father’s.	  In	  his	  remaining	  fragments,	  the	  
Athenian	   Diyllus	   “shows	   his	   interest	   in	   scandal,	   bribery	   and	   a	   Macedonian	   state	  
function.”13	   Hammond’s	   interpretation,	   written	   in	   the	   late	   1930s,	   has	   seen	   no	  
serious	  rejection	  by	  modern	  scholars,	  and	  was	  presented	  with	  slight	  revisions	  in	  his	  
1994	  biography	  of	  Philip.14	  It	  has	  been	  followed	  in	  this	  work,	  as	  the	  author	  has	  been	  
similarly	  unable	  to	  raise	  any	  serious	  objection	  with	  it.	  
	  
Diodorus’	  account	  demonstrates	  well	   the	  benefits	  and	  frustrations	  of	  general	  
historical	   works	   offer.	   At	   times	   the	   wider	   focus	   does	   much	   to	   fill	   in	   crucial	  
background	  information	  and	  provide	  context	  to	  situations.	  Thus	  Diodorus’	  summary	  
of	  the	  threats	  facing	  Philip	  in	  359	  is	  key	  to	  understanding	  the	  king’s	  achievement	  in	  
dealing	  with	  them;	  equally	   important	   is	  the	  outline	  of	  the	  previous	  fifty	  years,	  as	   it	  
can	  be	  observed	  that	  the	  problems	  were	   long-­‐standing	  ones,	  and	  formed	  part	  of	  a	  
cycle	  that	  had	  proved	  inescapable	  to	  all	  Philip’s	  predecessors.15	  However,	  the	  need	  
on	  the	  author’s	  part	  not	  to	  dwell	  overly	  on	  a	  particular	  area	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  others	  
can	   lead	   to	   omissions,	   over-­‐simplifications	   and	   compressions	   of	   information	   and	  
timescales.	   Diodorus	   in	   particular	   can	   confuse	   his	   subject	   matter	   at	   times;	   his	  
account	   of	   the	   rebellion	   of	   Attalus	   following	   Philip’s	   death	   and	   Alexander’s	  
successful	  attempt	  to	  deal	  with	  it	  does	  not	  make	  sense	  in	  the	  time	  scale	  he	  presents.	  
Similarly,	   his	   inclusion	   of	   two	   men	   named	   Pausanias	   in	   the	   events	   surrounding	  
Philip’s	   murder	   has	   suggested	   to	   some	   a	   serious	   misunderstanding	   of	   events.16	  
Despite	   these	   problems	   Diodorus’	   account	   generally	   seen	   to	   be	   quite	   reliable	   by	  
modern	  scholars	  due	  to	  his	  use	  of	  contemporaneous	  source	  material.	  It	  provides	  an	  
invaluable	  framework	  on	  which	  detail	  from	  other	  less	  general	  works	  and	  fragments	  
can	  be	  hung.	  
	  
                                         
12	  Diod.	  16.76.5.	  
13	  Hammond	  1994,	  13.	  
14	  Hammond	  1994,	  12.14.	  
15	  See	  below,	  pp16-­‐34.	  






	   The	  other	  continuous	  surviving	  source	  for	  Philip’s	  reign	  is	  the	  Epitome	  of	  the	  
Philippic	   History	   of	   Pompeius	   Trogus	   by	   Justin.17	   Written	   in	   the	   first	   century	   BC,	  
Trogus’	  original	  work	  has	  not	  survived.18	  Justin’s	  abridged	  version	  was	  composed	  at	  
some	   point	   between	   the	   second	   and	   fourth	   centuries	   AD.19	   In	   1991	   Hammond	  
applied	   the	   same	   method	   of	   source	   analysis	   to	   books	   7,	   8,	   and	   9	   as	   he	   had	   to	  
Diodorus’	  book	  16.	  Once	  again,	   the	  author	  has	   found	  no	  objection	   to	   following	  his	  
interpretation.	  	  
	  
Hammond’s	   conclusions	  were	  again	   that	   the	  material	   could	  be	  divided	   into	  
three	   groups.	   The	  parts	   in	  book	  7	   that	   focused	  on	  Macedonian	  history	  were	  most	  
likely	   taken	   from	   the	   Macedonia	   of	   Marsyas	   Macedon,	   the	   only	   Macedonian	  
historian	   known	   to	   us	   for	   this	   period.	   A	   contemporary	   of	   Alexander	   and	   his	  
Successors,	  Marsyas’	  work	  ran	  from	  the	  earliest	  kings	  of	  Macedon	  down	  to	  his	  own	  
time.	   The	   second	   group,	   comprising	   the	   sections	   in	   books	   7	   and	   9	   that	   dealt	  with	  
Macedonian	   royal	   women,	   particularly	   Olympias	   and	   Eurydice,	   was	   identified	   as	  
being	   taken	   from	   the	   Life	   of	   Philip	   by	   Satyrus	   the	   Peripatetic.	   A	   third	   century	  
philosopher	  and	  historian	  from	  Callatis	  on	  the	  Black	  Sea	  coast,	  Satyrus’	  chief	  use	  to	  
the	   modern	   scholar	   lies	   in	   his	   description,	   reproduced	   in	   the	   Deipnosophistae	   of	  
Athenaeus,	  of	  Philip’s	  seven	  marriages.	  Fragments	  of	  his	  biography	  of	  the	  dramatist	  
Euripides	  indicate	  that	  he	  frequently	  used	  unreliable	  sources	  for	  his	  works,20	  and	  he	  
seems	   to	   have	   possessed	   a	   keen	   interest	   in	   the	   gossip	   and	   scandal	   of	   the	  
Macedonian	   court.	   His	   description	   of	   the	   argument	   that	   arose	   between	   Philip,	  
Alexander	   and	   Attalus	   following	   the	   former’s	  marriage	   to	   Cleopatra	   is	   particularly	  
frenzied,21	   and	   Plutarch’s	   Life	   of	   Alexander	   preserves	   his	   somewhat	   overwrought	  
claims	   regarding	   Philip’s	   falling	   in	   love	   with	   and	   dramatic	   loss	   of	   interest	   in	  
Olympias.22	   The	   former	   comprises	   the	   young	   Philip	   falling	   instantly	   in	   love	   with	  
Olympias	   upon	   meeting	   her,	   whilst	   the	   latter	   involves	   Olympias	   being	   observed	  
                                         
17	  Hammond	  1991,	  496-­‐508.	  
18	  On	  Trogus,	  see	  esp.	  Alonso-­‐Nuñez	  1987,	  56-­‐72;	  Heckel	  &	  Develin	  1994;	  Yardley	  2003.	  
19	  See	  Syme	  1988,	  358-­‐71.	  
20	  Hunt	  1912,	  	  124-­‐82,	  n.	  1176.	  
21	  Ath	  13.557	  d-­‐e;	  Just.	  9.7.3-­‐5;	  Plut.	  Alex.	  9.4-­‐5.	  See	  below,	  pp	  99-­‐104.	  






sleeping	  with	  a	  serpent;	  both	  situations	  demand	  information	  that	  was	  hardly	  likely	  to	  
have	   been	   disclosed	   publicly	   and	   was	   most	   likely	   invented	   or	   exaggerated.	  
Hammond	   identified	   the	   third	  group	  of	   Justin’s	  work,	   comprising	   the	   remainder	  of	  
book	  7,	  most	  of	  book	  8	  and	   the	   latter	  part	  of	  book	  9	  as	   coming	   from	   the	  work	  of	  
Theopompus,	  whose	  work	  has	  already	  been	  discussed.	  	  
	  
Justin’s	   work	   has	   generally	   been	   seen	   as	   less	   reliable	   than	   Diodorus,	   as	   it	  
relies	  considerably	  on	  the	  somewhat	  salacious	  and/or	  opinionated	  work	  Satyrus	  and	  
Theopompus.	   The	   presentation	   of	  Olympias	   in	   particular	   is	   biased	   in	   the	   extreme,	  
forcing	  one	  to	  rely	  on	  other	  corroborating	  material	  to	  disentangle	  truth	  from	  fiction.	  
It	   also	   seems	   to	  misunderstand	  various	  matters	   to	  do	  with	   the	  Macedonian	   court.	  
Several	   references	   are	  made	   to	   Philip’s	   divorcing	  Olympias	   in	   favour	   of	   Cleopatra,	  
which	   shows	   a	   clear	   misunderstanding	   of	   the	   polygamous	   nature	   of	   Philip’s	  
marriages.23	  However,	  the	  biggest	  problem	  with	  Justin’s	  account	  is	  its	  compression.	  
By	  definition	   the	  Epitome	   is	  an	  abridgment	  of	  a	   larger	  work,	  and	   in	  addition	   Justin	  
states	   in	   his	   preface	   that	   his	   approach	   was	   to	   include	   only	   “what	   was	   worth	  
knowing…omitting	   what	   was	   neither	   pleasurable	   to	   learn	   nor	   necessary	   as	   an	  
example.”24	   As	   with	   Diodorus,	   this	   makes	   understanding	   events’	   relation	   to	   each	  
other	   difficult,	   as	   various	   matters’	   presentation	   strongly	   suggest	   their	   being	  
oversimplified	  or	  misunderstood.	  
	  
Away	  from	  history,	  one	  also	  has	  the	  Lives	  of	  Plutarch	  of	  Chaeronea.25	  Written	  
in	   the	   second	   century	   AD	   these	   were	   a	   series	   of	   parallel	   studies	   comparing	   the	  
biographies	   of	   significant	   Romans	   and	   Greeks	   whose	   careers	   and/or	   characters,	  
Plutarch	   felt,	   followed	   similar	   trajectories.	   Frustratingly,	   no	   Life	   of	   Philip	   was	  
composed,	   meaning	   the	   most	   significant	   work	   is	   his	   Alexander.	   Biographies	   of	  
Demosthenes,	   Phocion,	   Pelopidas	   also	   provide	   important	   information.	   Plutarch	  
made	  use	   in	  many	  cases	  of	   contemporary	   sources,	  and	  provides	   several	   important	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anecdotes	  concerning	  Philip’s	   interaction	  with	  the	  young	  Alexander.26	  However,	  his	  
focus	  being	  the	  son	  rather	  than	  the	  father,	  and	  his	   interest	  always	  being	  the	  moral	  
character	  of	  his	  subjects,	  rather	  than	  blow-­‐by-­‐blow	  accounts	  of	  their	  actions	  inspires	  
several	   potential	   issues.	  He	  was	  by	  nature	   selective	  with	   the	   information	  his	  work	  
included,	  and	  he	  would	  have	  had	  a	  vested	   interest	  both	   in	  painting	  Alexander	   in	  a	  
positive	  light	  with	  regard	  to	  his	  behaviour	  at	  court,	  and	  not	  above	  adapting	  or	  even	  
inventing	  if	  he	  felt	  it	  served	  to	  emphasise	  a	  point.	  In	  addition,	  Plutarch’s	  focus	  being	  
Alexander	  rather	   than	  Philip	  means	  that	  at	   times	  he	  makes	  no	  mention	  of	  matters	  
which	  occur	  in	  other	  sources,	  potentially	  throwing	  doubt	  on	  their	  veracity	  by	  offering	  
no	  corroboration.	  Conversely,	  he	  describes	  events	  which	  do	  not	  appear	  in	  Diodorus	  
or	  Justin	  as	  they	  concern	  minor	  events	  in	  Alexander’s	  life.	  A	  notable	  example	  of	  this	  
is	  the	  disagreement	  which	  reportedly	  arose	  between	  Philip	  and	  Alexander	  following	  
the	   latter’s	   offering	   himself	   as	   a	   potential	   husband	   for	   the	   daughter	   of	   the	  Carian	  
satrap	   Pixodarus,	   in	   opposition	   to	   Philip’s	   choice	   of	   Arrhidaeus.27No	   other	   source	  
mentions	   the	  occurrence.	  Although	  this	  could	  be	  due	  to	   invention,	   it	  could	  equally	  
be	  due	  to	  their	  authors	  feeling	  the	  event	  was	  of	  such	  marginal	  significance	  in	  Philip’s	  
life	   that	   it	   did	   not	   justify	   inclusion.	   In	   spite	   of	   the	   challenge	   such	   cases	   present,	  
Plutarch	  is	  a	  useful	  and	  largely	  reliable	  source	  for	  the	  end	  of	  Philip’s	  reign	  and	  events	  
surrounding	  his	  death.	  
	  
The	   various	   surviving	   speeches	   from	   the	   Athenian	   orators	   Aeschines	   and	  
Demosthenes	  offer	  an	  invaluable	  insight	  into	  Philip’s	  relationship	  with	  Athens.	  Both	  
address	   contemporary	   events	   in	   which	   they	   actually	   participated.	   However,	   their	  
speeches’	   purpose	   and	   method	   of	   delivery	   means	   that	   their	   testimony	   must	   be	  
received	  with	   the	  utmost	   suspicion.28	  The	  chief	   reason	   for	   this	   is	   that	   the	  orations	  
were	  composed	  not	  as	  historical	  documents,	  but	  as	  exercises	  in	  rhetoric,	  designed	  to	  
persuade	   an	   audience	  by	   any	  means	  necessary	   that	   the	   author’s	   claims	   should	   be	  
favoured	  over	   those	  of	  his	  opponent.	   In	  achieving	   this,	  as	  one	  historian	  has	  put	   it,	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“[the]	   truth	  was	  often	  as	   valuable	   to	   them	  as	   sand	   is	   in	   a	  desert.”29	  Demosthenes	  
provides	   the	   greater	   number	   of	   surviving	   speeches,	   and	   he	   especially	   “does	   not	  
flinch	  from	  distorting,	  or	  perhaps	  even	  inventing,	  facts.”30	  A	  clear	  example	  concerns	  
a	  letter	  which	  arrived	  in	  Athens	  shortly	  after	  the	  return	  of	  the	  First	  Embassy	  sent	  by	  
Athens	   to	  discuss	  peace	   terms	  with	  Philip.	   It	   cryptically	   referred	   to	   “benefits”	   that	  
Athens	   would	   enjoy	   were	   peace	   to	   be	   agreed,	   and	   Demosthenes	   subsequently	  
accused	  Aeschines	  of	  being	  bribed	  by	  Philip	   to	  write	   it	  himself.31	  Quite	  apart	   from	  
the	  complete	   lack	  of	  evidence	  to	  support	  such	  a	  claim,	  Aeschines	  comprehensively	  
rejects	   it	   by	   indicting	   the	   impracticality	   of	   such	   an	   arrangement.32	   Elsewhere	  
Demosthenes	   accuses	   Aeschines	   of	   conspiring	   to	   omit	   Athens’	   allies,	   the	   Thracian	  
king	   Cersebleptes	   and	   the	   cities	   of	   Halus	   and	   Phocis	   from	   the	   peace,33	   but	  
undermines	   his	   own	   allegation	   by	   changing	   the	   timing	   of	   this	   supposed	   action	   at	  
different	  point	  in	  his	  speech.34	  
	  
In	  addition,	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  speeches	  means	  that	  one	  is	  forced	  to	  contend	  
to	   a	   far	   greater	   degree	  with	   the	   authors’	   personal	   attitudes	   towards	   their	   subject	  
matter	  than	  with	  chroniclers	  of	  ancient	  events,	  where	  there	  is	  usually	  an	  attempt	  to	  
record	   detachedly	   events	   as	   they	   actually	   occurred.	   Thus	   when	   Demosthenes	   in	  
particular	  discusses	  matters	  even	  tangentially	  related	  to	  Philip,	  his	  claims	  are	  greatly	  
influenced	   by	   his	   fervent	   beliefs	   that	   the	   Macedonian	   king	   was	   bent	   on	   ending	  
Greek,	   and	   particularly	   Athenian	   independence.	   This	   situation,	   already	   difficult,	   is	  
complicated	  even	   further	   for	   the	  modern	  historian	  by	   the	   fact	   that	  Aeschines	  was	  
Demosthenes	   fierce	   political	   rival.	   His	   few	   surviving	   speeches	   deal	   with	   his	   own	  
defence	  against	  accusations	  brought	  by	  Demosthenes	  regarding	  the	  former’s	  role	  in	  
securing	  Athenian	  peace	  with	  Philip	  in	  346.	  The	  various	  benefits	  promised	  by	  Philip	  
and	   relayed	   to	   the	   Athenian	   Assembly	   by	   the	   embassy,	   which	   included	   both	  
Aeschines	   and	   Demosthenes,	   had	   not	   materialised.	   In	   attempting	   to	   avoid	   the	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resultant	   frustration	   of	   the	   Athenian	   populace,	   “both	   men	   had	   strong	   reasons	   to	  
obscure	   or	   distort	   the	   truth	   about	   certain	   vital	   elements”	   when	   discussing	   their	  
involvement	  in	  negotiations.35	  
	  
However,	  despite	  these	  issues,	  the	  speeches	  of	  Aeschines	  and	  Demosthenes	  
provide	   a	   priceless	   insight	   into	   Athenian	   attitudes	   towards	   Philip.	   Even	   with	   their	  
varying	  versions	  of	  events	  and	  opinions	  on	  situations	  they	  provide	  a	  crucial	  outline	  of	  
the	  Athens	  and	  Macedon’s	  interaction	  and	  the	  steps	  it	  took	  for	  peace	  to	  be	  agreed.	  	  
	  
References	  to	  Philip	  also	  appear	  in	  Arrian’s	  Anabasis	  of	  Alexander	  and	  Curtius	  
Rufus’	   The	   History	   of	   Alexander,	   both	   written	   in	   the	   first	   century	   AD.	   The	   former	  
provides	   important	   information	   on	   the	  Macedonian	  military,	   and	   although	   its	   first	  
two	   books	   are	   lost,	   the	   latter	   offers	   important	   information	   on	   the	   matter	   of	  
potential	   Lyncestian	   involvement	   in	   Philip’s	   death.36	   Arrian	   being	   a	   man	   of	  
considerable	  military	   experience,	   combined	  with	   his	   frequent	   use	   of	   Ptolemy	   as	   a	  
source	   has	   led	   to	   his	   being	   viewed	   as	   generally	   reliable.	   Curtius	   has	   gained	   a	  
reputation	   for	   self-­‐contradiction	   and	   ignorance	   of	   geography,	   chronology	   and	  
understanding	   of	   military	   matters.37	   However,	   he	   does	   offer	   information	   not	  
provided	  elsewhere,	  and	  considerable	  detail	  on	  many	  important	  matters.	  Small	  but	  
important	  references	  to	  Philip	  also	  occur	  in	  the	  works	  of	  Polyaenus	  (second	  century	  
AD),	   Polybius	   (second	   century	   BC,	   often	   commenting	   on	   his	   now	   lost	   sources’	  
veracity),	  Strabo	  (first	  century	  BC	  –	  first	  century	  AD),	  Theophrastus	  (third	  century	  BC)	  
and	  Asclepiodotus	  Tacitus	  (first	  century	  BC).	  	  
	  
Altogether	   then,	   the	   surviving	   record	   of	   Philip’s	   reign	   is	   distinctly	   non-­‐
contemporary	  and	  distinctly	  non-­‐Macedonian.	   That	  none	  of	   the	  multiple	  works	  on	  
Philip	  have	  survived	  to	  modern	  times	  goes	  a	  long	  way	  towards	  explaining	  why	  Philip	  
has	  not	  received	  the	  same	  study	  as	  his	  son.	  Given	  that,	  as	  has	  been	  said,	  the	  purpose	  
of	  this	  study	  is	  to	  investigate	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  modern	  author	  can	  construct	  a	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biography	  of	  Philip,	  and	  it	  is	  with	  the	  above	  shortcomings	  and	  biases	  of	  this	  data	  that	  
this	  study	  must	  contend,	  how	  should	  such	  a	  work	  conduct	  its	  analysis	  of	  the	  above	  
material?	  
	  
The	  general	  histories	  of	  Diodorus	  and	  Justin	  will	  often	  provide	  the	  backbone	  
of	  each	  chapter.	  Their	  continuous	  narratives	  will,	  if	  nothing	  else	  provide	  a	  framework	  
of	  events	  to	  which	  greater	  detail	  can	  subsequently	  be	  added.	  Such	  works	  also	  offer	  
some	  context,	  which	  is	  key	  to	  understanding	  the	  significance	  of	  the	  events	  which	  are	  
presented.	  Thus,	  as	  will	  be	  seen,	  some	  background	  is	  created	  in	  the	  investigation	  of	  
the	   events	   of	   359,	   aiding	   attempts	   to	   comprehend	   the	   significance	   of	   Philip’s	  
achievement	  in	  surviving	  his	  first	  year	  as	  king.	  
	  
Using	   such	  works	   is	   not	  without	   problems	  however.	   The	   broader	   approach	  
inevitably	  means	  that	  some	  events	  are	  compressed,	  over-­‐simplified	  or	  even	  omitted	  
completely.	  There	  is	  also	  a	  tendency	  in	  such	  works	  for	  matters	  which	  benefit	  from	  a	  
degree	  of	  specialist	  understanding	  to	  be	  presented	  in	  a	  frustratingly	  limited	  form.	  In	  
particular	  descriptions	  of	  battles	  and	  military	  matters	  are	  often	  reduced	  to	  basic	  lists	  
of	   numbers,	   with	   forces	   divided	   simply	   into	   infantry	   and	   cavalry.	   This	   makes	  
understanding	   the	   way	   in	   which	   Philip	   effected	   change	   to	   Macedon’s	   military	  
difficult.	  
	  
It	   is	   thus	   to	   this	  basic	   framework	   that	  greater	  detail	   can	  be	  added	  by	  other	  
references,	  usually	  fragmentary	  or	  passing,	  taken	  from	  works	  whose	  primary	  focus	  is	  
elsewhere.	  This	  has	  the	  benefit	  at	  times	  of	  bringing	  specialist	  knowledge	  or	  detailed	  
focus	   to	   a	  matter	   that	  would	  otherwise	   remain	   at	   a	   frustrating	   distance.	   Thus	   the	  
section	   in	   Athenaeus’	   Deipnosophistae	   that	   discusses	   Greek	   and	   Macedonian	  
attitudes	  to	  wives	  and	  mistresses	  provides	  crucial	   insight	  into	  the	  matter	  of	  Philip’s	  
polygamous	   marriages,	   and	   the	   context	   in	   which	   they	   were	   made.	   However,	   the	  
potential	  result	  of	  such	  material’s	  alternative	  focus	  can	  be	  that	  only	  details	  relevant	  
to	  the	  individual’s	  work	  are	  mentioned.	  As	  has	  already	  been	  mentioned,	  the	  case	  of	  






negatives	  of	   this	  situation.	   Information	  that	   is	  otherwise	  be	  unknown	   is	  presented,	  
but	  its	  very	  uniqueness	  raises	  questions	  about	  its	  reliability	  and	  the	  general	  reliability	  
of	  the	  source	  that	  provides	  it.	  	  
	  
Thus	  all	  the	  available	  material	  can	  be	  seen	  to	  potentially	  bring	  answers	  whilst	  
inevitably	  creating	  further	  questions.	  Such	  situations	  vary	  in	  each	  circumstance,	  and	  

















As	   has	   already	   been	   mentioned,	   very	   little	   source	   material	   survives	  
concerning	   the	   nature	   of	   Macedon’s	   armies	   before	   or	   during	   Philip’s	   reign.	   The	  
purpose	   of	   this	   chapter	   is	   thus	   to	   investigate	   firstly	   the	   state	   of	   the	  Macedonian	  
military	  in	  359,	  and	  secondly,	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  changes	  that	  Philip	  was	  responsible	  
for	  making	  during	  his	  reign.	  	  
	  
In	   doing	   so	   this	   chapter	   will	   firstly	   consider	   the	   immediate	   historical	  
background	   to	   Philip’s	   accession.	   The	   Macedonian	   state	   was	   frequently	   on	   the	  
defensive	  in	  the	  first	  half	  of	  the	  fourth	  century,	  with	  foreign	  incursions	  and	  internal	  
chaos	  causing	  constant	  problems.	   It	   is	  against	  this	  overview	  that	  the	  circumstances	  
Philip	   was	   forced	   to	   deal	   with	   upon	   acceding	   in	   359	   will	   be	   examined.	   Philip’s	  
becoming	   king	   was	   the	   result	   of	   the	   death	   of	   his	   predecessor	   in	   battle	   with	   an	  
invading	   Illyrian	   army.	   In	   addition	   to	   this	   threat	   Philip	   was	   faced	   with	   raids	   from	  
Paeonian	  and	  two	  pretenders	  to	  his	  throne,	  backed	  separately	  by	  the	  Athenians	  and	  
the	   Thracians.	   Discerning	   how	   great	   a	   danger	   each	   of	   these	   threats	   really	   posed	  
should	   indicate	   the	   capabilities	   of	   the	  Macedonian	  military	   at	   the	   start	   of	   Philip’s	  
reign.	  
	  
Having	  attempted	  to	  gain	  some	  insight	  into	  the	  capacity	  of	  Macedon’s	  forces	  
(or	   lack	   thereof)	  at	   the	   start	  of	  Philip’s	   reign,	   the	   focus	  will	   shift	   to	   the	  alterations	  
that	  occurred	  during	  the	  remainder	  of	  it.	  This	  will	  firstly	  comprise	  an	  examination	  of	  
the	  change	  in	  the	  millitary’s	  size.	  Descriptions	  of	  the	  army	  Philip	  led	  in	  359	  and	  that	  
which	  Alexander	  took	  to	  Asia	  in	  334	  suggest	  a	  vast	  increase	  in	  scale.	  Exactly	  how	  fair	  
an	   impression	   this	   is	  will	   be	  assessed.	   The	  brief	   surviving	   references	   to	   the	  army’s	  
levels	  of	  organisation,	  training	  and	  general	  professionalism	  will	  also	  be	  examined,	  as	  





innovation,	   the	   sarissa.	   Almost	   all	   descriptions	   of	   this	   weapon	   and	   its	   use	   by	  
Macedonian	   forces	   come	   from	   the	   reign	   of	   Alexander.	   The	   fundamental	   way	   in	  
which	   his	   armies	   were	   based	   around	   its	   use	   would	   suggest	   it	   was	   not	   newly	  
introduced	  during	  his	  reign.	  Instead,	  it	  would	  seem	  more	  likely	  that	  its	  employment	  
began	  and	  was	  perfected	  during	  Philip’s	  reign,	  something	  that	  is	  hinted	  at	  by	  the	  few	  
tentative	  references	  to	  sarissas	  at	  this	  time.	  
	  
The	   questions	   this	   chapter	   will	   discuss	   are	   thus	   firstly,	   the	   true	   extent	   of	  
Philip’s	  achievement	  in	  seeing	  off	  the	  threats	  he	  faced	  at	  the	  start	  of	  his	  reign,	  and	  
secondly,	   the	   scale	   of	   his	   influence	   on	   and	   changes	   to	   the	   Macedonian	   army.	  
Although	  conclusions	  to	  these	  questions	  will	  be	  reached,	  the	  issue	  of	  whether	  or	  not,	  
given	  the	  nature	  and	  quantity	  of	  the	  surviving	  evidence,	  such	  judgements	  have	  any	  





II.	  The	  Historical	  Context	  
	  
Before	  investigating	  the	  challenges	  that	  faced	  Philip	  upon	  his	  accession,	  one	  
should	  examine	   the	  period	   immediately	  preceding	  359.	  Understanding	   the	  context	  
of	   the	   threats	   he	   faced	   upon	   becoming	   king	   should	   help	   greatly	   in	   judging	   their	  
severity,	  and	  thus	  the	  extent	  of	  Philip’s	  achievement	  in	  dealing	  with	  them.	  
	  
The	  fourth	  century	  opened	  in	  Macedon	  with	  the	  death	  of	  a	  king,	  Archelaus,	  in	  
399.	   The	   security	   and	   relative	   stability	   that	   his	   long	   reign	   had	   offered	   swiftly	  
descended	   into	   dynastic	   turmoil,	   as	   five	   kings	   ruled	   and	   were	   overthrown	   in	   the	  
following	  six	  years.38	  The	  last	  was	  Amyntas	  III,	  whose	  reign,	  although	  lengthy	  (393/2-­‐
370/69)	  did	  not	  see	  a	  return	  to	  the	  stability	  of	  Archelaus’.	  Soon	  after	  his	  accession	  a	  
series	   of	   incursions	   by	   the	   Illyrians	   began	   under	   their	   king	   Bardylis.	   Amyntas	   was	  
driven	  from	  his	  throne	  and	  only	  restored	  with	  Thessalian	  aid.39	  He	  was	  ousted	  again	  
in	   383/2	   by	   a	   pretender,	   Argeus,	   and	   only	   returned	   after	   two	   years	   with	   the	  
assistance	  of	   the	  Olynthians,	   leaders	  of	   the	  Chalcidian	  League	   to	   the	   south.40	   Such	  
support	  came	  at	  a	  price	  however;	  control	  of	  much	  of	  Lower	  Macedon,	  including	  the	  
capital	  Pella,	  was	  granted	  to	  the	  League.	  When	  Amyntas	  sought	  it	  back,	  conflict	  was	  
inevitable.	   Although	   he	   had	   no	   doubt	   strengthened	   his	   position,	   Amyntas	   was	  
outclassed.	  He	  only	  survived	  thanks	  to	  the	  Spartans	  who,	  concerned	  at	  the	  growth	  of	  
Olynthian	  power,	  invaded	  Chalcidice	  in	  382	  and	  after	  capturing	  Olynthus	  three	  years	  
later,	  dissolved	  the	  League.41	  Unable	  to	  challenge	  the	  power	  of	  Pherae	  that	  arose	  in	  
Thessaly	   in	   the	   League’s	   place,	   Amyntas	   allied	   with	   Athens	   against	   it.	   Although	  
Athens	  initially	  sought	  to	  re-­‐establish	  its	  Aegean	  empire,	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  370s	   its	  
attention	   was	   focused	   on	   western	   Greece,	   and	   Amyntas	   was	   forced	   to	   ally	   with	  
Pherae’s	  ruler,	  Jason,	  in	  371/0.42	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Within	   a	   year	   both	   men	   were	   dead,	   and	   Amyntas	   was	   succeeded	   by	  
Alexander	   II	   (370/69	  –	  368/7).	  The	  new	  king	   immediately	   faced	  multiple	   threats	   to	  
his	   rule;	   to	   prevent	   internal	   uprisings	   he	   exiled	   various	   opponents,	   including	  
Amyntas’	   former	   advisor,	   Ptolemy	   ‘The	  Alorite’.43	   To	   avoid	   further	   Illyrian	   invasion	  
he	   was	   forced	   to	   pay	   extensively	   and	   surrender	   hostages,	   including	   his	   younger	  
brother,	  Philip.44	  Faced	  with	  renewed	  Pherean	  pressure,	  Alexander	  attempted	  to	  go	  
on	   the	   offensive	   by	   supporting	   the	   city	   of	   Larissa	   in	   its	   struggle	   with	   Pherae	   for	  
control	  of	  the	  Thessalian	  League.	  The	  move	  was	  misjudged	  however;	  not	  only	  did	  he	  
swiftly	   lose	   control	   of	   the	   two	   cities	   he	   captured	   due	   to	   insufficient	   military	  
strength,45	   Ptolemy	   seized	   the	   chance	   to	   return	   to	   Macedon	   in	   his	   absence.	   The	  
arrival	  of	  a	  Theban	  army,	  sent	  by	  Pherae’s	  allies	  in	  the	  Boeotian	  League,	  ended	  any	  
Macedonian	  hopes	  of	  expansion	  in	  Thessaly.	  Instead,	  Alexander	  fell	  into	  conflict	  with	  
Ptolemy,	   and	   was	   forced	   to	   rely	   on	   the	   Theban	   general,	   Pelopidas,	   to	   retain	   his	  
throne.	   This	   cost	   him	   dearly,	   as	   Pelopidas	   recalled	   the	   opponents	   Alexander	   had	  
exiled	   and	   took	   hostages	   to	   Thebes,	   including	   Philip,	   only	   recently	   returned	   from	  
Illyria.46	  Alexander	  did	  not	   suffer	   the	  humiliation	  of	   ruling	  as	  a	  Theban	  satellite	   for	  
long;	  in	  the	  summer	  of	  368	  he	  was	  assassinated,	  and	  Ptolemy	  assumed	  the	  throne	  as	  
regent	  for	  Alexander’s	  younger	  brother	  Perdiccas.47	  
	  
The	   confusion	   that	   surrounded	   the	   succession	   was	   exploited	   by	   Olynthus	  
who,	  following	  Sparta’s	  defeat	  to	  Thebes	  at	  the	  Battle	  of	  Leuctra	  in	  371,	  had	  begun	  
rebuilding	   the	  Chalcidian	   League.	  Having	  already	   fought	  with	  Athens	   for	   control	  of	  
Amphipolis,	   the	   Olynthians	   attempted	   to	   push	   into	  Macedon,	   and	   supported	   one	  
Pausanias	  against	  Ptolemy.	  The	   latter	  was	   forced	  to	  ally	  with	  Athens	  once	  more	  to	  
expel	  the	  pretender,48	  but	  this	  caused	  Pelopidas	  to	  return,	  take	  further	  hostages	  and	  
install	   a	   garrison	  at	  Pella.49	   Secure,	   though	  hardly	   independent,	  Ptolemy	   sought	   to	  
bring	   Amphipolis	   back	   under	  Macedonian	   control.	   An	   attempted	   alliance	  with	   the	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city	  fell	  through	  however,	  and	  only	  succeeded	  in	  alienating	  Athens.50	  Shortly	  after,	  in	  
365,	   Ptolemy	   was	   assassinated	   by	   Perdiccas,	   for	   whom	   he	   was	   regent,	   having	  
refused	  to	  surrender	  the	  throne.51	  
	  
Perdiccas	   III	   (365/4-­‐360/59)	  quickly	  worked	  to	  secure	  his	  position	  by	  allying	  
again	  with	  Athens52	  against	  the	  Chalcidian	  League,	  to	  whom	  Amphipolis	  had	  turned	  
when	   Ptolemy’s	   efforts	   had	   failed	   to	   provide	   an	   alliance.	   However,	   when	   Athens	  
closed	  on	  Amphipolis	  once	  more,	   the	  city	  offered	   itself	   to	  Perdiccas,	  who	  took	   the	  
opportunity	  and	  installed	  a	  garrison.53	  Athens	  promptly	  turned	  on	  him	  and	  captured	  
a	  series	  of	  cities	  along	  the	  Macedonian	  coast.54	  Perdiccas	  managed	  to	  maintain	  his	  
throne,	  and	  significantly	  kept	  control	  of	  Amphipolis.	  However,	  the	   Illyrian	  threat	  to	  
the	  north	  had	  grown	  once	  more,	  and	  359	  brought	  invasion:	  
	  
“[Perdiccas]	  was	  defeated	  in	  a	  great	  battle	  by	  the	  Illyrians	  and	  fell	  in	  action…Philip,	  
his	   brother,	  who	  had	  escaped	   from	  his	   detention	   as	   a	   hostage,	   succeeded	   to	   the	  
kingdom…The	  Macedonians	  had	   lost	  more	   than	   four	   thousand	  men	   in	   the	  battle,	  
and	   the	   remainder,	   panic-­‐stricken,	   had	   become	   exceedingly	   afraid	   of	   the	   Illyrian	  
armies	  and	  lost	  heart	  for	  continuing	  the	  war.”55	  
	  
Modern	   scholars	   have	   generally	   agreed	   “the	   potential	   merits	   of	   the	  
Macedonian	   kingdom	   were	   not	   realised”56	   during	   the	   forty	   years	   leading	   up	   to	  
Philip’s	  accession.	  As	  one	  historian	  put	  it:	  
	  
“In	   the	   opening	   chapters	   of	   his	   history	   Thucydides	   defined	   the	   obstacles	   which	  
prevent	   the	   growth	   of	   any	   significant	   degree	   of	   power:	   unsettled	   population,	  
political	  instability,	  lack	  of	  capital	  resources,	  and	  limited	  range.	  In	  399-­‐359	  Macedon	  
failed	  to	  surmount	  these	  obstacles.”57	  
	  
The	  period	  was	  characterised	  by	  frequent	  internal	  strife.58	  Ten	  kings	  reigned	  in	  forty	  
years,	   and	   each	   one’s	   death	   plunged	   the	   country	   into	   disorder	   that	   Macedon’s	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neighbours	  were	  quick	  to	  exploit.	  The	  frequent	   incursions	  by	  Athenians,	  Boeotians,	  
Chalcidians,	   Illyrians	   and	   Spartans	   kept	   Macedon	   in	   an	   ongoing	   state	   of	   financial	  
weakness.	   Alexander	   II	   coined	   only	   in	   bronze,	   and	   Perdiccas	   III,	   though	   initially	   in	  
silver,	  later	  the	  same.59	  	  Bardylis’	  expansion	  however,	  brought	  him	  “the	  silver	  mines	  
at	  Damastium,”60	  whilst	  Amphipolis	  and	  the	  cities	  of	  the	  Chalcidian	  League	  regularly	  
minted	  silver	  coins,	  and	  occasionally	  gold.61	  This	  prevented	  successive	  Macedonian	  
kings	  from	  assembling	  any	  strong	  military	  forces,	  a	  challenge	  that	  was	  made	  harder	  
by	   the	   lack	   of	   a	   centralised	   populace	   –	   “the	   peoples	   of	   Upper	   Macedonia	   were	  
mainly	  nomadic	  pastoralists,	  and	  the	  cities	  of	  Lower	  Macedonia	  were	  still	  at	  an	  early	  
age	  of	  development.”62	  The	  result	  was	  its	  kings	  being	  concerned	  almost	  entirely	  with	  
keeping	  foreign	  powers	  at	  bay,	  and	  only	  being	  able	  to	  do	  so	  through	  alliances	  with	  
stronger	  forces	  who	  were	  interested	  in	  using	  Macedon	  to	  achieve	  their	  own	  regional	  
interests.	  Whenever	   a	   king	   attempted	   to	   exploit	   rivals’	   attention	   being	   elsewhere,	  
there	  was	  always	  another	  power	   to	  not	  only	  curtail	   their	  ambitions,	  but	   to	   reduce	  
their	   power	   even	   further.	   Each	   time	   Macedon	   seemingly	   became	   ever	   more	   a	  
satellite	  to	  whichever	  force	  was	  dominant	  at	  the	  time	  and	  the	  likelihood	  of	  a	   lapse	  
back	   into	   internal	   chaos	   grew.	   Philip	   therefore	   acceded	   in	   359	   to	   a	   world	   where	  
security	   came	   at	   the	   price	   of	   dependence,	   lasted	   only	   as	   long	   as	   one’s	   allies’	  
attention	   was	   not	   elsewhere,	   and	   to	   which,	   thanks	   to	   a	   lack	   of	   strong	   domestic	  
military	  forces,	  there	  was	  no	  apparent	  alternative.	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Having	  gained	  an	  idea	  of	  Macedon’s	  internal	  stability	  (or	  rather	  the	  lack	  of	  it)	  
in	   the	   period	   leading	   up	   to	   Philip’s	   accession,	   one	  must	   now	   look	   at	   the	  multiple	  
external	   threats	   that	   assailed	   Macedon	   following	   the	   major	   military	   defeat	   that	  
brought	  about	  Philip’s	  accession	  in	  359	  BC.	  According	  to	  Diodorus,	  
	  
“The	  Macedonians	  had	  lost	  more	  than	  four	  thousand	  men	  in	  the	  battle,	  and	  the	  remainder,	  
panic-­‐stricken,	   had	   become	   exceedingly	   afraid	   of	   the	   Illyrian	   armies	   and	   lost	   heart	   for	  
continuing	  the	  war.	  About	  the	  same	  time	  the	  Paeonians,	  who	  lived	  near	  Macedonia,	  began	  
to	  pillage	  their	  territory,	  showing	  contempt	  for	  the	  Macedonians,	  and	  the	  Illyrians	  began	  to	  
assemble	  large	  armies	  and	  prepare	  for	  an	  invasion	  of	  Macedonia,	  while	  a	  certain	  Pausanias,	  
who	  was	   related	   to	   the	   royal	   line	  of	  Macedon,	  was	  planning	  with	   the	  aid	  of	   the	  Thracian	  
king	   to	   join	   the	   contest	   for	   the	   throne	   of	   Macedon.	   Similarly,	   the	   Athenians	   too,	   being	  
hostile	   to	  Philip,	  were	  endeavouring	  to	  restore	  Argaeus	  to	   the	  throne	  and	  had	  dispatched	  
Mantias	  as	  general	  with	  three	  thousand	  hoplites	  and	  a	  considerable	  naval	  force.”63	  
	  
Philip	   thus	   faced	   four	   separate	   threats:	   the	   Illyrians,	   led	   by	   Bardylis,	   from	   the	  
northwest;	   the	   Paeonians	   from	   the	   north;	   the	   Thracians	   from	   the	   east	   and	   the	  
Athenians	  from	  the	  south.	  Diodorus’	  conclusion	  was	  that	  “the	  Macedonians,	  because	  
of	   the	   disaster	   sustained	   in	   the	   battle	   and	   the	  magnitude	   of	   the	   dangers	   pressing	  
upon	   them,	   were	   in	   the	   greatest	   perplexity,”	   and	   most	   modern	   scholars	   have	  
concurred.	   As	   A.	   B.	   Bosworth	   put	   it,	   “Philip	   came	   to	   power…when	  Macedon	   was	  
threatened	  by	  dissolution,	  debilitated	  by	  a	  decade	  of	  dynastic	  feuding	  and	  crippled	  
by	  military	   defeat	   at	   the	   hands	   of	   the	   Illyrians.”64	   In	   this	   he	   is	   joined	   by,	   amongst	  
others,	  G.	  T.	  Griffith	  –	  “Philip’s	  future	  looked	  nearly	  hopeless”	  –	  J.	  R.	  Ellis	  –	  “Seldom	  
can	   any	   state	   have	   so	   nearly	   approached	   total	   dismemberment	   without	   utterly	  
disintegrating”	  –	  and	  N.	  G.	  L.	  Hammond	  –	  “the	  collapse	  of	  the	  Macedonian	  kingdom	  
seemed	  to	  be	  almost	  inevitable.”65	  However,	  within	  a	  year	  of	  becoming	  king,	  Philip	  
had	  apparently	  rebuilt	  the	  supposedly	  shattered	  Macedonian	  army	  and	  seen	  off	  all	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the	  threats.66	  Practically	  a	  miracle	  it	  would	  seem,	  but	  the	  question	  inevitably	  arises	  
of	   whether	   the	   Illyrians,	   Paeonians,	   Athenians	   and	   Thracians	   really	   posed	   such	  
severe	   threats	   to	   Macedon.	   Discerning	   this	   is	   best	   done	   by	   individually	   assessing	  
each	  menace,	  and	  the	  way	  in	  which	  it	  was	  dealt	  with.	  
	  
(ii)	  The	  Athenian	  Threat	  
	  
The	   pretender	   to	   the	   Macedonian	   throne,	   Argaeus,	   had	   most	   likely	   reigned	  
briefly	  as	  a	  puppet	  king	  in	  the	  380s.67	  His	  return	  was	  backed	  by	  3,000	  hoplites	  led	  by	  
the	  Athenian	  general	  Mantias.68	  This	  was	  clearly	  a	  force	  to	  be	  respected;	  Macedon	  
may	   have	   been	   able	   to	   see	   4,000	   fall	   against	   the	   Illyrians,	   but	   not	   without	   the	  
remainder	  of	  the	  army	  becoming	  “panic-­‐stricken,	  …	  exceedingly	  afraid	  of	  the	  Illyrian	  
armies	   and	   [losing]	   heart	   for	   continuing	   the	   war.”69	   However,	   as	   has	   been	   seen	  
above,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  Athenian	  interest	  was	  in	  the	  coastal	  city	  of	  Amphipolis.70	  Since	  
it	   had	   revolted	   from	   Athenian	   rule	   in	   424,	   the	   city	   had	   resisted	   all	   attempts	   to	  
remove	  its	  independence.	  Although	  Amyntas	  III	  had	  recognised	  Athens’	  claim	  to	  it	  in	  
371,71	   Perdiccas	   III	   had	   more	   recently	   sided	   with	   Amphipolis	   against	   Athens.72	  
Significantly,	   Philip	   withdrew	   the	   garrison	   Perdiccas	   had	   placed	   in	   the	   city	   almost	  
immediately	  after	  acceding	  to	  the	  throne:	  
	  
“…when	   [Philip]	   observed	   that	   the	   Athenians	   were	   centring	   all	   their	   ambition	   upon	  
recovering	  Amphipolis	  and	  for	  this	  reason	  were	  trying	  to	  bring	  Argaeus	  back	  to	  the	  throne,	  
he	  voluntarily	  withdrew	  from	  the	  city,	  after	  first	  making	  it	  autonomous.”73	  
	  
This	   was	   clearly	   a	   move	   intended	   to	   remove	   Athenian	   motivation	   for	   supporting	  
Argaeus,74	  and	  one	  that	  may	  have	  worked;	  the	  Athenian	  general	  Mantias	  is	  reported	  
as	   staying	   at	   Methone,	   leaving	   the	   pretender	   to	   approach	   Aegae	   with	   his	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“mercenaries”	   (μισθόφοροι).	   The	   absence	   of	   the	   word	   ‘hoplites’	   (ὁπλίται)	   which	  
Mantias’	  troops	  had	  previously	  been	  referred	  to	  as,	  is	  noticeable,	  and	  may	  well	  have	  
been	  deliberate.	  It	  could	  well	  mean	  that	  Mantias	  had	  been	  ordered	  to	  refrain	  from	  
engaging	  his	  troops,	  and	  they	  remained	  at	  Methone	  with	  him:75	  
	  
“Mantias,	  the	  Athenian	  general,	  who	  had	  sailed	  into	  Methone,	  stayed	  behind	  there	  himself	  
but	   sent	   Argaeus	   with	   his	   mercenaries	   to	   Aegae.	   And	   Argaeus	   approached	   the	   city	   and	  
invited	  the	  population	  of	  Aegae	  to	  welcome	  his	  return	  and	  become	  the	  founders	  of	  his	  own	  
kingship.”76	  
	  
However,	  Demosthenes’	  speech	  Against	  Aristocrates	  suggests	  otherwise:	  
	  
“Take	  Philip,	  who	  is	  now	  accounted	  our	  very	  worst	  enemy.	  At	  the	  time	  when,	  having	  caught	  
some	  of	   our	   citizens	   in	   the	   act	   of	   trying	   to	   restore	  Argaeus,	   he	   released	   them	  and	  made	  
good	  all	  their	  losses,	  when	  he	  professed	  in	  a	  written	  message	  that	  he	  was	  ready	  to	  form	  an	  
alliance	  with	  us,	  and	  to	  renew	  his	  ancestral	  amity.”77	  
	  
If	  the	  men	  captured	  by	  Philip	  were	  citizens,	  they	  would	  have	  to	  have	  been	  Mantias’	  
hoplites	   rather	   than	   hired,	   non-­‐citizen	   mercenaries.	   Demosthenes’	   speech	   was	  
delivered	  only	  seven	  years	   later,	   in	  352,	  so	   for	  him	  to	  have	  made	  a	  mistake	  would	  
seem	  unlikely.	  However,	  the	  apparent	  ease	  with	  which	  3,000	  men	  were	  defeated	  by	  
Philip	  does	  not	  suggest	  their	  being	  all	  experienced,	  well-­‐armed	  hoplites:	  
	  
“When	   no-­‐one	   paid	   any	   attention,	   [Argaeus]	   turned	   back	   to	   Methone,	   but	   Philip,	   who	  
suddenly	  appeared	  with	  his	  soldiers,	  engaged	  him	  in	  battle,	  slew	  many	  of	  his	  mercenaries,	  
and	  released	  under	  a	  truce	  the	  rest,	  who	  had	  fled	  for	  refuge	  to	  a	  certain	  hill,	  after	  he	  had	  
first	  obtained	  from	  these	  the	  exiles,	  whom	  they	  delivered	  to	  him.”78	  
	  
As	   a	   result	   one	   should	   consider	   the	   possibility	   that	   the	   description	   of	   the	  men	   as	  
citizens	   was	   deliberately	   chosen	   by	   Demosthenes,	   despite	   being	   inaccurate,	   for	  
greater	   impact	   on	   his	   audience.	   The	   alternative	   possibility	   is	   that	   the	   total	   force	  
comprised	  a	  mix	  of	  hoplites	  and	  less	  experienced,	  non-­‐Athenian	  mercenaries.	  Such	  a	  
situation	  would	  suggest	  that	  Philip’s	  withdrawal	  from	  Amphipolis	  had	  no	  impact	  on	  
Athenian	  policy.	  As	  a	  result,	  Mantias’	  absence	  would	  presumably	  have	  been	  down	  to	  
reasons	  that	  go	  unrecorded,	  but	  which	  were	  not	  a	  result	  of	  instructions	  from	  Athens.	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Ultimately,	  the	  matter	  delivers	  the	  same	  conclusion.	  If	  Athenian	  citizen	  forces	  
were	   involved	   in	   the	  battle	   the	  ease	  with	  which	   they	  were	  defeated	   suggests	   that	  
they	  were	  not	  a	  serious	  threat	  to	  Philip.	  If	  they	  were	  not	  involved,	  Athens	  must	  have	  
been	   persuaded	   to	   decline	   further	   active	   involvement	   with	   Argeaus	   simply	   by	  
Philip’s	   withdrawal	   from	   Amphipolis.	   If	   the	   latter	   were	   the	   case	   Athens	   was	  
presumably	  not	  that	  interested	  in	  seriously	  invading	  Macedon.	  
	  
(iii)	  The	  Paeonian	  Threat	  
	  
“[Philip]	   sent	   an	   embassy	   to	   the	   Paeonians,	   and	   by	   corrupting	   some	   with	   gifts	   and	  
persuading	   others	   by	   generous	   promises	   he	   made	   an	   agreement	   with	   them	   to	   maintain	  
peace	  for	  the	  present.”79	  
	  
So	  says	  Diodorus.	  G.	  T.	  Griffith	  has	  argued	  that	  Philip	  cannot	  have	  possessed	  the	  
financial	   reserves	  necessary	  to	  affect	  such	  bribery.80	  Such	  an	   idea	  has	  considerable	  
merit.	  Much	  has	  been	  made,	   as	  will	   be	   seen	  below,81	   of	   Polyaenus’	   description	  of	  
Philip’s	  military	  reforms,	  which	  notably	  does	  not	   include	  the	  breastplate	   in	  a	   list	  of	  
infantry	  armour:	  
	  
“[Philip]	  made	  them	  take	  up	  their	  arms	  an	  march	  often	  300	  stades	  carrying	  helmet,	  shield,	  
greaves,	   sarissa	   and	   in	   addition	   to	   their	   arms	   rations	   and	   all	   gear	   for	   day-­‐to-­‐day	  
existence.”82	  
	  
This	   absence	   has	   commonly	   been	   put	   down	   by	   modern	   scholars	   to	   financial	  
restrictions	  at	  the	  start	  of	  Philip’s	  reign.83	  However,	  Diodorus	  previously	  notes	  that	  
Philip	  “equipped	  the	  men	  appropriately	  with	  weapons	  of	  war”	  before	  training	  them	  
extensively.84	  	  This	  apparently	  says	  much	  for	  the	  presumably	  poor	  state	  his	  army	  was	  
in,	  but	  also	  suggests	  that	  Philip’s	  coffers	  were	  not	  entirely	  empty.	  In	  addition,	  it	  has	  
                                         
79	  Diod.	  16.3.4.	  The	  king	  referred	  to	  is	  the	  Thracian	  Cotys,	  whose	  death	  soon	  after	  Philip’s	  accession	  is	  attested	  by	  
Ath.	  6.248e	  and	  Theop.	  FGrH	  n.	  115	  F31.	  
80	  Griffith	  1979,	  210.	  estimates	  that	  “at	  least	  100	  to	  200	  talents	  apiece”	  would	  have	  been	  required	  to	  satisfy	  the	  
Thracian	  and	  Paeonian	  kings.	   It	  does	  not	   seem	  an	  unreasonable	   figure,	  but	   there	   is	   little	   to	  go	  on	   to	   judge	   its	  
accuracy.	  
81	  See	  Section	  III.	  
82	  Polyaen.	  4.2.10.	  
83	  See	  esp.	  Griffith	  1979,	  421f	  on	  the	  matter.	  





been	   argued	   that	   the	   absence	   of	   breastplates	  was	   by	   no	  means	   uncommon.	   J.	   K.	  
Anderson	  has	   suggested	   that	   the	   later	   fifth	   century	   saw	  a	  move	   towards	  a	   lighter,	  
less	  tough	  hoplite	  cuirass	  or	  breastplate,	  and	  by	  the	  fourth	  many	  soldiers	  apparently	  
wore	  none	  at	  all.85	  	  
	  
Having	   said	   that,	   it	   is	   probable	   that	   Philip	   had	   little	   money	   available	   for	  
bribery	   given	  Macedon’s	   recent	   history.	   His	   predecessors	   had	   paid	   tribute	   to	   the	  
Illyrians	   since	   the	   390s86	   and	   it	   was	   not	   until	   356	   that	   Philip	   relieved	   the	   city	   of	  
Crenides	   from	   Thracian	   siege	   and	   gained	   the	   1,000	   talents	   a	   year	   in	   gold	   that	   its	  
mines	   provided.87	   Similarly,	   he	   did	   not	   gain	   access	   to	   the	   silver	   mines	   of	   Mt	  
Pangaeum	  until	  late	  in	  the	  same	  year.88	  Coin	  hoards	  suggest	  that	  it	  was	  not	  until	  356	  
that	  Philip	  coined	  gold	  and	  silver,	  presumably	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  above	  acquisitions.89	  
	  
Based	  on	  this	  it	  would	  seem	  safe	  to	  assume	  that	  Philip	  was	  short	  of	  money	  in	  
359.	   However,	   there	   remains	   the	   question	   of	   how	  much	   bribing	   the	   Paeonians	   to	  
prevent	   invasion	   would	   cost.	   To	   this	   there	   is	   simply	   no	   answer	   as	   a	   serious	  
estimation	   of	  what	   the	   Paeonian	   king	  would	   demand	   cannot	   be	  made.	   There	   is	   a	  
near	   total	   absence	   of	   information	   concerning	   Paeonian	   history	   and	   infrastructure.	  
Indeed,	  nothing	  survives	  from	  the	  period	  of	  the	  Peloponnesian	  war	  to	  c.	  360.	  Even	  
thereafter,	  the	  only	  point	  worth	  nothing	  is	  that	  following	  Philip’s	  successful	  invasion	  
in	  358,	  the	  new	  Paeonian	  king,	  Lycceus,90	  was	  able	  to	  return	  to	  minting	  his	  own	  coins	  
almost	  immediately.91	  This	  could	  be	  taken	  indicate	  that	  the	  level	  of	  organisation	  that	  
existed	  was	  enough	  to	  prevent	  a	  crisis-­‐like	  defeat	  to	  Philip	  causing	  a	  lurch	  into	  tribal	  
disunity,	  but	  little	  more.	  
	  
                                         
85	  Anderson	  1970,	  25f.	  Cf.	  Griffith	  1979,	  422f.	  
86	  Diod.	  16.2.2.	  
87	  Diod.	  16.8.6.	  
88	  The	  exact	  timing	  is	  uncertain	  as	  Diod.	  16.3.7	  mentions	  Philip’s	  renaming	  the	  city	  of	  Crenides	  as	  Philippi	  in	  the	  
context	  of	  360/59,	  and	  16.8.6	  does	  so	  in	  358/7.	  However,	  see	  Hammond	  1994,	  199	  n.	  21.	  
89	  Coins:	  Head	  1979,	  13.	  
90	   A	   coin	   from	   his	   name	   features	   the	   name	   ‘ΛΥΚΚΕΙΟΥ’	   but	   an	   inscription	   from	   the	   same	   period	   spells	   it	  
‘ΛΥΚΠΕΙΟΣ’	  GHI	  ii.	  157.	  





One	  can	  only	  say	  then	  that	  it	  would	  be	  extremely	  surprising	  if	  Philip	  had	  more	  or	  
even	  the	  same	  amount	  to	  offer	  the	  Paeonians	  than	  they	  could	  gain	  from	  raiding	  and	  
invasion.	   Consequently,	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   Paeonians	   were	   dissuaded	   from	   further	  
attacks	  to	  those	  mentioned	  by	  Diodorus92	  raises	  the	  question	  of	  their	  motivation	  and	  
capacity	   to	   make	   further	   inroads	   into	   Macedon.	   In	   358,	   not	   long	   after	   making	  
arrangements	  with	  Philip,	  the	  Paeonian	  king	  Agis	  died:	  
	  
“Now	  that	  [Philip]	  was	  relieved	  of	  the	  war	  with	  the	  Athenians	  and	  had	  information	  that	  the	  
king	  of	  the	  Paeonians,	  Agis,	  was	  dead,	  he	  conceived	  that	  he	  had	  the	  opportunity	  to	  attack	  
the	  Paeonians.	  Accordingly,	  having	  conducted	  an	  expedition	  into	  Paeonia	  and	  defeated	  the	  
barbarians	   in	   a	   battle,	   he	   compelled	   the	   tribe	   to	   acknowledge	   allegiance	   to	   the	  
Macedonians.”93	  
	  
For	  the	  Paeonians	  to	  be	  defeated	  so	  simply	  by	  an	  army	  still	  feeling	  the	  impact	  of	  its	  
defeat	  in	  359	  would	  suggest	  that	  they	  were	  not	  particularly	  well	  organised	  internally	  
and	  their	  forces	  not	  exceptionally	  strong.94	  Diodorus	  mentions	  that	  Paeonian	  cavalry	  
formed	   part	   of	   the	   forces	   that	   were	   taken	   to	   Asia	   by	   Alexander.95	   Given	   their	  
‘specialist’	  nature,	  it	  would	  seem	  fair	  to	  assume	  that	  such	  troops	  were	  picked	  on	  the	  
basis	   of	   exceptional	   ability,96	   but	   the	   cursory	   nature	   of	   Diodorus’	   description	   of	  
Philip’s	  victory	  in	  358	  prevents	  any	  confirmation	  of	  this.	  It	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  upon	  
Perdiccas’	   death	   in	   359,	   the	   Paeonians	   “began	   to	   pillage	   [Macedonian]	   territory,	  
showing	   contempt	   for	   the	   Macedonians”97	   rather	   than	   launching	   a	   more	   serious	  
invasion.	  This	  could	  be	  seen	  to	  indicate	  a	  disinterest	  in	  serious	  expansion;	  it	  is	  even	  
possible	  that	  Agis’	  death	   in	  358	  was	  the	  result	  of	  old	  age	  or	  medical	  complications	  
that	  prevented	  a	  greater	  level	  of	  activity	  the	  year	  before.	  	  
	  
The	   absence	   of	   evidence	   about	   the	   precise	   nature	   of	   Paeonian	   military	  
strength	  and	  concerns	  prevents	  a	  conclusion	  either	  way,	  but	  the	  result	  is	  ultimately	  
the	  same;	  either	  way	  the	  Paeonians	  would	  seemingly	  not	  have	  presented	  a	  serious	  
                                         
92	  Diod.	  16.3.3.	  
93	  Diod.	  16.4.2.	  
94	  Errington	  1990,	  41	  views	  the	  victory	  as	  being	  “conducted	  like	  a	  military	  exercise.”	  
95	  Diod.	  17.17.4.	  
96	  Griffith	  1979,	  213.	  





threat	   to	  Macedon.98	  The	   raids	  would	  have	  undoubtedly	  been	  a	  problem,	  and	  one	  
more	  challenging	  to	  deal	  with	  due	  to	  the	  recent	  setback	  suffered	  by	  the	  Macedonian	  
army.	   It	   was	   to	   prevent	   these	   that	   Philip	   used	   what	   money	   he	   had	   for	   bribes.	  
However,	  bribery	  was	  not	  a	  viable	  long-­‐term	  policy	  and	  with	  the	  spectre	  of	  genuine	  
invasion	   looming	   elsewhere,	   it	   would	   surely	   have	   been	   a	   case	   of	   finding	   the	   best	  
short-­‐term	  solution	  to	  the	  Paeonian	  raiding	  so	  that	  Macedonian	  attention	  could	  be	  
turned	  fully	  to	  the	  more	  serious	  threats	  at	  hand.	  Once	  (if!)	  these	  were	  dealt	  with	  the	  
matter	  of	  the	  Paeonians	  could	  be	  returned	  to.	  Agis	  of	  course	  died	  soon	  afterwards,	  
offering	  the	  chance	  for	  Philip	  to	  deal	  with	  it	  swiftly	  and	  permanently.	  
	  
(iv)	  The	  Thracian	  Threat	  
	  
Diodorus	   states	   that	   upon	   Peridccas’	   death	   the	   Thracians,	   like	   the	   Athenians,	  
supported	   a	   pretender	   to	   the	   Macedonian	   throne.99	   The	   pretender	   was	   one	  
Pausanias,	   almost	   certainly	   the	   same	   man	   who	   had	   tried	   and	   failed	   to	   seize	   the	  
throne	  in	  368	  with	  backing	  from	  the	  Chalcidian	  League.100	  Philip	  
	  
“…prevented	   the	   return	  of	  Pausanias	  by	  winning	  over	  with	  gifts	   the	  king	  who	  was	  on	   the	  
point	  of	  attempting	  [Pausanias’]	  restoration”101	  
	  
The	   king	   in	   question	   is	   most	   likely	   Cotys	   I,	   whose	   assassination	   very	   soon	   after	  
Philip’s	  accession	  is	  attested	  elsewhere.102	  Upon	  his	  death,	  apparently	  at	  the	  hands	  
of	  vengeance-­‐driven	  Greeks,	  Thrace	  was	  divided	  between	  his	  son,	  Cersobleptes,	  and	  
two	  others,	  Amadocus	  and	  Berisades.103	  Whatever	  negotiations	  or	  actions	  took	  place	  
between	   the	   new	   rulers	   and	   Philip	   is	   unknown,	   but	   the	   result	   was	   presumably	   a	  
peace	  agreement	  of	  some	  kind	  between	  Thrace	  and	  Macedon,	  as	  no	  further	  conflict	  
is	  mentioned.	  
	  
                                         
98	  Ellis	  1976,	  57.	  
99	  Diod.	  16.2.6.	  
100	  Aesch.	  2.28f;	  Diod.	  14.89.2.	  
101	  Diod.	  16.3.4.	  
102	  Ath.	  248e;	  Dem.	  23.8,	  183;Theop.	  FGrH	  n.	  115	  F	  31	  (J).	  





This	  would	  suggest	  that	  Thrace	  presented	  no	  real	  threat	  to	  Macedon,	  but	   it	  
must	   be	   remembered	   that	   prior	   to	   359	   the	   kingdom	  was	  one	  of	   considerable	   size	  
and	  strength.	  The	  Odrysian	  Cotys	  apparently	  inherited	  control	  of	  the	  region’s	  other	  
southeastern	  tribes	  between	  the	  Greek	  colony	  of	  Apollonia,	  on	  the	  Black	  Sea	  coast,	  
and	  the	  Chersonese	  around	  c.	  385.104	  By	  359	  he	  had	  expanded	  his	  territory	  up	  to	  the	  
R.	  Hebrus’	   eastern	  bank,	   gained	   control	   of	   the	  entire	   Pontic	   seaboard	   and	  pushed	  
north	  in	  the	  Odessan	  interior.105	  
	  
Described	  by	  one	  historian	  as	  “the	  most	  vigorous,	  skilful	  and	  astute	  of	  fourth-­‐
century	  Odrysian	  rulers,”106	  he	  was	  clearly	  a	  strong	  and	  capable	  monarch,	  and	  one	  
that	   would	   surely	   have	   presented	   a	   serious	   threat	   in	   359.	   However,	   despite	  
presumably	  being	  able	  to	  back	  Pausanias	  with	  considerable	  military	  force,	  Cotys	  was	  
apparently	   dissuaded	   from	   doing	   so	   by	   Macedonian	   bribes.	   Consequently,	   his	  
commitment	   to	   Pausanias’	   cause	   must	   be	   questioned.	   As	   has	   already	   been	  
discussed,	  Macedon’s	  likely	  financial	  state	  means	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  see	  how	  Philip	  could	  
have	  been	  able	   to	  stop	  Paeonian	   raids	  by	  bribery,	  assuming	   the	   latter	  presented	  a	  
genuine	  threat.107	  That	  he	  could	  have	  bought	  off	   the	  considerably	   larger	  and	  more	  
united	  Thracian	  kingdom	  seems	  by	  extension	  impossible.	  In	  such	  circumstances	  one	  
is	   left	   to	   assume	   that	   Cotys	   was	   simply	   not	   very	   interested	   in	   gaining	   control	   of	  
Macedon,	   or	   felt	   doing	   so	   unnecessarily	   difficult.	   His	   untimely	   death	   prevents	   any	  
conclusions	  being	  reached,	  but	  it	  may	  be	  that	  Cotys	  preferred	  to	  take	  whatever	  the	  
Macedonians	  could	  offer	  him	  to	  not	  subject	  them	  to	  raids,	   invasion	  and	  other	  such	  
troubles.	  This	   could	  have	  been	   inspired	  by	  his	  advanced	  age,	  but	  given	  Macedon’s	  
history	   of	   internal	   and	  external	   problems	   throughout	   the	   fourth	   century,	   he	   could	  




                                         
104	  Dem.	  23.129;	  Theop.	  FGrH	  115	  F	  31;	  Nep.	  Iphic.	  2.1	  record	  the	  Athenian	  general	  Iphicrates	  marrying	  Cotys’	  
daughter	  in	  c.	  386,	  suggesting	  he	  was	  either	  king	  already,	  or	  close	  to	  becoming	  so.	  
105	  Dem.	  23.181f;	  school.	  Aesch.	  2.81;	  Str.	  7.	  F	  78.	  	  
106	  Archibald	  1994,	  460.	  





(v)	  The	  Illyrian	  Threat	  
	  
“The	   fears	   of	   what	   might	   have	   come	   from	   Paeonia	   and	   Thrace	   were	   as	  
nothing	   compared	   with	   the	   fear	   of	   what	   the	   Illyrians	   might	   do,”	   wrote	   G.	   T.	  
Griffith.108	   Certainly,	   of	   all	   the	   peoples	   threatening	   Macedon	   in	   359,	   the	   Illyrians	  
were	   unquestionably	   the	   strongest.	   Philip’s	   accession	   was	   a	   direct	   result	   of	   the	  
heavy	   defeat	   they	   had	   inflicted	   on	   his	   predecessor,	   Perdiccas,	   a	   defeat	   that	   saw	  
4,000	   Macedonians	   dead	   alongside	   their	   king.109	   The	   Illyrian	   king,	   Bardylis,	   had	  
previously	   led	  major	   incursions	   into	  Macedon	   on	   several	   occasions,	   notably	   393/2	  
and	   383/2.110	   Perdiccas’	   predecessor,	   Amyntas,	   had	   been	   forced	   to	   abandon	   his	  
kingdom	  on	  both	  occasions.	  In	  light	  of	  this,	  the	  matter	  requiring	  investigation	  is	  why	  
Bardylis	  did	  not	  follow	  up	  his	  victory	  in	  359	  by	  invading	  Macedon	  as	  soon	  as	  possible.	  
	  
One	   should	   immediately	   recognize	   that	   the	   absence	   of	   any	   exploitation	   by	  
the	  Illyrians	  of	  their	  victory	  could	  have	  been	  caused	  by	  internal	  problems	  that	  went	  
unrecorded.	  G.	   T.	  Griffith	   has	   suggested	   Bardylis’	   age	   as	   a	   potential	   factor111	   –	   he	  
had	  been	  king	  for	  over	  forty	  years	  at	  this	  point	  –	  as	  he	  might	  have	  lacked	  the	  drive	  
for	   further	   conflict	   after	   a	   life	   of	   campaigning.	   Given	   that	   he	   led	   the	   Illyrian	   army	  
against	   Philip	   in	   358	  without	   any	   apparent	   difficulty	   however,	   this	   seems	   hard	   to	  
credit.	  
	  
The	   alternative	   is	   that	   he	   was	   somehow	   forestalled.	   No	   record	   exists	   of	   a	  
treaty	   being	   signed	   between	   the	  Macedonians	   and	   Illyrians,	   but	   it	   is	   surely	   to	   be	  
expected	  that	  Philip	  attempted	  to	  negotiate	  following	  the	  disaster	  of	  359.	  However,	  
that	  he	  managed	  to	  draw	  such	  talks	  out	  for	  over	  a	  year	  against	  an	  Illyrian	  force	  eager	  
for	   further	   success	   beggars	   belief,	   especially	   as	   given	   the	   Illyrian	   and	  Macedonian	  
positions,	  the	  former	  could	  essentially	  dictate	  terms	  to	  the	  latter,	  and	  demand	  their	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swift	  acceptance	  or	  face	  invasion.	  For	  Bardylis	  to	  have	  waited	  so	  long,	  one	  of	  three	  
situations	  must	  have	  occurred.	  
	  
Firstly,	  it	  could	  be	  that	  Bardylis	  was	  confident	  enough	  in	  his	  position	  to	  either	  
allow	   himself	   to	   deal	   with	   other	   unrecorded	  matters,	   or	   at	   least	   to	   take	   his	   time	  
deciding	   how	   to	   act	   further	   against	   Macedon.	   As	   we	   have	   seen,	   however,	   no	  
comment	  can	  be	  made	  on	  the	  question	  of	  Illyrian	  domestic	  affairs	  other	  than	  to	  say	  
that	   there	   is	   nothing	   to	   suggest	   that	   any	   such	  matters	   were	   pressing	   on	   Bardylis	  
before	  then.	  
	  
Secondly,	   an	   alliance	   of	   some	   kind	   could	   have	   been	   arranged.	   Philip’s	   first	  
marriage	  occurred	  early	   in	  his	  reign	  and	  was	  to	  one	  Audata,	  an	   Illyrian.112	   It	  seems	  
safe	  to	  presume	  that	  this	  arrangement	  was	  a	  political	  one,	  made	  in	  connection	  with	  
Philip’s	  conflict	  with	  Bardylis.	  One	  assumption	  would	  be	  that	  the	  union	  occurred	  to	  
secure	  the	  treaty	  that	  followed	  Philip’s	  victory	  against	  Bardylis	  in	  358.113	  However,	  J.	  
R.	   Ellis	   has	   suggested	   that	   the	   marriage	   instead	   followed	   Perdiccas’	   defeat	   and	  
formed	  part	  of	  a	  deal	  brokered	  by	  Philip	   in	   its	  aftermath.114	  One	  cannot	  be	  certain	  
either	  way	  given	  the	  vague	  dating,	  but	  there	  is	  no	  inherent	  reason	  why	  this	  could	  not	  
have	  been	  the	  situation.	  	  
	  
One	  might	  ask	  why	  Bardylis	  should	  seek	  such	  an	  arrangement	  only	  to	  return	  
to	  conflict	  so	  soon	  afterwards,	  as	  if	  he	  always	  sought	  the	  latter	  delaying	  brought	  no	  
benefit.	   There	  can	  have	  been	   little	   to	  attract	  Bardylis	   to	   such	  a	  prospect	   if	  he	  was	  
eager	  to	  benefit	  fully	  from	  his	  victory	  over	  Perdiccas.	  He	  had	  yet	  to	  add	  any	  serious	  
booty	  or	   territory	   to	   that	  which	  he	  already	  held,	  and	  as	   things	  stood	  he	  seemingly	  
had	   the	  whole	  of	  Macedon	  open	   to	  him.	  Philip’s	  and	  Bardylis’	  meeting	   in	  battle	   in	  
358	  was	   in	   fact	   triggered	   by	   the	   former’s	   invasion	   of	   the	   latter’s	   territory;	   not,	   as	  
might	  be	  expected,	   the	  other	  way	  around.	   For	  Bardylis	   to	  have	   to	   accepted	   terms	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would	   indicate	   only	   one	   thing;	   that	   he	   was	   disinterested	   in	   further	   territorial	  
advance.	  
	  
Such	   a	   lack	   of	   interest	   in	   further	   acquisition	   of	   territory	   forms	   the	   third	  
possible	  situation;	  that	  even	  if	  the	  marriage	  did	  not	  occur	  until	  after	  Bardylis’	  defeat,	  
the	   king	   was	   not	   interested	   in	   expansion	   into	   Macedon.	   By	   359	   Bardylis	   already	  
effectively	  controlled	  all	  of	   Illyria	  and	  Upper	  Macedonia,	  a	  considerable	  amount	  of	  
territory.	   In	   addition,	   he	   had	   received	   a	   steady	   flow	   of	   tribute	   from	   the	   part	   of	  
Macedon	   that	   remained	   independent	   since	   the	   reign	   of	   Amyntas.115	   When	   Philip	  
advanced	  on	  Bardylis	  in	  358,	  the	  king’s	  initial	  response	  was	  to	  offer	  peace,	  with	  both	  
sides	  retaining	  control	  of	  what	  they	  already	  held.116	  Such	  actions	  are	  surely	  not	  the	  
behaviour	  of	  one	  who	  is	  interested	  in	  expansion,	  especially	  as	  Philip’s	  position	  could	  
not	   have	   improved	   so	   dramatically	   as	   to	   have	   overturned	   Bardylis’	   military	  
advantage.117	  Indeed,	  R.	  M.	  Errington	  has	  interpreted	  the	  Illyrian	  king’s	  response	  as	  
one	  caught	  “wholly	  unprepared”	  by	  a	  disruption	  to	  the	  existing	  arrangements.118	  
	  
It	  would	  seem	  then	  that	  disinterest	   in	  expansion	  was	  the	  most	   likely	  reason	  
for	  there	  being	  no	  Illyrian	  invasion.	  A	  king	  who	  was	  intent	  on	  a	  full-­‐scale	  invasion	  and	  
with	  so	  overwhelmingly	  strong	  a	  position	  as	  Bardylis	  would	  surely	  not	  wait	  so	  long	  to	  
follow	   up	   such	   a	   crushing	   victory	   like	   that	   of	   359,	   even	   if	   other	   business	   were	  
pressing	   him.	   He	   would	   certainly	   not	   make	   offers	   of	   peace	   when	   opposed	   by	   an	  
enemy	  he	  had	  already	  defeated	  once.	  Bardylis	  was	  an	  old	  man	  by	  the	  start	  of	  Philip’s	  
reign,	   in	   control	   of	   considerable	   territory	   and	   receiving	   regular	   tribute	   from	  
Macedon.	  He	  would	  presumably	  have	  expected	  his	  victory	  in	  359	  to	  have	  confirmed	  
this,	   and	  with	   such	   a	   situation	   in	   place,	   further	   territorial	   expansion	  was	   probably	  
judged	  unnecessary.	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It	   should	  be	   said	   that	   such	   a	   conclusion	  might	  not	  have	  been	  Philip’s	   upon	  
becoming	   king.	   With	   such	   a	   major	   defeat	   suffered	   so	   recently,	   and	   Macedon	   so	  
exposed,	   Illyrian	   invasion	   would	   probably	   have	   seemed	   inevitable.	   In	   such	  
circumstances,	  negating	  ‘lesser’	  threats	  from	  elsewhere	  as	  swiftly	  as	  possible	  would	  
have	  been	  the	  most	  natural	  move.119	  
	  
(vi)	  Summary	  of	  Findings	  
	  
	   The	   threats	   facing	   Philip	   in	   359	   certainly	   give	   the	   impression	   of	   utmost	  
severity.	  They	  would	  undoubtedly	  have	  seemed	  so	   to	  Philip.	  However,	   the	   relative	  
ease	  with	  which	   the	  Paeonian	  and	  Thracian	   threats	  were	  apparently	  nullified,	  with	  
financial	  incentives	  that	  cannot	  have	  been	  hugely	  impressive,	  does	  not	  enhance	  this	  
view.	   Similarly,	   that	   Philip	   apparently	   persuaded	   Athens	   to	   withdraw	   support	   for	  
Pausanias	   simply	   by	   removing	   the	  Macedonian	   garrison	   from	  Amphipolis	   suggests	  
the	  city’s	  commitment	  to	  the	  pretender’s	  cause	  was	  not	  as	  strong	  as	   it	  might	  have	  
been.	  Such	  judgements	  are	  of	  course	  made	  with	  hindsight;	  it	  must	  be	  assumed	  that	  
Philip	   could	   not	   have	   known	   how	   successful	   such	   measures	   would	   be	   against	  
opposition	  which	  could	  seemingly	  take	  by	  force	  far	  more	  than	  he	  was	  offering.	  
	  
	   Philip	  was	  also	  undoubtedly	  aided	  by	  the	  timely	  deaths	  of	  the	  Paeonian	  and	  
Thracian	   kings,	   Agis	   and	   Cotys.	   The	   internal	   distractions	   that	   these	   events	   would	  
have	   caused	   –	   especially	   in	   the	   case	   of	   Cotys,	   who	   was	   murdered	   –	   would	   have	  
distracted	   from	   any	   possible	   exploitation	   of	   Macedon’s	   vulnerability	   in	   the	   short	  
term.	   Philip	  was	   also	   fortunate	   that	   no	   further	   Illyrian	   incursion	   followed	  Bardylis’	  
victory	  in	  359.	  It	  may	  be	  that	  Philip	  was	  able	  to	  bring	  about	  a	  treaty	  with	  the	  Illyrian	  
king;	   if	   so	   however,	   it	   only	   demonstrates	  Bardylis’	   disinterest	   in	   further	   expansion	  
more	  than	  it	  does	  any	  influence	  Philip	  had.	  
	  
	   However,	   Philip’s	   achievement	   in	   managing	   all	   the	   above,	   even	   if	   he	   was	  
fortunate	  in	  some	  respects,	  should	  not	  be	  underplayed.	  To	  persuade	  any	  force	  which	  
                                         





has	  the	  potential	  to	   inflict	  great	  damage	  on	  you	  to	  accept	  bribes	  or	  tribute	  smaller	  
than	   what	   they	   could	   most	   likely	   take	   from	   your	   by	   force	   is	   no	   mean	   feat.	   In	  
addition,	   his	   defeat	   of	   Bardylis	   in	   358	   was	   without	   doubt	   an	   exceptional	  
accomplishment.	  The	  effect	  of	  Perdiccas’	  defeat	  must	  have	  been	  dramatic,	  and	  due	  
to	  the	  loss	  of	  4,000	  men	  with	  him,	  a	  significant	  proportion	  of	  Philip’s	  army	  must	  have	  
had	   little	   or	   no	   training	   or	   argument.	   To	   rally	   such	   a	   force	   to	   emerge	   victorious	  
against	  a	  force	  that	  was	  far	  more	  confident	  and	  better	  practised	  demonstrates	  huge	  





IV.	  Military	  Genius?	  
	  
Philip	   has	   frequently	   been	   credited	  with	   creating	   a	   new	  Macedonian	   army,	  
and	  introducing	  various	  innovations	  in	  weaponry	  and	  armour	  to	  make	  it	  the	  premier	  
fighting	  force	  in	  the	  ancient	  world.	  The	  lack	  of	  source	  material	  for	  the	  Macedonian	  
army	   during	   Philip’s	   reign	  makes	   assessing	   to	  what	   degree	   such	   praise	   is	   justified	  
difficult.	   That	   change	   occurred	   in	   some	   areas	   is	   clear;	   surviving	   military	   statistics	  
from	  the	  start	  of	  Philip	  and	  Alexander’s	  reigns	  suggest	  considerable	  enlargement,	  as	  
will	   be	   seen,	   and	   several	   units	   present	   in	   the	   latter’s	   army	   were	   most	   likely	  
introduced	  or	  reformed	  by	  Philip.	  Beyond	  this	  matters	  are	  less	  certain	  as	  information	  
for	   earlier	  military	  matters	   is	   fragmentary	   at	   best,	   and	   for	   the	  majority	   of	   Philip’s	  
reign,	   almost	   entirely	   absent.	   Therefore,	   this	   section	  will	   seek	   to	   assess	   firstly	   the	  
impact	   Philip	   had	   on	   the	   size	   of	   the	  Macedonian	   army;	   secondly,	   his	   effect	   on	   its	  





In	  358	  Philip	  defeated	  Bardylis	  with	  a	  force	  of	  10,000	  infantry	  and	  600	  cavalry,	  
presumably	  the	  largest	  force	  he	  could	  possibly	  have	  assembled.120	  The	  previous	  year	  
Perdiccas	   had	   died	   alongside	   4,000	   of	   his	   men.	   No	   further	   figures	   survive	   for	  
Macedonian	  contingents	  of	  Philip’s	  armies	  during	  his	  reign.121	  Consequently,	  the	  first	  
indication	   of	   Philip’s	   improvements	   to	   the	   Macedonian	   military’s	   size	   is	   the	  
description	   of	   the	   force	   Alexander	   crossed	   to	   Asia	   with	   in	   334.	   According	   to	  
Diodorus:	  
	  
“There	  were	   found	   to	   be,	   of	   infantry,	   twelve	   thousand	  Macedonians,	   seven	   thousand	  
allies,	   and	   five	   thousand	   mercenaries,	   all	   of	   whom	   were	   under	   the	   command	   of	  
Parmenio.	  Odrysians,	  Triballians,	  and	  Illyrians	  accompanied	  him	  to	  the	  number	  of	  seven	  
thousand;	  and	  of	  archers	  and	  the	  so-­‐called	  Agrianians	  one	  thousand,	  making	  up	  a	  total	  
of	   thirty-­‐two	   thousand	   foot	   soldiers.	   Of	   cavalry	   there	   were	   eighteen	   hundred	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Macedonians,	  commanded	  by	  Philotas	  son	  of	  Parmenio;	  eighteen	  hundred	  Thessalians,	  
commanded	  by	  Calas	   son	  of	  Harpalus;	   six	   hundred	   from	   the	   rest	   of	  Greece	  under	   the	  
command	  of	  Erigyius;	  and	  nine	  hundred	  Thracian	  and	  Paeonian	  scouts	  with	  Cassander	  in	  
command,	   making	   a	   total	   of	   forty-­‐five	   hundred	   cavalry.	   These	   were	   the	   men	   who	  
crossed	  with	  Alexander	  to	  Asia.”122	  
	  
An	   immediately	  noticeable	  point	   is	   the	   inaccuracy	  of	  Diodorus’	   calculation	  of	  
the	  total	  cavalry.	  He	  describes	  contingents	  totaling	  5,100,	  but	  includes	  a	  total	  count	  
of	   only	   4,500.	   This	   could	   well	   be	   dismissed	   as	   a	   simple	   error,	   but	   other	   sources’	  
descriptions	   make	   the	   matter	   more	   complicated.	   Justin	   offers	   a	   total	   of	   32,000	  
infantry	  and	  4,500	  cavalry.123	  Given	  that	  Diodorus’	  30,000	  foot	  is	  conveniently	  neat,	  
and	   so	   very	   possibly	   rounded	   down,	   this	   is	   essentially	   an	   identical	   count,	   so	   very	  
likely	   from	   the	   same	   source.	   Thus	   more	   significant	   is	   the	   account	   of	   Arrian,	   who	  
agrees	  that	  the	   infantry	  comprised	  “not	  much	  more	  than”	  30,000,	  but	  reports	  that	  
there	  were	  slightly	  over	  5,000	  cavalry.124	  In	  addition,	  Plutarch	  mentions	  that	  in	  their	  
various	  histories,	  Aristobulus	  claimed	  30,000	  infantry	  and	  4,000	  cavalry	  crossed	  with	  
Alexander,	  Ptolemy	  offered	  30,000	  and	  5,000	   (thus	  very	   likely	  making	  him	  Arrian’s	  
source)	   and	   Anaximenes	   43,000	   and	   5,500.125	   Finally,	   Polybius	   reports	   that	  
Callisthenes’	  account	  offered	  40,000	  and	  4,500.126	  
	  
Thus	  there	  are	  disparities	  between	  both	  infantry	  and	  cavalry	  numbers	  that	  are	  
simply	  too	  large	  to	  be	  dismissed	  as	  errors.	  Regarding	  cavalry,	  the	  exceptions	  are	  the	  
higher	   counts	   of	   5,000+	   by	   Arrian	   and	   Ptolemy	   and	   the	   accumulated	   5,100	   of	  
Diodorus’	   description.	   Concerning	   infantry,	   Callisthenes’	   40,000	   and	   Aristobulus’	  
43,000	  are	  the	  anomalies.	  Making	  sense	  of	  this	  is	  difficult.	  P.	  A.	  Brunt	  has	  made	  the	  
point	  that	  Anaximenes	  and	  Callisthenes’	  being	  contemporaries	  of	  the	  events	  makes	  
their	   infantry	  figures	  most	  likely.	   If	  they	  had	  any	  agenda,	   it	  would	  be	  to	  understate	  
the	  size	  of	  Alexander’s	  forces	  to	  make	  his	  achievements	  all	  the	  more	  impressive,	  but	  
they	  offer	  numbers	  at	  least	  10,000	  higher	  than	  all	  other	  accounts.127	  This	  argument	  
has	  definite	  value,	  but	  it	  should	  be	  remembered	  that	  Ptolemy	  and	  Aristobulus	  were	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also	  contemporaries	  of	  the	  events	  they	  describe,	  and	  Brunt’s	  argument	  on	  its	  own	  is	  
not	  enough	  to	  justify	  following	  Anaximenes	  and	  Callisthenes	  outright.	  
	  
If	   one	   assumes	   that	   the	   figure	   of	   40,000	   offered	   by	   Callisthenes,	   and	   the	  
30,000	  of	  Diodorus,	  Aristobulus,	  and	  most	   likely	  Ptolemy	  have	  been	  rounded	  down	  
from	   43,000	   and	   32,000	   respectively,	   the	   difference	   in	   the	   accounts	   is	   11,000	  
infantry.	   This	   is	   a	   sensible	   step	   as	   the	   former	   figures	   are	   suspiciously	   generalised,	  
whereas	  the	  latter	  suggest	  greater	  specificity.	  Assuming	  this,	  a	  clue	  to	  explaining	  the	  
11,000-­‐strong	   disparity	   can	   be	   found	   in	   the	   terms	   in	   which	   the	   various	   authors	  
present	   their	   figures.	   Diodorus	   and	   Arrian	   both	   state	   explicitly	   that	   their	   statistics	  
refer	  to	  the	  party	  that	  crossed	  to	  Asia	  with	  Alexander.	  As	  Justin	  most	  likely	  used	  the	  
same	  source	  as	  Diodorus,	  it	  would	  seem	  likely	  that	  his	  totals	  refer	  to	  the	  same	  force.	  
Similarly,	   if	  Ptolemy’s	  account	   is	   the	  ultimate	  source	  of	  Arrian’s	   figure,	   it	  must	  also	  
have	  referred	  to	  the	  army	  that	  crossed	  in	  334.	  However,	  another	  force	  had	  already	  
crossed	  to	  Asia	  in	  336,	  led	  by	  Attalus,	  Parmenio,	  Amyntas	  and	  Calas.128	  This	  advance	  
party	  was	   estimated	   by	   Polyaenus	   to	   have	   been	   10,000	   strong.129	   	   Brunt	   has	   thus	  
posited	   that	   the	   figures	   of	   Callisthenes	   and	   Aristobulus	   included	   this	   advance	  
party.130	  Frustratingly,	  this	  theory	  cannot	  be	  confirmed	  as	  the	  context	  of	  Callisthenes	  
and	  Aristobulus’	  numbers	  has	  been	   lost,	  and	  the	  activities	  and	  fate	  of	   the	  advance	  
party	  go	  almost	  completely	  unrecorded.131	  However,	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  comfortable	  
fit	  its	  alleged	  numbers	  make	  with	  the	  difference	  in	  infantry	  figures	  discussed	  above	  –	  
10,000	  again	  suggests	  a	  rounded	  off	  figure,	  and	  could	  very	  likely	  have	  actually	  been	  
the	  11,000	  required	  –	  facts	  would	  appear	  to	  point	  to	  an	  absorption	  of	  the	  advance	  
force	  into	  the	  334	  army.	  The	  only	  alternative	  to	  such	  incorporation	  is	  that	  the	  party	  
was	   recalled	  back	   to	  Macedon	  before	  Alexander’s	   crossing,	   and	   thereafter	   formed	  
either	  part	  of	  the	  army	  described	  by	  Diodorus,	  or	  that	  which	  remained	  in	  Macedon	  
under	  Antipater.	  Withdrawal	  seems	  unlikely,	  as	  the	  force	  is	  recorded	  as	  active	  in	  Asia	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not	   long	  before	  Alexander’s	  arrival.132	  Also,	  although	  the	  fall	  of	  Attalus133	  may	  well	  
be	  seen	  as	  a	  trigger	  for	  the	  force	  being	  recalled,	  and	  Parmenio	  apparently	  withdrew	  
to	  Macedon	  upon	  Philip’s	  death	  and	  returned	  to	  Asia	   in	  334,134	  Amyntas	  and	  Calas	  
remained	  to	  command	  it.	  Given	  this,	  there	  seems	  to	  be	  no	  obvious	  reason	  to	  assume	  
that	   the	   force	   must	   have	   returned	   home	   if	   one	   or	   both	   men	   were	   removed	   or	  
recalled.135	  
	  
If	   this	   interpretation	   is	   correct,	   this	   would	   mean	   that	   Alexander’s	   army	  
comprised	   approximately	   42-­‐43,000	   infantry.	   The	   exact	   Macedonian	   contingent	  
cannot	   be	   determined	   as	   the	  makeup	   of	   the	   advance	   party	   goes	   unrecorded,	   but	  
apparently	  involved	  at	  least	  the	  12,000	  mentioned	  by	  Diodorus.	  A.	  B.	  Bosworth	  has	  
argued	   that	   the	  proportion	  of	  Macedonians	   in	   the	  advance	   force	  would	   surely	  not	  
have	   been	   greater	   than	   that	   of	   the	   main	   force	   of	   334.136	   	   If	   this	   is	   accepted,	  
approximately	  3,000	  men	  should	  be	  added	  to	  the	  Macedonian	  infantry	  total.	  
	  
Assuming	   this	   was	   the	   situation,	   what	   of	   the	   cavalry?	   One	   cannot	   rely	   on	  
Callisthenes	  and	  Aristobulus	  in	  the	  same	  way,	  as	  the	  former	  offers	  a	  total	  of	  4,500,	  
and	  the	   latter	  only	  4,000	  (surely	  rounded	  down).	  As	  already	  mentioned,	   Justin	  and	  
Diodorus	  also	  offer	   totals	  of	  4,500,	   though	   the	   latter	   individual	   counts	   total	  5,100.	  
Arrian	   and	   Ptolemy	   offer	   in	   excess	   of	   5,000	   and	   Anaximenes	   5,500.	   Given	   the	  
detailed	   description	   Diodorus	   offers	   of	   Alexander’s	   army	   of	   334,	   it	   is	   harder	   to	  
accept	  his,	  and	  therefore	  others’,	  lower	  figure	  of	  4,500	  over	  the	  cumulative	  total	  of	  
5,100.	   It	  has	  already	  been	  stated	  that	  Justin	  and	  Diodorus	  could	  very	   likely	  share	  a	  
source	  given	  the	  similarity	  of	  their	  infantry	  and	  cavalry	  totals.	  As	  Callisthenes	  offers	  
an	   identical	  cavalry	  count,	  Brunt	  has	  argued	  that	  he	  was	  the	  source	   in	  question.137	  
Diodorus’	  discrepancy	  could,	  in	  Brunt’s	  view,	  be	  a	  result	  of	  Callisthenes	  accidentally	  
omitting	  a	  unit	  in	  his	  count,	  which	  presumably	  did	  not	  include	  a	  breakdown	  of	  all	  the	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units.	  Having	  taken	  his	  incorrect	  total,	  Diodorus	  used	  a	  second	  source	  for	  a	  detailed	  
description	  of	  all	   the	  units,	  and	  failed	  to	  recognise	  the	  difference	   in	  the	  totals	   that	  
resulted.138	  	  
	  
Unfortunately	   this	   is	   merely	   conjecture,	   though	   in	   the	   absence	   of	   suitable	  
alternative	   explanations	   it	   does	   appear	   to	   be	   the	   most	   acceptable	   possibility.	  
However,	   the	   matter	   of	   Anaximenes’	   count	   of	   5,500	   remains.	   If	   the	   above	  
interpretation	   of	   Alexander’s	   infantry	   is	   correct,	   5,500	   must	   surely	   include	   the	  
cavalry	  of	  both	   the	  crossing	   force	  and	  advance	  party.	  However,	   if	   the	   total	   for	   the	  
former	   alone	   is	   5,100,	   as	   suggested	   above,	   this	   would	   mean	   the	   latter’s	   horse	  
numbered	  only	  400.	  As	  a	  proportion	  of	  10,000,	  this	  is	  simply	  too	  small	  a	  total.139	  In	  
explaining	  this,	  a	  clue	  may	  be	  found	  in	  the	  following	  details.	  Plutarch	  claims	  that	  at	  
the	  Battle	  of	  the	  Granicus	  River	  in	  331:	  
	  
“When	  Parmenio	  advised	  him	  against	  risking	  the	  crossing	  [of	  the	  Granicus]	  at	  such	  a	  late	  
hour	  in	  the	  day,	  Alexander	  declared	  that	  the	  Hellespont	  would	  blush	  for	  shame	  if,	  once	  
he	   had	   crossed	   it,	   he	   should	   shrink	   back	   from	   the	   Granicus;	   then	   he	   immediately	  
plunged	  into	  the	  stream	  with	  13	  squadrons	  (ilai)	  of	  cavalry.”140	  
	  
However,	   at	   the	   Battle	   of	   Gaugamela	   three	   years	   later,	   Arrian	   states	   that	   the	  
Companion	   cavalry	   was	   divided	   into	   only	   eight	   squadrons.141	   This	   inconsistency	   is	  
apparently	   explained	   in	   his	   version	   of	   the	   events	   at	   the	   Granicus	   though,	   where	  
Alexander:	  
	  
“…commanded	  Amyntas,	  son	  of	  Arrhabaeus,	  to	  make	  the	  first	  rush	  into	  the	  river	  at	  the	  
head	   of	   the	   skirmishing	   cavalry	   (prodromoi),	   the	   Paeonians,	   and	   one	   regiment	   of	  
infantry.”142	  
	  
Thus	  it	  can	  be	  argued	  that	  Plutarch’s	  13	  squadrons	  were	  in	  fact	  Arrian’s	  eight	  ilai	  of	  
Companion	   cavalry,	   plus	   one	   of	   Paeonian	   light	   cavalry143	   and	   therefore	   four	   of	  
prodromoi.	   Brunt	   has	   posited	   that	   given	   their	   being	  mentioned	  with	   and	   frequent	  
                                         
138	  Brunt	  1963,	  33f.	  
139	  ibid.	  
140	  Plut.	  Alex.	  16.2.	  
141	  Arr.	  3.11.8.	  
142	  Arr.	  1.14.6.	  	  
143	  Given	  Diod.	  17.17.4’s	  description	  of	  “900	  Thracian	  and	  Paeonian	  scouts”	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  see	  how	  there	  could	  





positioning	   close	   to	   the	  Companions	   in	  battle,144	   these	  prodromoi	  must	  have	  been	  
Macedonian.145	  This	   is	  most	   likely	  correct,	  as	  the	  units	  of	   light	  cavalry	  described	  by	  
Diodorus	   are	   explicitly	   stated	   to	   be	   Paeonian	   and	   Thracian.146	   This	   therefore	  
demands	  that	  the	  prodromoi	  were	  already	  in	  Asia	  with	  the	  advance	  party.	  However,	  
Arrian’s	  division	  of	  1,800	  Companion	  cavalry	  into	  eight	  ilai	  would	  give	  225	  in	  each.	  As	  
a	  similar	  set	  up	  would	  surely	  have	  been	   in	  place	   for	   lighter	  cavalry,	   the	   four	   ilai	  of	  
prodromoi	   would	   presumably	   be	   around	   900	   strong,	   more	   than	   twice	   the	   400	  
Anaximenes’	   cavalry	   count	  of	   5,500	  allows	   for.	  Once	  again	  one	   is	   reduced	   to	  pure	  
conjecture,	  but	  it	  could	  be	  that,	  like	  Callisthenes,	  Anaximenes	  inadvertently	  omitted	  
a	   unit	   from	   his	   total	   cavalry	   count.	   If	   this	   were	   the	   500	   required	   to	   meet	   the	  
expected	   900	   prodromoi,	   this	   would	   mean	   Alexander’s	   total	   cavalry	   numbered	  
approximately	   6,000,	   1,800	   of	   which	   were	   Macedonian	   Companions	   and	   900	   of	  
which	  were	  Macedonian	  prodromoi.147	  
	  
If	   the	   above	   interpretations	   are	   followed,	   it	   would	   seem	   that	   Philip	   took	   an	  
army	   that	   in	   359	   comprised	   10,000	   Macedonian	   infantry	   and	   600	   cavalry	   and	  
enlarged	   it	   so	   that	   in	   334	   his	   son	   could	   take	   15,000	   infantry	   and	   2,700	   cavalry	   to	  
Asia.	  To	  this	  must	  also	  be	  added	  the	  forces	  left	  behind:	  
	  
“The	   soldiers	   who	   were	   left	   behind	   in	   Europe	   under	   the	   command	   of	   Antipater	  
numbered	  twelve	  thousand	  foot	  and	  fifteen	  hundred	  horse.”148	  
	  
This	  would	  mean	  that	  during	  his	  reign	  Philip	  enlarged	  his	  infantry	  to	  27,000,	  a	  270%	  
increase,	  and	  his	  cavalry	  to	  4,200,	  a	  700%	  increase.149	  This	  is	  not	  all	  however,	  as	  the	  
important	  matters	  of	  losses	  and	  reinforcements	  must	  be	  considered.	  
	  
Calculating	  losses	  to	  Alexander’s	  armies	  during	  his	  reign	  is	  exceedingly	  difficult.	  
The	   sources	   rarely	   offer	   any	   figures,	   and	   whenever	   Alexander	   is	   present	   in	   a	  
                                         
144	  Mentioning	  with	  Companions:	  Arr.	  1.12.7,	  14.1.6,	  2.9.2,	  3.12.3,	  18.2,	  20.1,	  21.2.	  Stationing	  near	  Companions:	  
1.14.6	  (Granicus),	  2.9.2	  (Issus),	  3.12.3	  (Gaugamela).	  
145	  Brunt	  1963,	  35f.	  
146	  Diod.	  17.17.3-­‐4.	  
147	  Brunt	  1963,	  35f.	  
148	  Diod.	  17.17.5.	  
149	   Griffith	   1980,	   59	   follows	  Diod.	   17.17	   in	   calculating	   “24,000	   or	  more	   [infantry]	   +	   3,300	   cavalry…in	   the	   year	  





situation,	   they	   are	   always	   very	   low.150	   However,	   various	   references	   indicate	   that	  
losses	   off	   the	   battlefield	   must	   have	   been	   significant.	   Arrian	   makes	   multiple	  
references	  to	  the	  hardship	  suffered	  by	  the	  Macedonian	  armies,	  describing	  “scarcity	  
of	   provisions”,	   “severe	   hardship”	   and	   forced	   marches.”151	   His	   description	   of	   the	  
crossing	  of	  the	  Gedrosian	  desert	  in	  particular	  strongly	  suggests	  heavy	  casualties:	  
	  
“Alexander	  then	  advanced	  towards	  the	  capital	  of	  the	  Gedrosians…Most	  of	  the	  historians	  
of	  Alexander’s	   reign	  assert	   that	  all	   the	  hardships	  which	  his	  army	  suffered	   in	  Asia	  were	  
not	  worthy	  of	  comparison	  with	  the	  labours	  undergone	  here…The	  scorching	  heat	  and	  lack	  
of	  water	  destroyed	  a	  great	  part	  of	  the	  army,	  and	  especially	  the	  beasts	  of	  burden;	  most	  of	  
which	  perished	  from	  thirst	  and	  some	  of	  them	  even	  from	  the	  depth	  and	  heat	  of	  the	  sand,	  
because	   it	  had	  been	  thoroughly	  scorched	  by	  the	  sun.	  For	  they	  met	  with	   lofty	  ridges	  of	  
deep	  sand,	  not	  closely	  pressed	  and	  hardened,	  but	  such	  as	  received	  those	  who	  stepped	  
upon	   it	   just	   as	   if	   they	   were	   stepping	   into	   mud,	   or	   rather	   into	   untrodden	   snow…The	  
soldiers	  killed	  many	  of	   the	  beasts	  of	  burden	  of	   their	  own	  accord…they	  ate	  the	  flesh	  of	  
these,	   and	   said	   that	   they	   had	   died	   of	   thirst	   or	   had	   perished	   from	   the	   heat…The	  
consequence	  was	  that	  it	  was	  no	  longer	  easy	  to	  convey	  the	  soldiers	  who	  were	  suffering	  
from	  disease,	  or	  those	  who	  were	  left	  behind	  on	  the	  roads	  on	  account	  of	  the	  heat…Thus	  
some	  were	  left	  behind	  along	  the	  roads	  on	  account	  of	  sickness,	  others	  from	  fatigue	  or	  the	  
effects	  of	  the	  heat,	  or	  from	  not	  being	  able	  to	  bear	  up	  against	  the	  drought;	  and	  there	  was	  
no	  one	  either	  to	  lead	  them	  or	  to	  remain	  and	  tend	  them	  in	  their	  sickness.	  Most	  of	  them	  
perished	   in	   the	   sand,	   like	  men	  getting	  out	  of	   the	   course	  at	   sea.	  Another	   calamity	  also	  
befell	  the	  army…On	  one	  occasion,	  when	  the	  army	  bivouacked,	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  its	  water,	  
near	  a	  small	  brook	  which	  was	  a	  winter	  torrent,	  about	  the	  second	  watch	  of	  the	  night	  the	  
brook	  which	  flowed	  there	  was	  suddenly	  swelled	  by	  the	  rains	  in	  the	  mountains	  which	  had	  
fallen	   unperceived	   by	   the	   soldiers.	   The	   torrent	   advanced	   with	   so	   great	   a	   flood	   as	   to	  
destroy	  most	  of	  the	  wives	  and	  children	  of	  the	  men	  who	  followed	  the	  army,	  and	  to	  sweep	  
away	   all	   the	   royal	   baggage	   as	   well	   as	   all	   the	   beasts	   of	   burden	   still	   remaining.	   The	  
soldiers,	  after	  great	  exertions,	  were	  hardly	  able	  to	  save	  themselves	  together	  with	  their	  
weapons,	  many	  of	  which	  they	  lost	  beyond	  recovery.”152	  
	  
Curtius	  also	  relates	  a	  desert	  crossing	  to	  the	  River	  Oxus,	  where:	  
	  
“Some	  men	  gulped	  water	  down	  too	  greedily	  and	  died	  from	  blockage	  of	  the	  windpipe	  –	  
and	  the	  number	  of	  these	  exceeded	  the	  numbers	  Alexander	  had	  lost	  in	  any	  battle.”153	  
	  
However,	   as	   such	   descriptions	   are	   rare	   and	   do	   not	   permit	   any	   meaningful	  
calculation,	  one	  is	  better	  served	  by	  examining	  the	  various	  bodies	  of	  reinforcements	  
sent	  out	  to	  Asia,	  to	  which	  multiple	  references	  are	  made.	  	  
                                         
150	  Macedonian	  losses	  at	  the	  Battle	  of	  the	  Granicus	  (334),	  for	  example,	  were	  varyingly	  recorded	  as	  nine	  infantry	  
and	  25	   cavalry	   (Plut.	  Alex.	   16.15),	   nine	   infantry	   and	  120	   cavalry	   (Just.	   11.6.12),	   and	  around	  85	   cavalry	   and	  30	  
infantry	  (Arr.	  1.16.4).	   	  At	  the	  Battle	  of	   Issus	  the	  Macedonians	  apparently	   lost	  only	  32	  foot	  and	  150	  horse	  (Cirt.	  
3.11.27),	  or	  130	  and	  150	  (Just.	  11.9.10).	  Gaugamela	  saw	  losses	  of	  either	  100	  (Arr.	  3.15.6),	  fewer	  than	  300	  (Curt.	  
4.16.26)	  or	  500	  (Diod.	  17.61.3)	  Macedonians	  in	  total.	  
151	  Arr.	  3.20.1,	  28.1,	  28.8.,	  4.21	  and	  23.	  
152	  Arr.	  6.24-­‐5.	  





The	   first	   such	   force	   was	   apparently	   dispatched	   from	   Macedon	   almost	  
immediately	  after	  the	  main	  body	  of	  334	  had	  reached	  Asia.	  Arrian	  reports	  that	  newly	  
married	  soldiers	  were	  allowed	  to	  return	  to	  Macedon	  on	   leave	  during	  the	  winter	  of	  
334/3	  whilst	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  army	  wintered	  near	  Gordium,	  and	  returned	  in	  the	  spring	  
with	   3,000	  more	   infantry	   and	   300	   cavalry.154	   The	  matter	   is	   confused	   however,	   by	  
Polybius,	   quoting	   Callisthenes,	   also	   noting	   that	   “when	   he	   was	   on	   the	   point	   of	  
invading	   Cilicia,”	   Alexander	   received	   further	   reinforcement,	   this	   time	   of	   5,000	  
infantry	  and	  800	  cavalry.	   It	  would	   seem	  that	  both	   reports	  are	  differing	  versions	  of	  
the	  same	  event,	  as	  Arrian’s	  report	  is	   in	  the	  context	  of	  Alexander’s	  being	  in	  Phrygia,	  
just	   before	   he	   enters	   Cappadocia,	   from	  which	   he	   swiftly	  moves	   on	   to	   Cilicia.155	   In	  
addition,	  Curtius	  notes	   that	   the	  command	  of	   “the	   troops	   that	  had	   recently	  arrived	  
from	   Macedonia”	   was	   given	   to	   Calas,	   “while	   Alexander	   himself	   made	   for	  
Cappadocia.”156	   Brunt	   has	   argued	   otherwise,	   suggesting	   that	   Callisthenes’	   figures	  
were	  an	  amalgam	  of	  Arrian’s	   reinforcements	  and	  a	  second	  force	  of	  2,000	   foot	  and	  
500	  horse.157	  Whilst	  this	  explains	  the	  difference	  in	  figures,	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  believe	  that	  a	  
second	  group	  of	  reinforcements	  would	  have	  been	  dispatched	  so	  soon	  after	  the	  first.	  
Callisthenes’	   being	   part	   of	   the	   expedition	   would	   seem	   to	  make	   his	   account	  more	  
reliable,	   there	   is	   no	   reason	   for	   him	   to	   invent	   or	   exaggerate	   his	   figures.158	   Arrian’s	  
forces	  were	  presumably	  a	  misinterpretation	  or	  textual	  corruption.	  
	  
The	  next	  reference	  to	  reinforcements	  sees	  one	  Amyntas,	  son	  of	  Andromedes,	  
being	   sent	   back	   to	  Macedon	   to	   recruit	  more	   troops	   and	   returning	   in	   summer	   331	  
with	   6,000	   Macedonian	   and	   7,500	   allied	   infantry,	   and	   500	   Macedonian	   and	   980	  
allied	  cavalry.159	  That	  he	  was	  dispatched	  over	  dangerous	  winter	   seas	   suggests	   that	  
Alexander	   was	   in	   desperate	   need	   of	   such	   men.160	   Thereafter	   no	   Macedonian	  
reinforcements	  are	  recorded;	   it	  may	  be	  that	  they	  occurred,	  but	  went	  unmentioned	  
                                         
154	  Arr.	  1.29.4.	  
155	  Phrygia:	  Arr.	  1.29	  and	  2.3;	  Cappadocia	  and	  entry	  into	  Cilicia:	  2.4.	  
156	  Curt.	   1.24.	  Contra	   Bosworth	  1986,	  6,	  which	   sees	  Curtius’	   reference	  as	  being	   to	  a	   separate	   force.	  However,	  
there	  is	  no	  reason	  to	  assume	  this.	  
157	  Brunt	  1963,	  36-­‐7.	  
158	  ibid.	  
159	  Curt.	  4.6.30,	  Diod.	  17.49.1	  (mission);	  Curt.	  5.1.40-­‐2,	  Diod.	  17.65.1	  (numbers).	  Cf	  Arr.	  3.16.10,	  which	  does	  not	  
give	  any	  numbers.	  	  





by	   the	   sources.	   However,	   Bosworth	   has	   pointed	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   subsequent	  
recruitment	   of	  mercenary	   forces	   from	   both	   Greece	   and	   Asia	   is	  mentioned,161	   and	  
argued	  that	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  Macedonian	  troops	  were	  already	  in	  Asia	  by	  331.162	  
In	  support	  of	  this,	  when	  King	  Agis	  of	  Sparta	  rebelled	  in	  331/0,	  captured	  several	  Greek	  
cities	  and	  besieged	  Megalopolis,	  Antipater	  is	  recorded	  as	  being	  forced	  to	  mobilise	  an	  
army	   in	   response,163	   and	   seemingly	   had	   to	   rely	   heavily	   on	   recently	   levied	   Greek	  
mercenaries.164	  Similarly,	  upon	  the	  renewal	  of	  rebellion	  in	  Greece	  in	  323,	  Antipater	  
could	  mobilise	  on	  13,000	  infantry	  and	  600	  cavalry	  in	  response,	  with	  most	  likely	  only	  
part	   of	   the	   former	   being	   Macedonian.165	   A	   lack	   of	   Macedonian	   troops	   is	   further	  
suggested	   by	   Antipater’s	   defeat	   at	   Lamia	   shortly	   after	   entering	   Greece,	   which	  
resulted	   in	   his	   being	   besieged	   in	   the	   city	   until	   relieved	   by	   the	   Phrygian	   satrap	  
Leonnatus.166	  
	  
Perhaps	  the	  most	   important	  reference	  to	  post-­‐331	  reinforcements	  refers	  to	  
an	  event	  in	  324.	  After	  facing	  revolt	  from	  his	  army	  at	  Opis,	  Alexander	  released	  a	  large	  
group	   of	   his	   troops	   from	   service.	   The	   exact	   number	   is	   uncertain,	   as	   at	   one	   point	  
Diodorus	   offers	   a	   figure	   of	   10,000,	   of	   which	   6,000	   “had	   crossed	   into	   Asia	   with	  
Alexander.”	  Later	  however,	  he	  says	  the	  forces	  numbered	  “more	  than	  10,000”.	  Arrian	  
agrees	   with	   the	   latter	   total,	   and	   Justin	   offers	   11,000.167	   In	   his	   later	   reference,	  
Diodorus	  also	  states	  that	  the	  returning	  force	   included	  1,500	  cavalry,	  so	   it	  may	  well	  
be	   that	   the	   infantry	   numbered	   10,000,	   with	   some	   cavalry	   also	   demobbed.168	   The	  
total	   recorded	   horse	   sent	   to	   Asia	   by	   331	   numbered	   3,100,	   so	   if	   further	  
reinforcements	  were	  not	  sent,	  practically	  half	  this	  number	  were	  being	  sent	  back	  to	  
                                         
161	  In	  330,	  the	  Alexander’s	  allied	  infantry	  was	  dispatched	  along	  the	  Cilician	  coast	  (Arr.	  3.19.5-­‐6;	  Diod.	  17.74.3-­‐4)	  
and	   returned	   two	  years	   later	  with	  additional	  mercenary	   forces	   (Arr.	  4.7.2;	  Curt.	  7.10.11-­‐12).	  Around	   the	  same	  
time	  Antipater	  sent	  8,000	  “Greeks”,	  including	  600	  cavalry.	  In	  329	  a	  group	  of	  Macedonian	  veterans	  were	  sent	  back	  
to	  Macedon	   (Arr.	   3.29.5)	   and	   returned	   three	   years	   later	  with	   30,000	   infantry	   and	   6,000	   cavalry,	   described	   as	  
“allies	  and	  mercenaries	  from	  Greece”	  (Diod	  17.95.4).	  
162	  Bosworth	  1986,8.	  
163	  Aesch.	  3.165	  
164	  Diod.	  17.63.1.	  
165	  Diod.	  18.12.2	  refers	  to	  all	  the	  troops	  as	  ‘Macedonians’,	  but	  this	  is	  surely	  an	  error	  or	  meant	  as	  a	  general	  term,	  
as	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  see	  why	  Antipater	  could	  not	  have	  had	  such	  troops	  available	  to	  him	  in	  331.	  In	  addition,	  Diodorus	  
notes	  that	  “Macedonia	  was	  short	  of	  citizen	  soldiers	  because	  of	  the	  number	  of	  those	  who	  had	  been	  sent	  to	  Asia	  as	  
replacements	  for	  the	  army.”	  
166	  Diod.	  18.12.4-­‐13.3	  (defeat	  and	  siege),	  14.5	  (Leonnatus	  being	  sent	  for	  and	  arriving).	  
167	  Arr.	  7.8.1,	  12.1-­‐4;	  Diod.	  17.109.1,	  18.4.1,	  12.1,	  16.4;	  Just.	  12.12.7.	  





Macedon	   in	   324.	   Once	   losses	   and	   garrisoning	   are	   taken	   into	   account,	   Alexander	  
cannot	  have	  had	  any	  cavalry	   left	  with	  him	  under	  such	  circumstances.	  For	  the	  same	  
reasons	   it	   is	  similarly	  hard	  to	  believe	  that	  any	   infantry	  remained	  once	  10,000	  were	  
demobbed.	  	  
	  
This	  clashes	  directly	  with	  the	  claim	  Curtius	  makes	  that	  Alexander	  planned	  to	  
keep	   a	   force	   of	   13,000	   infantry	   and	   2,000	   cavalry	  with	   him	   to	  maintain	   control	   in	  
Asia.169	  As	  Brunt	  and	  Griffith	  have	  argued,	  this	  must	  refer	  to	  Macedonian	  troops,	  as	  
the	  total	  allied	  Greek	  and	  Balkan	  forces	  sent	  to	  Asia	  far	  exceeded	  such	  figures,	  and	  
cannot	   feasibly	  have	  dropped	  so	   low,	  even	  with	  heavy	   losses.	  Equally,	   they	  cannot	  
be	   oriental	   forces,	   as	   access	   to	   such	  men	  was	   essentially	   unlimited.170	   Brunt	   feels	  
that	  Curtius	  must	  be	  referring	  to	  a	  number	  of	  troops	  ordered	  by	  Alexander	  following	  
the	  discharge	  of	  324.	  Whilst	  this	  would	  seem	  the	  most	  acceptable	  explanation,	  it	   is	  
difficult	   to	  accept	   that	  Alexander	  had	  no	  Macedonian	   troops	   left	   following	  324,	  as	  
the	  above	  analysis	  would	   suggest.	   In	   fact,	   several	   references	   suggest	  otherwise.	   In	  
323	   Alexander	   apparently	   combined	   20,000	   newly	   levied	   Persian	   infantry	   with	  
surviving	  Macedonians	   “so	   that	   in	   each	   company	   there	  were	   twelve	   Persians	   and	  
four	   Macedonians.”171	   This	   shows	   Alexander	   to	   be	   low	   on,	   but	   not	   completely	  
lacking	   Macedonian	   forces,	   as	   a	   ratio	   of	   3:1	   would	   mean	   the	   presence	   of	   6,700	  
Macedonians.172	   In	   addition,	   in	   describing	   the	   events	   that	   followed	   Alexander’s	  
death,	  Diodorus	   refers	   several	   times	   to	  a	  3,000-­‐strong	  elite	   infantry	  unit	  known	  as	  
the	  ‘Silver	  Shields.’	  Clearly	  having	  been	  with	  Alexander	  from	  the	  start	  of	  his	  reign	  –	  in	  
318	  “the	  youngest…were	  about	  60	  years	  old,	  most	  of	  the	  others	  about	  seventy,	  and	  
some	   even	   older”	   –	   their	   continued	   presence	   confirms	   that	   Alexander	   did	   not	  
discharge	  all	  his	  remaining	  Macedonian	  forces	  in	  324.173	  
	  
If	   the	   army	   of	   334	   comprised	   15,000	   Macedonian	   infantry	   (12,000	   in	   the	  
crossing	  force,	  3,000	  from	  the	  advance	  party),	  and	  they	  received	  only	  two	  groups	  of	  
                                         
169	  Curt.	  10.2.19.	  
170	  Brunt	  1963,	  38f;	  Griffith	  1965,	  131.	  
171	  Arr.	  7.23.3-­‐4.	  
172	  Bosworth	  1986,	  3.	  





reinforcements,	  of	  5,000	  in	  334	  (assuming	  Callisthenes’	  figure	  is	  correct	  rather	  than	  
Arrian’s)	  and	  6,000	  in	  331,	  the	  total	  is	  29,000.	  If	  one	  subtracts	  from	  this	  the	  10,000	  
who	   were	   discharged,	   the	   6,700	   who	   were	   combined	   with	   the	   newly	   recruited	  
20,000	  Persians,	   and	   the	  3,000	   ‘Silver	   Shields’	  who	  also	   remained,	   one	   is	   left	  with	  
only	  6,300	  infantry	  for	  losses,	  garrisons	  and	  settlements	  for	  all	  of	  Alexander’s	  reign.	  
Given	   that,	   as	   the	   force	   of	   334	   was	   originally	   12,000,	   losses	   for	   subsequently	  
dispatched	   troops	   would	   number	   only	   300.	   It	   is	   clear	   therefore,	   that	   additional	  
forces	   must	   have	   been	   sent	   to	   Asia	   during	   Alexander’s	   reign,	   with	   their	   being	   so	  
going	  unrecorded.	  Exactly	  how	  many	  is	  impossible	  to	  know.	  What	  can	  be	  said,	  given	  
that	   as	   Alexander	   reigned	   only	   13	   years	   all	   troops	   must	   have	   been	   born	   under	  
Philip’s	  rule,	   is	  that	  Philip	  was	  apparently	  responsible	  for	  an	  amazing	  turnaround	  in	  
the	  scale	  of	  Macedon’s	  military.	  If	  the	  above	  analysis	  is	  correct,	  the	  crossing	  force	  of	  
334	   included	   12,000	   infantry,	   the	   advance	   party	   at	   least	   3,000;	   the	   forces	   left	   in	  
Macedon	  under	  Antipater	  numbered	  12,000,	  and	  recorded	  reinforcements	  totalled	  
11,000.	   Cavalry	   comprised	   1,800	   in	   the	   crossing	   force,	   the	   same	   again	   left	   in	  
Macedon,	  plus	  500	   reinforcements	   in	  334	  and	  again	   in	  331.	  Philip	  was	   responsible	  
for,	   at	   the	   very	   least,	   380%	   increase	   in	  Macedonian	   infantry	   and	   600%	   growth	   in	  
cavalry	  from	  the	  10,000	  men	  and	  600	  horse	  he	  faced	  Bardylis	  with	  in	  359.174	  
	  
(ii)	  Equipment	  and	  Organisation	  
	  
“Despite	   the	   presence	   of	   such	   great	   terrors	   and	   dangers	   Philip	   was	   not	   dismayed	   at	   the	  
gravity	  of	  the	  impending	  trials,	  but	  he	  made	  the	  Macedonians	  confident	  by	  convening	  them	  
in	   assembly	   after	   assembly	   and	   exhorting	   them	   by	   his	   eloquence	   to	   be	   brave,	   and	   after	  
altering	  for	  the	  better	  the	  military	  units	  and	  equipping	  the	  men	  appropriately	  with	  weapons	  
of	  war	   he	   held	   continuous	  manoeuvres	   under	   arms	   and	   training	   exercises	   under	   combat	  
conditions.	   Indeed,	   he	   invented	   the	   close	   order	   and	   the	   equipment	   of	   the	   phalanx	   in	  
imitation	  of	   the	  shield-­‐to-­‐shield	  order	  of	   the	  heroes	  at	  Troy,	  and	  he	   first	  put	   together	   the	  
Macedonian	  phalanx.”175	  
	  
So	   speaks	   Diodorus	   on	   the	   matter	   of	   Philip’s	   military	   reforms.	   Immediately	  
noticeable	  is	  the	  implication	  that	  Philip	  introduced	  the	  ‘Macedonian	  phalanx’	  for	  the	  
first	   time.	   This	  would	  at	   first	   seem	  unlikely.	   In	  424	  Perdiccas	   II	   had	  allied	  with	   the	  
                                         
174	  Ellis	  1980,	  40	  cautiously	  claims	  that	  “the	  combined	  total	  of	  available	  horsemen	  and	  infantrymen	  must	  have	  at	  
least	  doubled	  during	  Philip’s	  reign,	  and	  the	  increase	  may	  have	  been	  much	  higher.”	  





Spartan	  general	  Brasidas,	  who	  used	  his	   force	  of	  1,700	  hoplites	  to	  defeat	  Perdiccas’	  
Lyncestian	   enemy	   Arrhabaeus,	   who	   was	   himself	   in	   command	   of	   a	   force	   of	   Greek	  
hoplites.176	  Similarly,	  Amyntas	  IV	  had	  persuaded	  Sparta	  to	  assist	  in	  the	  retaking	  of	  his	  
territory	  from	  the	  Olynthians	  in	  381/0.177	  It	  was	  thus	  not	  as	  if	  the	  Macedonians	  had	  
never	  observed	  the	  benefits	  of	  hoplite	  phalanxes,	  or	   lacked	  the	  chance	  to	  emulate	  
them.	   This	   is	   not	   proof	   that	   Macedonian	   kings	   must	   have	   adopted	   this	   style	   of	  
warfare	   however,	   and	   in	   fact	   there	   is	   no	   mention	   of	   phalanxes	   or	   other	   similar	  
infantry	  bodies	   in	  the	  description	  of	  the	  military	   improvements	  made	  by	  Perdiccas’	  
successor,	  Archelaus:	  
	  
“[Archelaus]	  built	  the	  forts	  that	  now	  exist	  in	  the	  country,	  made	  straight	  roads	  and	  improved	  
military	  strength	  in	  other	  ways,	  with	  horses,	  arms	  and	  military	  equipment	  better	  than	  all	  the	  
eight	  preceding	  kings.”178	  
	  
Closer	   to	   Philip’s	   reign	   there	   seems	   little	   opportunity	   for	   such	   a	   situation	   to	   have	  
been	  seriously	  improved.179	  Indeed,	  state	  provision	  of	  arms	  was	  rare	  in	  Greece,	  and	  
presumably	  also	  in	  Macedon.180	  Even	  allowing	  for	  the	  severity	  of	  Perdiccas’	  defeat	  in	  
359,	   that	   Philip	   was	   forced	   to	   resort	   to	   such	   measures	   surely	   indicates	   that	   the	  
Macedonian	   military	   can	   have	   enjoyed	   little	   in	   the	   way	   of	   investment	   or	  
organisation.181	  
	  
It	  would	  seem	  likely	  then	  that	  whilst	  the	  Macedonian	  army	  that	  was	  crushed	  by	  
the	  Illyrians	  contained	  10,000	  men	  with	  weapons	  and	  possibly	  armour	  of	  some	  kind,	  
they	  were	  not	  trained,	  experienced	  or	  organised	  in	  any	  way	  that	  could	  lead	  to	  their	  
being	   called	   hoplite	   infantry.	   Thus	   in	   his	   above	   description,	   Diodorus	   would	   have	  
meant	  that	  Philip	  was	  attempting	  to	  properly	  organise	  the	  Macedonian	  infantry	  for	  
the	  first	  time.	  It	  is	  with	  this	  in	  mind	  that	  one	  should	  examine	  the	  following:	  
	  
                                         
176	  Alliance	  with	  Brasidas:	  Thuc.	  4.79.1.	  Arrhabaeus:	  4.79.2,	  83.1.	  The	  latter’s	  Greek	  allies:	  4.124.1.	  
177	  See	  above,	  p18.	  
178	  Thuc.	  2.100.2.	  
179	  See	  above,	  p19-­‐20.	  
180	  Athens’	  fourth	  century	  practice	  of	  issuing	  free	  shields	  and	  spears	  to	  youths	  upon	  completing	  military	  training	  
(Aris.	  Pol.	  42.4)	  is	  the	  only	  such	  recorded	  example,	  and	  was	  presumably	  due	  to	  the	  city’s	  being	  richer	  than	  most	  
others.	  





“When	  Philip	  put	  together	  army	  for	  the	  first	  time,	  he	  forbade	  the	  use	  of	  carts	  for	  everyone,	  
allowed	   no	   more	   than	   one	   groom	   to	   each	   cavalryman,	   and	   one	   attendant	   for	   each	   ten	  
infantrymen	  to	  carry	  their	  grinders	  and	  ropes;	  and	  he	  issued	  the	  order	  that	  flour	  for	  thirty	  
days	  was	  to	  be	  carried	  on	  each	  man’s	  back	  when	  they	  went	  out	  into	  summer	  quarters.”182	  
	  
“Philip	  was	  training	  the	  Macedonians	  before	  the	  dangers.	  He	  made	  them	  take	  up	  their	  arms	  
and	  march	   often	   300	   stades	   [c.	   35	  miles]	   carrying	   helmet,	   shield,	   greaves,	   sarissa	   and	   in	  
addition	  to	  their	  arms	  rations	  and	  all	  gear	  for	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  existence.”183	  
	  
There	  is	  no	  obvious	  reason	  to	  doubt	  such	  descriptions,	  as	  they	  are	  entirely	  in	  
keeping	  with	   improving	   an	   army’s	   efficiency.	   Fifth	   century	  Macedonian	   soldiers	   of	  
had	   transported	   their	   equipment	   by	   ox-­‐cart,	   for	   example.184	   Philip’s	   allowing	   only	  
one	  attendant	  for	  every	  ten	  men	  and	  making	  the	  men	  carry	  their	  own	  armour	  and	  
weapons,	   would	   drastically	   reduce	   the	   size	   of	   the	   army’s	   baggage	   train,	   allowing	  
faster	   movement,	   and	   would	   result	   in	   an	   altogether	   stronger,	   fitter	   and	   hardier	  
soldier.	   35	   mile	   route	   marches	   would	   obviously	   further	   this,	   as	   would	   constant	  
training.	  Such	  changes	  of	  organisation,	  equipment	  and	  training	  could	  perfectly	  well	  
have	   been	   introduced	   within	   Philip’s	   first	   year	   as	   king,	   such	   is	   the	  
straightforwardness	  of	  their	  nature.	   Indeed,	  such	  moves	  would	  have	  been	  the	  best	  
method	   of	   rebuilding	   the	   no	   doubt	   shattered	   morale	   at	   the	   recently	   crushed	  
Macedonian	  army.	  
	  
(iii)	  The	  Sarissa	  
	  
The	   cornerstone	   of	   Macedonian	   military	   success	   from	   the	   fourth	   to	   the	  
second	   centuries	   BC	   was	   the	   sarissa,	   almost	   certainly	   introduced	   by	   Philip.	   The	  
alteration	  to	  the	  existing	  Greek	  hoplite	  spear	  and	  the	  resultant	  advantage	  is	  simple	  
enough.	  Whereas	  the	  existing	  weapon	  was	  approximately	  eight	  feet	  long,	  the	  sarissa	  
was	  between	  15	  and	  18	   feet,	  which	  would	  allow	   the	  user	   to	  engage	  his	  opponent	  
without	   suffering	   attacks	   himself.185	   The	   iron	   spike	   on	   the	   end	   of	   the	   sarissa	   was	  
                                         
182	  Front.	  4.1.6.	  
183	  Polyaen.	  4.2.10.	  
184	  Thuc.	  4.128.4.	  
185	  Theoph.	  De	  Hist.	  Plant.	  3.12.2	  says	  the	  longest	  examples	  were	  12	  cubits	  in	  length,	  around	  18ft.	  Asclepiodotus	  
Tact.	   5.1	   claims	   the	   shortest	   were	   10	   cubits,	   or	   approximately	   15ft,	   and	   agrees	   with	   Theophrastus	   that	   the	  
longest	  were	  not	  more	  than	  18.	  Arr.	  Tact.	  12	  offers	  the	  figure	  of	  approximately	  16ft,	  perhaps	  an	  average.	  For	  the	  





longer	   than	   that	   of	   a	   hoplite	   spear,186	   and	   thus	   carried	   greater	   weight	   behind	   it,	  
allowing	  greater	  damage	  to	  be	   inflicted.	  However,	   there	   is	  more	  to	   the	  matter.	  M.	  
M.	   Markle	   has	   calculated	   that	   given	   the	   length	   and	   size	   of	   the	   weapon’s	   head	  
spike,187	  an	  18	  foot	  sarissa	  would	  have	  weighed	  approximately	  6.5	  kg,	  and	  a	  fifteen	  
foot	  example	  slightly	  under	  5.5	  kg;	  an	  8	  foot	  hoplite	  spear	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  would	  
have	  only	  weighed	   just	  one	  kg.188	  Such	  a	  vast	  change	   in	  weapon	  mass	  would	  have	  
meant	  it	  was	  not	  simply	  a	  case	  of	  lengthening	  one’s	  spear	  and	  continuing	  to	  use	  it	  in	  
the	  same	  way	  as	  before	  for	  the	  Macedonian	  soldier.	  Even	  if	  the	  weight	  were	  not	  a	  
problem,	  the	  increased	  length	  would	  surely	  have	  made	  fighting	  with	  the	  sarissa	  held	  
in	  only	  one	  hand	  impossibly	  unwieldy.	  It	  was	  surely	  one	  or	  both	  of	  these	  factors	  that	  
would	  have	  resulted	  in	  the	  use	  of	  both	  hands	  to	  utilise	  the	  sarissa.	  This	  demanded	  a	  
change	  in	  the	  employment	  of	  the	  shield,	  and	  in	  turn	  its	  size.	  As	  it	  could	  no	  longer	  be	  
carried	  by	  hand,	  it	  was	  apparently	  strapped	  around	  the	  neck	  and	  over	  the	  shoulder.	  
Such	   a	   move	   would	   have	   required	   a	   decrease	   in	   the	   shield’s	   diameter	   to	   allow	  
movement,	   resulting	   in	   less	   protection	   being	   provided.189	   In	   addition,	   the	   sarissa	  
allowed	   significant	   alteration	   to	   be	   made	   to	   the	   arrangement	   of	   the	   traditional	  
hoplite	  phalanx.	  As	  Hammond	  has	  put	  it,	  
	  
“Pikemen	  were	  to	  fight	   in	  a	  phalanx,	  of	  which	  the	  depth	  was	  to	  be	  ten	  men	  instead	  of	  
the	  hoplites’	  eight	  men.	  Their	  advantage	  was	  that	  they	  could	  present	  three	  or	  four	  pike	  
points	  ahead	  of	  the	  first	  rank,	  while	  the	  opposing	  hoplites’	  spears	  stayed	  out	  of	  reach.	  
Moreover,	  because	  they	  had	  a	  smaller	  shield,	  they	  could	  form	  a	  closer	  rank,	  in	  which	  a	  
bristling	  hedge	  of	  up	  to	  five	  pike	  points	  ahead	  of	  the	  front	  rank	  could	  be	  presented	  to	  
the	   enemy,	   and	   a	   charge	   by	   such	   a	   phalanx	   was	   likely	   to	   destroy	   a	   standard	   hoplite	  
phalanx	  with	  a	  minimum	  of	  damage	  to	  itself.”190	  
	  
The	  question	  of	  when	  Philip	   began	   the	   introduction	  of	   the	   sarissa,	   and	   the	  
changes	  associated	  with	  it	  is	  unclear.	  Hammond	  has	  confidently	  asserted	  that	  when	  
Philip	  met	  Bardylis	   in	  battle	   in	  358,	  he	  “led	   ‘his	   finest	   infantrymen,”	  equipped	  with	  
                                         
186	  See	  Andronicus	  1970,	  91-­‐107	  for	  excavated	  examples	  and	  their	  measurements.	  
187	   One	   sarissa	   spike	   found	   at	   Vergina,	   for	   example,	   dating	   from	   the	   second	   half	   of	   the	   fourth	   century	   BC,	  
weighed	  1235g	  compared	  to	  a	  hoplite-­‐style	  spear	  spike	  from	  the	  same	  site	  that	  weighed	  just	  97g.	  Cf.	  Andronicus	  
1970,	  98.	  
188	  Markle	  1977,	  324f.	  
189	  Aelian	  Tact.	  12;	  Asclep.	  Tact.	  3,	  4.1,	  5.1;.	  Arr.	  Tact.	  12.6;	  An.	  1.6.2;	  Plut.	  Cleom.	  11.2;	  Aem.	  19.1;.	  





and	   trained	   as	   pike-­‐men	   in	   what	   we	   now	   call	   the	   sarissa-­‐phalanx.”191	   However,	  
training	  with	  such	  new	  weapons	  must	  have	  taken	  considerable	  time.	  The	  first	  year	  of	  
his	   reign,	   as	   has	   been	   said,	  was	  most	   likely	   haunted	   by	   a	   constant	   fear	   of	   Illyrian	  
invasion,	  and	  presumably	  characterised	  by	  a	  scramble	  to	  prepare	  as	  many	  troops	  as	  
could	   be	   mustered	   before	   it	   came.	   Such	   a	   situation	   was	   not	   the	   time	   for	   radical	  
innovation	  or	  experimentation.	  According	   to	  Diodorus,	  Philip	  positioned	  “his	   finest	  
infantrymen”192	  on	  the	  right	  in	  the	  battle	  against	  Bardylis	  in	  358,	  a	  well-­‐established	  
tactic.193	  Contrary	  to	  Hammond’s	  interpretation,	  such	  a	  choice	  of	  phrase	  need	  not	  be	  
taken	  to	  refer	  to	  infantry	  armed	  with	  sarissas.	  As	  Philip	  met	  Bardylis	  with	  a	  force	  of	  
10,000	  infantry	  and	  600	  cavalry194	  he	  must	  have	  recruited	  at	  least	  4,000	  new	  men	  to	  
have	  met	  the	  Illyrian,	  as	  Perdiccas	  had	  lost	  that	  many	  of	  his	  own	  10,000-­‐strong	  force	  
in	  359.	  By	  “finest	  infantrymen”	  Diodorus	  could	  well	  have	  been	  referring	  to	  those	  of	  
Philip’s	   army	  who	  had	   the	  most	   experience	   and	   training.	  Given	   this,	   the	   idea	   that	  
Philip	  completed	  the	  discussed	  changes	  to	  the	  army	  entirely	  at	  the	  start	  of	  his	  reign	  
is	  surely	  to	  be	  rejected.	  
	  
Unfortunately	   for	   one	   attempting	   to	   understand	   the	   process	   and	   timing	   of	  
the	  sarissa’s	  introduction,	  the	  first	  mention	  of	  the	  weapon	  being	  used	  does	  not	  occur	  
until	   339,	   only	   three	   years	   before	   Philip’s	   death.195	   In	   his	   analysis	   of	   speeches	   of	  
Demosthenes,	  the	  commentator	  Didymus	  states:	  
	  
“[Philip]	  receives	  his	  third	  wound	  in	  the	  assault	  on	  the	  Triballi,	  when	  one	  of	  the	  men	  he	  was	  
pursuing	  thrust	  his	  sarissa	  into	  his	  right	  thigh	  and	  maimed	  him.196	  
	  
Thus	  not	  only	  is	  the	  earliest	  reference	  to	  the	  sarissa	  very	  late	  in	  Philip’s	  reign,	  it	  also	  
appears	  to	  describe	  the	  weapon’s	  use	  against	  a	  Macedonian	  army	  rather	  than	  by	  it.	  
                                         
191	  Hammond	  1980a,	  58f.	  Cf	  Errington	  1990,	  40-­‐41.	  
192	  Diod.	  16.4.5.	  
193	  Markle	  1978,	  486f	  
194	  Diod.	  16.4.3.	  
195	   Markle	   1978,	   489f	   has	   tried	   to	   argue	   against	   the	   sarissa	   having	   been	   used	   at	   the	  Macedonian	   defeat	   to	  
Onomarchus	  in	  353.	  Polyaenus’	  description	  of	  the	  battle	  (2.38.2)	  uses	  the	  term	  ἦκροβολίσαντο	  to	  describe	  the	  
Macedonians’	  engaging	  Onomarchus’	  forces,	  the	  basic	  element	  of	  which	  -­‐	  βολέω,	  βολίζομαι,	  βάλλω	  –	  suggests	  a	  
throwing	  action.	  The	  resultant	  notion	  that	  this	  indicates	  the	  use	  of	  javelins	  rather	  than	  sarissas	  has	  merit,	  but	  is	  
hardly	  conclusive,	  as	  Markle	  himself	  admits.	  
196	  Τ[ρ]ίτον	  τραῦμα	  λ[α]μβάνει	  κατὰ	  τὴν	  εἰς	  τϱιβάλλοὺς	  ἐμβολήν	  τὴν	  οάϱισάν	  τινος	  τῶν	  διωκομ[έν]ων	  εἰς	  τὸν	  





The	   only	   conclusion	   one	   can	   draw	   from	   this	   is	   that	   the	   use	   of	   the	   sarissa	   had	  
presumably	  become	  sufficiently	  established	  in	  Macedon	  to	  have	  begun	  being	  copied	  
by	  surrounding	  kingdoms.	  Justin	  also	  mentions	  Philip’s	  wounding:	  
	  
“Philip	  was	  wounded	   in	   his	   thigh	   in	   such	   a	  way	   that	   his	   horse	  was	   slain	   through	  his	   own	  
body.”197	  
	  
M.	  M.	  Markle	  has	  argued	  that	  such	  an	  injury	  could	  only	  have	  been	  inflicted	  by	  a	  man	  
who	  was	  also	  mounted,	  suggesting	  that	  the	  Triballian	  cavalry	  were	  using	  sarissas.198	  
This	  would	  have	  important	  implications	  regarding	  the	  extent	  of	  the	  weapon’s	  use	  in	  
the	  Macedonian	   army,	   as	   Philip’s	   horse	  would	   presumably	   have	   embraced	   such	   a	  
tactic	  by	  this	  time	  if	  their	  rivals	  had	  done	  so.	  However,	  Markle’s	  point	  is	  debatable.	  
In	  the	  melee	  of	  battle	  it	  is	  hardly	  impossible	  that	  an	  infantryman	  could	  have	  stabbed	  
Philip’s	  horse	  from	  ground	  level	  and	  pierced	  his	  leg	  in	  doing	  so.	  In	  addition,	  Markle’s	  
argument	   depends	   heavily	   on	   his	   alternative	   interpretation	   of	   Didymus’	   excerpt	  
describing	  the	  Triballians	  as	  pursuing	  Philip.,	  rather	  than	  vice	  versa.	  The	  quotation’s	  
unclear	   wording	   makes	   this	   far	   from	   certain	   however.	   Even	   if	   Philip	   was	   being	  
pursued,	  there	  is	  no	  reason	  to	  suspect	  that,	  for	  example,	  having	  attacked	  a	  body	  of	  
infantry	   and	   got	   into	   difficulties,	   he	  was	  wounded	  whilst	   trying	   to	   extract	   himself	  
from	  the	  melee.	  
	  
The	  first	  attested	  use	  of	  the	  sarissa	  by	  a	  Macedonian	  army	  is	  at	  the	  battle	  of	  
Chaeronea	   in	   338.	   Describing	   the	   destruction	   of	   the	   300-­‐strong	   Sacred	   Band	   of	  
Thebes,	  Plutarch	  says	  that:	  
	  
“After	  the	  battle,	  Philip	  was	  surveying	  the	  dead,	  and	  stopped	  at	  the	  place	  where	  the	  three	  
hundred	  were	   lying,	  all	  where	  they	  had	  faced	  and	  met	  his	  sarissae,	  with	  their	  armour	  and	  
mingled	  one	  with	  another,	  he	  was	  amazed.”199	  
	  
It	   is	   obvious	   that	   use	   of	   the	   sarissa	   must	   have	   been	   well	   established	   in	   the	  
Macedonian	  army	  for	  Philip	  to	  have	  employed	  it	  at	  so	  important	  a	  battle.	  Other	  than	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this,	  there	  is	  no	  indication	  of	  how	  long	  it	  had	  been	  in	  use	  in	  the	  Macedonian	  army.	  
However,	   two	   references	   from	  early	   in	  Alexander’s	   reign	  make	  an	   important	  point	  
about	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   sarissa’s	   use	   in	   Philip’s	   reign	   that	   must	   be	   remembered	  
when	  attempting	  to	  understand	  when	  it	  was	  adopted.	  During	  a	  campaign	  across	  the	  
Danube	  in	  335	  to	  suppress	  the	  Getae	  
	  
“Alexander	   led	   his	  men	   through	   the	   field	   of	   standing	   corn,	   ordering	   the	   infantry	   to	   lean	  
upon	   the	   corn	  with	   their	   sarissas	  held	   transversely,	   and	   thus	   to	   advance	   into	   the	  untilled	  
ground…Terrible	  to	  [the	  Getae]	  also	  was	  the	  closely-­‐locked	  order	  of	  the	  phalanx.”200	  
	  
As	   has	   already	   been	   mentioned,	   Arrian	   was	   a	   man	   of	   considerable	   military	  
understanding.	   His	   use	   of	   ‘sarissas’	   (σάρισσαι)	   rather	   than	   ‘spears’	   (δόρασι)	   was	  
thus	   surely	  deliberate.	  Moreover,	  his	   source	  at	   this	  point	  was	  most	   likely	  Ptolemy,	  
also	  a	  man	  to	  whom	  such	  a	  matter	  would	  not	  be	  unfamiliar.	  Clearly	  then,	  the	  sarissa	  
was	  firmly	  in	  place	  as	  an	  infantry	  weapon.	  	  
	  
Shortly	  before	  this	  however,	  Arrian	  records	  an	  incident	  with	  the	  Taulantians	  that	  
would	   suggest	   the	   use	   of	   the	   spear,	   not	   the	   sarissa.	   Finding	   himself	   on	   a	   plain	  
hemmed	  in	  by	  mountains,	  woods	  and	  a	  river,	  and	  with	  enemies	  positioned	  so	  that	  
the	  only	  route	  out	  was	  so	  narrow	  that	  exit	  was	  impossible	  “even	  if	  only	  four	  shield-­‐
bearers	  marched	   abreast”,	   Alexander	   drew	   up	   his	   troops	   and	   had	   them	   carry	   out	  
what	  can	  best	  be	  described	  as	  drill	  exercises:	  
	  
“…he	  gave	  the	  signal	  to	  the	  heavy-­‐armed	  infantry	  in	  the	  first	  place	  to	  hold	  their	  spears	  erect,	  
then	  to	  couch	  them	  at	  the	  concerted	  sign;	  at	  one	  time	  to	   incline	  their	  spears	  to	  the	  right,	  
closely	  locked	  together,	  and	  at	  another	  time	  towards	  the	  left.	  He	  then	  set	  the	  phalanx	  itself	  
into	  quick	  motion	  forward,	  and	  marched	  it	  towards	  the	  wings,	  now	  to	  the	  right,	  and	  then	  to	  
the	  left.”201	  
	  
The	   speed	   and	   skill	   with	   which	   his	   infantry	   did	   so	   was	   enough	   to	   scare	   the	  
Taulantians	   into	   “quitting	   the	   first	   ridge	   of	   the	   mountains”	   on	   which	   they	   were	  
positioned.	  To	  further	  exploit	  this	  apprehension	  
	  
                                         






“…Alexander	  ordered	  the	  Macedonians	  to	  raise	  the	  battle-­‐cry	  and	  made	  a	  clatter	  with	  their	  
spears	   upon	   their	   shields,	   and	   the	   Taulantians,	   being	   still	  more	   alarmed	   at	   the	   noise	   led	  
their	  army	  back	  to	  the	  city	  with	  all	  speed.”202	  
	  
It	   is	   difficult	   to	   see	   how	   such	  manoeuvres	   could	   have	   been	   carried	   out	   effectively	  
with	  18ft	  sarissas.	  In	  addition,	  the	  clashing	  of	  a	  weapon	  of	  such	  length	  upon	  a	  small,	  
shoulder-­‐mounted	   shield	  would	   surely	   not	   have	   been	   practical.	   Thus	   it	  was	   surely	  
the	  shorter	  spear	  that	  was	   in	  use	  here	  rather	  than	  the	  sarissa.	  As	  a	  result	   it	  would	  
seem	   that	   in	   335	   there	   is	   one	   case	   of	   Macedonian	   infantry	   operating	   without	  
sarissas,	   and	   one	   where	   they	   did.	   Given	   Arrian’s	   already	   mentioned	   reliability,	   it	  
seems	  reasonable	  to	  assume	  these	  descriptions’	  reliability.	  	  
	  
Such	  variation	   is	  surely	   indicative	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  even	  though	  the	  adoption	  
of	  the	  sarissa	  marked	  a	  shift	  in	  the	  Macedonian	  infantry’s	  default	  weapon,	  the	  use	  of	  
other	  weapons	  was	   not	   completely	   abandoned.203	   Given	   the	   specialised	   nature	   of	  
the	   sarissa	   –	   it	   was	   of	   use	   only	   in	   set	   piece	   battles,	   not	   skirmishes	   and	   sieges	   –	  
Macedonian	  infantry	  must	  have	  been	  trained	  to	  use	  the	  more	  versatile	  hoplite	  spear	  
and	  associated	  equipment	  as	  well.204	  Consequently,	  the	  search	  for	  an	  exact	  point	  at	  
which	   the	   sarissa	   was	   introduced	   would	   most	   likely	   be	   fruitless	   even	   if	   more	  
information	   survived	   for	   Philip’s	   reign,	   as	   Philip	   would	   have	   adapted	   his	   army’s	  
arrangement	  and	  armament	  depending	  on	  the	  circumstances.	  	  
	  
(iv)	  Summary	  of	  Findings	  
	  
“It	  is	  impossible	  to	  say	  what	  parts	  of	  the	  army	  Philip	  inherited	  from	  previous	  kings,	  and	  
what	   he	   created	   for	   himself,	   as	   the	   sources	   say	   so	   little	   on	   the	   subject.	   It	   is	   also	  
impossible	  to	  provide	  a	  timeline	  for	  the	  reforms.	  Everything	  did	  not	  happen	  overnight,	  
and	   military	   innovations	   were	   still	   being	   made	   as	   Macedon	   increased	   in	   size	   and	  
power.”205	  
	  
	   In	   saying	   this,	   I.	   Worthington,	   author	   of	   the	   most	   recently	   published	  
biography	   of	   Philip,	   is	   largely	   correct.	   Exactly	   how	  much	   of	   an	   army	   Philip	   found	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himself	   in	  possession	  of	   in	  359	  is	  unknown,	  and	  detailed	  understanding	  of	  what	  he	  
did	   to	   it	   and	   when	   is	   impossible	   to	   ascertain	   from	   the	   surviving	   source	   material.	  
However,	   though	   the	   timeline	   for	   his	   reforms	   remains	   uncertain,	   the	   reforms	  
themselves	  do	  not	  remain	  unknown	  to	  the	  modern	  scholar.	  
	  
	   Philip	   was	   surely	   behind	   the	   introduction	   of	   the	   sarissa.	   Even	   though	   the	  
weapon’s	   first	   appearance	   in	   the	   sources	   is	   not	   until	   339,	   its	   importance	   in	   the	  
campaigns	   of	   his	   son	   is	   too	   great	   for	   Alexander	   to	   have	   been	   responsible	   for	   its	  
widespread	  use	  in	  the	  Macedonian	  army.	   If	  one	  assumes	  this,	  one	  can	  credit	  Philip	  
with	   various	   alterations	   to	   the	   arrangement	   of	   the	   troops	   that	   made	   use	   of	   the	  
weapon.	  Wielding	  the	  sarissa	  with	  two	  hands	  rather	  than	  one	  demanded	  the	  shield	  
be	  carried	  on	  the	  shoulder,	  resulting	  in	  a	  decrease	  in	  its	  size.	  This	  in	  turn	  permitted	  
infantrymen	  to	  stand	  closer	  together,	  resulting	  in	  a	  more	  firmly	  formed	  phalanx.	  The	  
weapon’s	  greater	   reach	  allowed	  more	  spear	   tips	   to	  protrude	  beyond	  the	  phalanx’s	  
front	   row,	   allowing	   the	   unit	   greater	   offensive	   and	   defensive	   potential	   than	   the	  
standard	   hoplite	   equivalent.	   Altogether	   this	   made	   it	   extremely	   difficult	   for	   a	  
traditional	  hoplite	  phalanx	  to	  inflict	  significant	  damage	  on	  Macedonian	  infantrymen,	  
as	  the	  latter	  would	  always	  be	  able	  to	  offer	  greater	  attacking	  force,	  and	  do	  so	  before	  
the	  hoplite	  unit	  was	  close	  enough	  to	  inflict	  any	  damage	  itself.	  
	  
	   Philip	  can	  also	  be	  credited	  with	  a	  vast	  increase	  in	  the	  scale	  of	  the	  Macedonian	  
army.	  Although	  a	  significant	  proportion	  of	   the	  380%	   increase	   in	   infantry	  and	  600%	  
growth	  in	  cavalry	  would	  have	  been	  a	  result	  of	  the	  reabsorbtion	  or	  Upper	  Macedonia,	  
a	   greater	   proportion	   would	   have	   been	   due	   to	   the	   stability	   that	   Philip	   brought	   to	  
Macedon.	  Once	  the	  threat	  of	  foreign	  incursion	  was	  removed,	  domestic	  productivity	  
would	   have	   improved,	   resulting	   in	   steady	   population	   growth.	   Philip’s	   using	   allied	  
forces	  alongside	  his	  own	  throughout	  his	  reign	  would	  have	  helped	  this.	  Increasing	  the	  
number	  of	  potential	  soldiers	  was	  not	  Philip’s	  only	  contribution	  however.	  His	  changes	  
to	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  army	  travelled	  and	  was	  trained	  brought	  to	  it	  a	  new	  level	  of	  






One	  cannot	  be	  sure	  exactly	  what	  state	  Macedon’s	  army	  was	   in	  when	  Philip	  
acceded	   in	  359.	  However,	   that	   it	  was	  small,	  basic	  and	  poorly	  equipped	  seems	  very	  
likely;	  unfamiliar	  with	  traditional	  hoplite-­‐phalanx	  warfare	  very	  possible;	  and	  low	  on	  
morale	   following	   a	   crushing	   defeat	   near	   certain.	   By	   the	   end	   of	   his	   reign	   it	   was	  
approximately	  four	  times	  the	  size	  it	  had	  been.	  In	  addition,	  it	  was	  seemingly	  trained	  in	  
a	  superior	  version	  of	  such	  phalanx-­‐based	  combat	  that	  made	   it	   the	  premier	  fighting	  
force	  in	  the	  ancient	  world.	  That	  Alexander,	  apparently	  without	  any	  major	  alteration	  
or	  improvement,	  was	  able	  to	  achieve	  what	  he	  did	  with	  the	  same	  army	  is	  surely	  the	  







	   Philip	   II	   has	   the	   reputation	   of	   one	  who	   rescued	   a	   country	   on	   the	   verge	   of	  
destruction	  and	  finally	  realised	  its	  full	  military	  potential.	  This	  chapter	  has	  attempted	  
to	  investigate	  whether	  such	  a	  reputation	  is	  deserved,	  and	  indeed	  whether	  sufficient	  
evidence	  survives	  to	  fairly	  assess	  the	  matter	  at	  all.	  
	  
	   With	   regard	   to	   the	   challenges	   Philip	   faced	   upon	  becoming	   king	   in	   359,	   the	  
danger	   posed	   by	   the	   Illyrians,	   Thracians,	   Paeonians	   and	   Illyrians	  was	   undoubtedly	  
huge.	  However,	   it	  would	   seem	  that	   some	  of	   these	  peoples	  were	  not	  as	   concerned	  
with	  wreaking	  the	  destruction	  they	  were	  capable	  of	  as	  Philip	  and	  the	  Macedonians	  
might	   have	   feared.	   The	   bribes	   that	   dissuaded	   the	   Paeonians	   and	   Thracians	   from	  
serious	   incursions	   into	   Macedonian	   territory	   cannot	   have	   been	   large	   given	  
Macedon’s	   financial	   state.	   Similarly,	   Philip	   apparently	   inspired	  Athens	   to	  withdraw	  
support	   for	   their	  pretender	   to	   the	   throne	   simply	  by	  withdrawing	  his	  garrison	   from	  
Amphipolis.	   Even	   so,	   one	   must	   still	   recognise	   the	   achievement	   such	   matters	  
represent;	   persuading	   the	   Paeonian	   and	   Thracian	   kings	   to	   agree	   to	   such	   terms	  
should	  not	  be	  underestimated	  as	  they	  were	  already	  reaping	  the	  benefits	  of	  raids	  into	  
Macedon,	  and	  had	  to	  be	  persuaded	  to	  desist.	  However,	  Philip’s	  finest	  achievement	  
in	  359	   is	   in	  regard	  to	  the	   Illyrians.	  Unlike	  the	  kings	  of	  Thrace	  and	  Paeonia,	  Bardylis	  
was	   clearly	   concerned	  with	  major	   invasion.	   It	  would	   seem	  perfectly	  possible,	   even	  
likely	  that	  Philip	  managed	  to	  persuade	  the	  Illyrian	  to	  agree	  to	  a	  peace,	  sealed	  with	  a	  
marriage.	  Even	  though	  this	  suggests	  he	  too	  was	  not	  fully	  concerned	  with	  complete	  
conquest	   of	   Macedon,	   Philip’s	   achievement	   should	   not	   be	   underestimated.	   His	  
defeat	  of	  Bardylis’	  forces	  only	  a	  year	  later	  is	  perhaps	  even	  more	  impressive	  given	  the	  
losses	  sustained	  by	  Perdiccas	  in	  359,	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  forces	  remaining	  and	  the	  level	  
morale	  must	  have	  been	  at.	  	  
	  
	   It	  is	  in	  his	  effect	  on	  the	  Macedonian	  army	  that	  Philip’s	  achievement	  truly	  lies.	  
The	   growth	   in	   its	   size	  was	  huge,	   and	   cannot	  be	  put	  down	   simply	   to	   the	  economic	  





Rather,	  the	  accounts	  offered	  of	  his	  changes	  to	  the	  army’s	  organisation	  and	  training	  
standards	   indicate	  a	   concerted	  effort	   to	   turn	   it	   into	   the	   finest	   fighting	   force	   in	   the	  
Greek	  world.	  Constant	  expansion	  of	  the	  army’s	  numbers	  must	  have	  formed	  part	  of	  
this.	  
	  
	   The	  biggest	   single	   trigger	   for	   fundamental	   alteration	   to	  every	  aspect	  of	   the	  
military’s	  organisation,	  particularly	   in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  infantry,	  was	  the	  introduction	  
of	   the	   sarissa.	   This	   was	   undoubtedly	   Philip’s	   innovation,	   and	   resulted	   in	   a	  
fundamental	  change	  to	  the	  arrangement	  of	  the	  infantry	  phalanx,	  and	  the	  way	  it	  was	  
operated.	  Use	  of	   the	   sarissa	   required	  a	   very	  high	   level	  of	   training,	  both	  personally	  
and	  as	  a	  unit.	  It	  also	  led	  to	  a	  change	  in	  the	  size	  and	  employment	  of	  the	  shield,	  which	  
was	  strapped	  across	  the	  shoulder	  rather	  than	  carried	  in	  the	  hand.	  Unfortunately	  one	  
has	  as	  little	  information	  on	  the	  process	  by	  which	  these	  changes	  occurred	  as	  one	  does	  
on	  the	  stages	  of	  the	  army’s	  expansion.	  One	  is	  left	  to	  comment	  only	  on	  the	  results	  of	  
the	   innovations,	   not	   the	   processes	   by	  which	   they	  were	   introduced.	   However,	   this	  
does	  not	  detract	  from	  the	  achievement	  the	  changes	  represent.	  Philip	  took	  an	  army	  
that	  was	   small,	   broken	  and	  possibly	   even	  unfamiliar	  with	   the	  basic	   concept	  of	   the	  
Greek	  hoplite	   phalanx,	   and	  not	   only	   defeated	   the	   Ilyrian	   forces	  who	  had	  only	   one	  
year	  before	  killed	  4,000	  Macedonians,	  but	  turned	  it	  into	  the	  premiere	  fighting	  force	  
in	  the	  Greek	  world.	  That	  Alexander	  was	  able	  to	  embark	  on	  his	  invasion	  of	  the	  Persian	  
empire	  and	  achieve	  what	  he	  did	   so	   soon	  after	  becoming	  king	   firmly	   indicates	   this.	  	  
Thus	  it	  would	  be	  fair	  to	  say	  that	  Philip’s	  reputation	  as	  saviour	  of	  Macedon	  and	  one	  















Philip	  and	  Athens:	  War	  and	  Peace	  
	  
	  
I. 	  Introduction	  
	  
The	  history	  of	  Philip’s	  relations	  with	  Athens	  is	  long	  and	  complex	  enough	  to	  fill	  
entire	  books.	  This	  chapter	  will	  thus	  not	  be	  a	  study	  of	  such	  relations	  in	  their	  entirety,	  
and	   certainly	   not	   of	   Philip’s	   wider	   involvement	   with	   the	   myriad	   Greek	   city-­‐states	  
generally.	   Instead,	   the	   focus	  will	   be	   the	   conflict	   that	   existed	   between	   Athens	   and	  
Macedon	  from	  the	  early	  stages	  of	  Philip’s	  reign	  until	  the	  summer	  of	  346,	  and	  which	  
culminated	   on	   the	   highly	   controversial	   ‘Peace	   of	   Philocrates’.	   The	   purpose,	   in	  
keeping	  with	  the	  general	  theme	  of	  this	  work,	  will	  be	  to	  indicate	  whether	  the	  modern	  
scholar	  can	  make	  a	  fair	  assessment	  of	  Philip’s	  political	  aims	  regarding	  Athens	  in	  this	  
period,	  and	  indeed	  with	  Greece	  generally.	  As	  will	  be	  seen,	  Philip	  was	  very	  much	  the	  
party	  who	  sought	  to	  bring	  the	  conflict	  between	  the	  two	  sides,	  which	  had	  begun	   in	  
358/7,	   to	   a	   close.	   The	   question	   that	  will	   be	   considered	   concerns	  what	   exactly	   his	  
motives	  were	  in	  doing	  so.	  Although,	  as	  has	  been	  stated,	  a	  detailed	  study	  of	  Philip’s	  
involvement	  with	   Athens	   or	   the	   rest	   of	   Greece	   up	   to	   this	   point	   is	   not	   possible	   or	  
appropriate,	   some	   examination	   of	   such	   matters	   must	   occur.	   Understanding	   the	  
events	   that	   preceded	   the	   treaty	   of	   346	   is	   crucial	   to	   grasping	   the	   context	   in	  which	  
Philip’s	  actions	  were	  made.	  
	  
Consequently,	   this	   chapter	   will	   be	   constructed	   along	   broadly	   chronological	  
lines.	   It	  will	   firstly	  outline	   the	  causes	  of	   the	  outbreak	  of	   the	  way	  between	   the	   two	  
parties	   which,	   as	   will	   be	   seen,	   was	   almost	   entirely	   the	   result	   of	   Philip’s	   actions	  
towards	  Athenian	  holdings	  in	  the	  north	  Aegean.	  The	  events	  will	  be	  examined	  to	  see	  
whether	   or	   not	   Philip	   was	   guilty	   of	   intentionally	   misleading	   Athens,	   to	   delay	   the	  
declaration	  of	  war	  for	  his	  own	  strategic	  gain.	  As	  such	  an	  accusation	  has	  been	  levelled	  
at	  Philip	  regarding	  the	  Peace	  of	  Philocrates,	  this	  will	  offer	  important	  insight	  into	  his	  







The	  following	  section	  will	  offer	  a	  brief	  summary	  of	  the	  Third	  Sacred	  War,	  its	  
causes	  and	  the	  stage	  at	  which	  matters	  stood	  when	  Philip	  and	  Athens	  opened	  peace	  
talks.	  In	  the	  opinion	  of	  many	  modern	  scholars	  Philip’s	  actions	  towards	  and	  promises	  
to	  Athens	  were	  directly	   informed	  by	  his	   intentions	   regarding	   the	  conclusion	  of	   the	  
Sacred	   War,	   into	   which	   he	   had	   become	   drawn.	   An	   understanding	   of	   Philip’s	  
involvement	  in	  the	  conflict	  is	  thus	  crucial	  to	  a	  fair	  examination	  of	  his	  motives	  in	  346.	  
	  
The	  following	  section	  will	  focus	  on	  the	  events	  that	  led	  up	  to	  the	  close	  of	  the	  
conflict,	   and	  examine	  what	   inspired	   the	  Athenians,	  who	  were	   suffering	  no	   greater	  
lack	  of	  success	  than	  they	  had	  done	  in	  previous	  years,	  to	  respond	  to	  Philip’s	  overtures	  
when	  they	  had	  previously	  rejected	  them.	  
	  
The	   chapter’s	   focus	   will	   then	   turn	   to	   the	   extended	   negotiations	   that	  
surrounded	  the	  terms	  of	  peace	  settlement.	  Both	  of	  the	  embassies	  send	  by	  Athens	  to	  
Philip’s	  court	  will	  be	  examined,	  as	  will	  the	  surrounding	  debates	  held	  in	  the	  Assembly.	  
It	   is	   here	   in	   particular	   that	   the	   reliability	   of	   the	   evidence	  will	   be	   examined,	   as	   the	  
chief	  surviving	  sources	  are	  the	  speeches	  of	  Aeschines	  and	  Demosthenes.	  As	  has	  been	  
mentioned	  elsewhere,	  their	  rivalry,	  and	  the	  context	  of	  most	  of	  the	  relevant	  speeches	  








(i)	  Outbreak	  of	  War	  
	  
It	  has	  been	  argued	  elsewhere206	  that	  Philip’s	  withdrawal	  of	  the	  Macedonian	  
garrison	  present	  at	  Amphipolis	  in	  359	  was	  clearly	  done	  with	  the	  aim	  of	  placating	  the	  
Athenians	  and	  persuading	  them	  to	  abandon	  their	  support	  for	  Argeus,	  the	  pretender	  
to	   Philip’s	   throne.	   After	   this	  went	   as	   Philip	   had	   hoped,	   and	   Argeus	  was	   defeated,	  
Philip	  sent	  a	   letter	  of	   friendship	  to	  Athens,207	  which	  was	  followed	  soon	  after	  by	  an	  
embassy	  to	  assure	  the	  Athenians	  he	  had	  renounced	  all	  claim	  to	  Amphipolis.208	  
	  
However,	   in	  early	  357	  the	  Athenians	  had	  not	  acted	  on	  this	   information	  and	  
moved	  against	  Amphipolis,	  perhaps	  mindful	  of	  their	   failure	  to	  take	  the	  city	   in	  their	  
previous	  attempts,209	  but	  more	  likely	  as	  a	  result	  of	  their	  being	  involved	  with	  Euboea	  
and	  the	  Chersonese.210	  Consequently,	  when	  “the	  Amphipolitans	  were	  unfriendly	  to	  
him	  and	  had	  given	  him	  provocation,”	  Philip	  besieged	  the	  city	  and	  captured	   it	   fairly	  
swiftly.211	   It	  did	  not	  occur	   so	  quickly	   that	  Athens	  could	  not	  have	   reacted	  however;	  
indeed,	  Amphipolitan	  envoys	  reached	  Athens	  and	  offered	  to	  surrender	  to	  Athenian	  
rule	   if	   only	   Philip	   was	   repulsed.212	   Such	   an	   offer	   was	   rejected	   however,	   when	   a	  
message	  from	  Philip	  was	  received	  promising	  to	  hand	  the	  city	  over	  to	  Athens	  upon	  its	  
capture.213	  
	  
Athens’	   taking	   such	   an	   approach,	   combined	   with	   Demosthenes’	   cryptic	  
reference	   to	  a	   “secret	  everyone	  was	   talking	  about”	  at	   the	   time214	  has	   led	   some	   to	  
                                         
206	  See	  above,	  p23-­‐4.	  
207	  Dem.	  23.121.	  
208	  Diod.	  16.4.1.	  
209	  Most	  recently	  an	  expedition	  led	  by	  Timotheus	  had	  failed	  in	  360/59	  –	  Aesch.	  Schol.	  2.31;	  Polyaen.	  3.10.8.	  
210	  Griffith	  1979,	  237.	  
211	  Diod.	  16.8.2.	  How	  the	  Amphipolitans	  were	  “unfriendly”	  is	  unknown.	  Hammond	  1994,	  30	  suggests	  the	  party	  in	  
power	  were	  hostile	  to	  Philip,	  who	  felt	  he	  could	  not	  risk	  this	  leading	  to	  an	  alliance	  with	  Athens.	  Griffith	  1979	  
suspects	  that	  Philip	  sought	  to	  exploit	  Athens’	  inaction,	  and	  demanded	  Amphipolis	  allow	  a	  Macedonian	  garrison	  
to	  be	  reinstalled,	  with	  Philip	  using	  the	  city’s	  refusal	  as	  provocation	  for	  his	  attack.	  
212	  Dem.	  1.8,	  26.	  
213	  Dem.	  2.27,	  23.116.	  






suspect	   that	   a	   secret	   arrangement	   was	   made	   for	   Athens	   to	   receive	   control	   of	  
Amphipolis	   from	   Philip	   in	   exchange	   for	   surrendering	   Pydna.215	   Athenian	  
ambassadors	   were	   certainly	   dispatched	   to	   attempt	   to	   negotiate	   such	   an	  
arrangement,216	  but	   that	   it	  was	  ever	  officially	  agreed	  upon	   is	  most	  unlikely.	  Such	  a	  
matter	   could	  hardly	  have	  been	  a	   secret	   at	  Athens,	   as	   it	  would	  need	   to	  have	  been	  
approved	  by	  the	  Assembly.	  If	  this	  were	  the	  case	  the	  arrangement	  would	  have	  been	  
official,	  in	  which	  case	  it	  would	  have	  been	  related	  as	  such.	  The	  only	  alternative	  is	  that	  
it	  was	  a	  rumour,217	  which	  could	  perfectly	  well	  have	  resulted	  from	  the	  envoys	  being	  
dispatched.	  More	   significantly	  however,	   the	  Athenians	  had	  already	  been	  promised	  
Amphipolis	   for	   free.	   Their	   seeking	   to	   exchange	   another	   city	   for	   it	   can	   only	   have	  
occurred	   some	   time	   later,	   when	   Philip	   had	   failed	   to	   deliver	   the	   city	   as	   initially	  
promised.	  
	  
That	  the	  Athenians	  believed	  that	  they	  could	  still	  do	  such	  business	  with	  a	  man	  
who	  had	  presumably	  gone	  back	  on	  his	  word	  once	  already	  may	  seem	  naïve.	  However,	  
it	   would	   explain	   how	   they	   did	   not	   declare	   war	   on	   Philip,	   despite	   their	   failure	   to	  
secure	  Amphipolis	  after	  its	  capture,	  until	  the	  king	  attacked	  and	  took	  control	  of	  Pydna	  
in	  357.218	  G.	  T.	  Griffith	  has	  argued	  that	   the	  Athenians	  would	  not	  have	  been	  hugely	  
shocked	  by	  Philip’s	  not	  surrendering	  Amphipolis.	   Instead,	  their	  experience	  in	  Greek	  
inter-­‐state	   politics	   would	   have	   led	   them	   to	   presume	   Philip	   was	   angling	   to	   gain	  
something	  for	  surrendering	  the	  city,	  and	  see	  such	  a	  move	  as	  regular	  enough	  to	  allow	  
for	   it.	   A	   deal	   involving	   Pydna	   was	   thus	   a	   response	   to	   this.219	   Such	   an	   argument	  
cannot	  be	  proven,	  but	  it	  should	  be	  said	  that	  it	  is	  harder	  to	  accept	  that	  the	  Athenians	  
believed	  Philip	  would	  genuinely	  surrender	  as	  important	  a	  site	  as	  Amphipolis,	  without	  
expecting	  anything	  in	  return.	  
	  
On	  reality	  Philip	  clearly	  had	  no	  intention	  of	  surrendering	  Amphipolis	  for	  any	  
price.	  As	  has	  been	  said,	  soon	  after	  the	  city	  was	  taken	  he	  moved	  against	  Pydna	  itself,	  
                                         
215	  See	  de	  Ste-­‐Croix	  1963,	  110-­‐119.	  
216	  Theop.	  FGrh	  n.	  115	  F	  30A	  and	  30	  B.	  
217	  de	  Ste-­‐Croix	  1963,	  111f.	  Cf.	  Griffith	  1979,	  238f.	  
218	  Diod.	  16.8.3.	  






and	  took	   it	  after	  a	  short	  siege.220	   It	  was	  apparently	  not	  until	   this	  point	  that	  Athens	  
finally	   recognised	   the	   true	   situation,	  and	  declared	  war.221	   	  One	  might	  wonder	  why	  
Philip	  continued	  to	  indicate	  that	  he	  genuinely	  intended	  to	  withdraw	  from	  Amphipolis	  
until	   this	   time.	   The	   most	   likely	   answer	   is	   that	   he	   was	   in	   negotiations	   with	   the	  
Chalcidian	  League,	  which	  he	  did	  want	  allying	  with	  Athens,	  and	  so	  did	  what	  he	  could	  
to	  delay	  for	  as	  long	  as	  possible	  the	  latter’s	  turning	  against	  him.	  	  
	  
The	   Chalcidian	   League	   had	   already	   attempted	   to	   forge	   an	   alliance	   with	  
Athens	  in	  358	  but	  the	  latter	  had	  rejected	  the	  overtures	  thanks	  to	  Philip’s	  promise	  of	  
Amphipolis.	  This	   time	  Philip	  headed	  off	  an	  Athenian-­‐Chalcidian	  union	  by	  promising	  
the	  League	  control	  of	  the	  city	  of	  Potidaea	  if	  the	  League	  allied	  with	  him	  against	  it.222	  
Philip	  ensured	  the	  treaty	  included	  a	  clause	  that	  neither	  party	  should	  ally	  separately	  
with	  the	  Greek	  city,	  clearly	  to	  guarantee	  an	  agreement	  with	  Athens	  was	  avoided.223	  
This	   situation	   secure,	   Philip	   soon	  moved	  against	   Potidaea.	  Athens	   voted	   to	   send	  a	  
force	   to	   relieve	   it,	   but	   for	   reasons	   that	   remain	   unclear	   it	   was	   most	   likely	   never	  
dispatched.224	   Significantly	   though,	   when	   the	   city	   fell	   its	   Athenian	   cleuruchs	   were	  
permitted	   to	   return	   to	   Athens	   unharmed,	   whilst	   the	   rest	   of	   the	   population	   was	  
enslaved.225	  
	  
At	  this	  point	  on	  should	  pause.	  As	  mentioned	  above,	  the	  Social	  War	  of	  357-­‐5	  
curtailed	   the	   Athenians’	   opposition	   to	   Philip.	   The	   extent	   of	   their	   moves	   against	  
Macedon	   in	   the	   mid-­‐350s	   were	   consequently	   limited	   to	   the	   signing	   of	   various	  
treaties	  with	   Philip’s	   other	   enemies	   in	   the	   north	  Aegean,	   including	   the	   Paeonians,	  
Thracians	   and	   Illyrians.226	   Philip	   turned	   his	   attention	   to	   campaigning	   against	   these	  
rivals,	   and	   thereafter	  became	   increasingly	   involved	   in	   the	   conflict	   that	  had	  divided	  
Greece,	  the	  Third	  Sacred	  War.	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(ii)	  The	  Sacred	  War	  
	  
As	  has	  been	  said,	  the	  focus	  of	  this	  essay	  is	  not	  Philip’s	  relations	  with	  all	  of	  the	  Greek	  
states.	   However,	   the	   impact	   of	   the	   Third	   Sacred	  War	   on	   the	   political	   and	  military	  
actions	  of	  all	  the	  Greek	  states	  is	  such	  that	  a	  brief	  summary	  of	  its	  events,	  and	  Philip’s	  
involvement	  in	  them,	  is	  necessary.	  
	  
The	  Third	  Sacred	  War	  had	  broken	  out	  in	  356.227	  Thebes,	  the	  dominant	  state	  
in	  Greece	   for	  much	  of	   the	   360s,	   had	   seen	  her	   position	  begin	   to	  weaken	   since	   the	  
inconclusive	   battle	   of	   Mantinea	   in	   363/2,	   where	   the	   city’s	   great	   general,	  
Epaminondas,	  had	  been	  killed.	  Thebes’	  strength	  had	  previously	  been	  recognised	  by	  it	  
being	   granted	   precedence	   over	   all	   other	   cities	   on	   the	   Amphictyonic	   Council	   in	  
consulting	   the	   oracles	   of	   Apollo	   at	   Delphi	   and	   Demeter	   and	   Thermopylae.	   The	  
council	   was	   responsible	   for	   the	   protection	   of	   the	   sacred	   shrine	   and	   comprised	  
representatives	   from	   multiple	   city-­‐states,	   its	   origins	   lying	   in	   the	   twelve	  
‘Amphictyones’	   (‘dwellers	   around’),	   tribes	   who	   originally	   resided	   nearby.228	   It	   was	  
through	   her	   prominent	   position	   on	   this	   body,	   combined	   with	   the	   support	   of	   her	  
allies	   that	   Thebes	   sought	   to	   arrest	   her	   political	   slide.	   When,	   in	   357,	   Athens	   was	  
drawn	   into	   conflict	   with	   Rhodes,	   Chios,	   Cos	   and	   Byzantium,	   Thebes	   attempted	   to	  
strengthen	  her	  own	  position	  through	  her	  position	  on	  the	  Council.	  This	  took	  the	  form	  
of	  a	  large	  fine	  for	  Athens’	  ally	  Sparta	  for	  an	  occupation	  of	  the	  Theban	  acropolis	  back	  
on	   382.229	   This	  was	   swiftly	   followed	   by	   a	   similar	   fine	   for	   the	   Phocians	   for	   illegally	  
cultivating	   the	   Cirrhaian	   Plan.230	   The	   Phocians	   were	   outraged	   and	   refused	   to	   pay.	  
Although	  from	  the	  beginning	  they	  enjoyed	  Spartan	  backing,	  the	  Phocians	  lacked	  the	  
manpower	  and	  finances	  to	  oppose	  Thebes	  militarily.	  They	  therefore	  occupied	  Delphi	  
with	  what	   forces	   they	  had	  and	  used	   its	   funds	   to	  hire	  armies	  of	  mercenaries.	  Soon,	  
formal	  alliances	  were	  made	  with	  Athens	  and	  Sparta,	   though	  they	  were	  worth	   little	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militarily,	  and	  in	  response	  Thebes	  persuaded	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  Amphictyonic	  Council	  to	  
declare	  war	  on	  them	  in	  355.231	  
	  
The	   swift	   success	   that	   the	   Thebans	   hoped	   for	  with	   the	   League’s	   combined	  
forces	   was	   not	   forthcoming;	   indeed,	   the	   Phocian	   commander	   Philomelus	   inflicted	  
several	  defeats	  on	  the	  Boeotian	  and	  Thessalian	  forces	  in	  354,	  with	  the	  result	  that	  the	  
latter	   split	   into	   two	   groups.	   The	   tyrants	  who	   controlled	   Pherae	   allied	  with	   Athens	  
and	  joined	  the	  Phocian	  cause.	  The	  remainder	  of	  the	  Thessalian	  League	  appealed	  to	  
Philip	   for	   help	   against	   them.	   Having	   captured	  Methone,	   he	   answered	   the	   calls	   in	  
early	  353,	  and	  soon	  allied	  with	  Thebes	  and	  her	  other	  allies.232	  
	  
Shortly	   before,	   in	   the	   autumn	   of	   354,	   Boeotian	   forces	   inflicted	   a	   serious	  
defeat	   on	   Philomelus,	   who	   committed	   suicide.233	   The	   Thebans	   were	   so	   confident	  
that	   this	   victory	   and	   Philip’s	   entry	   into	   the	   war	   signalled	   the	   end	   of	   the	   Phocian	  
resistance	  that	  they	  sent	  5,000	  men	  to	  serve	  as	  mercenaries	  against	  the	  Persian	  king,	  
as	  the	  payments	  would	  go	  some	  way	  to	  covering	  their	  war	  expenses.	  However,	  they	  
had	  misjudged	  the	  situation,	  as	  the	  Phocians	  swiftly	  found	  a	  dynamic	  and	  extremely	  
capable	   new	   leader,	   Onomarchus.	   With	   an	   army	   of	   newly	   hired	   mercenaries	   he	  
forced	  Thebes’	  ally	  Locris	  out	  of	  the	  war,	  and	  pinned	  down	  the	  forces	  of	  the	  various	  
cities	   in	   Boeotia.	   He	   also	   bribed	   various	   Thessalian	   cities,	   including	   Pherae,	   to	  
withdraw	  from	  the	  conflict.	  Philip	  was	  required	  to	  act,	  and	  with	  his	  own	  forces	  and	  
those	   of	   the	   Thessalian	   League	   he	   besieged	   Pherae.	   A	   relief	   effort	   sent	   by	  
Onomarchus	  was	  initially	  defeated,	  but	  in	  353	  the	  man	  himself	  arrived	  and	  with	  the	  
aid	   of	   Pheraean	   forces	   inflicted	   two	   defeats	   upon	   Philip,	   and	   forced	   him	   out	   of	  
Thessaly.234	  
	  
Further	  Phocian	  success	  in	  353	  meant	  that	  were	  Onomarchus	  to	  have	  united	  
with	  Athenian	  forces	  the	  next	  year,	  the	  rest	  of	  Thessaly	  would	  surely	  have	  fallen	  to	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him.	   Boeotia	   would	   have	   followed,	   and	   the	   destruction	   of	   Thebes	   was	   the	   likely	  
culmination	   of	   events.	   Philip	   therefore	   swiftly	   renewed	   his	   siege	   of	   Pherae,	   and	  
persuaded	   the	   Thessalian	   League	   to	   grant	   him	   command	  of	   all	   their	   forces.	  When	  
Onomarchus	  responded	  to	  renewed	  appeals	  from	  Pherae,	  Philip	  defeated	  him	  at	  the	  
Battle	  of	   the	  Crocus	  Field.	  The	  Phocian	   leader	  either	  died	  or	  committed	  suicide,	  as	  
the	  destruction	  of	  his	  forces	  meant	  the	  effective	  end	  of	  Phocis’	  ability	  to	  fight	  on.235	  
Pherae	  swiftly	  surrendered,	  and	  Philip	  saw	  that	  only	  its	  tyrants	  were	  punished.	  The	  
war	  was	  effectively	  over,	  with	  the	  only	  matter	  remaining	  being	  the	  capture	  of	  Phocis.	  
Before	   pursuing	   this	   however,	   Philip	   dealt	   with	   various	   matters	   in	   Thessaly.	   The	  
result	  was	   his	   being	   elected	   to	   the	   position	   of	   archon	   of	   the	   League	   for	   life,	   thus	  
effectively	  granting	  him	  permanent	  control	  of	  its	  resources	  and	  military.236	  
	  
The	  matter	   of	   Phocis	   was	   not	   to	   be	   settled	   soon.	   	   To	   reach	   the	   city	   from	  
northern	  Greece	   required	   passage	   through	   Thermopylae.	  When	   Philip	   approached	  
the	   pass	   in	   352	   it	   was	   blocked	   by	   a	   force	   of	   5,000	   Athenian	   infantry	   and	   200	  
cavalry.237	   Philip	   retreated	  without	   engaging.	   The	  Athenians	  were	  not	   to	   assemble	  
such	  a	  force	  against	  Philip	  again	  until	  the	  Battle	  of	  Chaeronea	  in	  339/8;	  that	  they	  did	  
so	   in	  352	  was	  most	   likely	  due	   to	  a	   fear	   that	  once	  he	  had	  dealt	  with	   the	  Phocians,	  
Philip	  would	  turn	  on	  them.	  With	  his	  having	  passed	  through	  Thermopylae,	  they	  would	  
have	  no	  way	  of	  opposing	  his	  entry	  into	  Attica.	  Sparta	  and	  Achaea	  would	  presumably	  
have	  feared	  a	  similar	  invasion	  of	  the	  Peloponnese.	  
	  
(iii)	  Closing	  of	  the	  War	  
	  
As	   a	   result	   of	   the	   Social	   War,	   Athens’	   control	   of	   the	   north	   Aegean	   had	  
weakened,	   allowing	   the	   northern	   Chalcidian	   League,	   to	   dominate	   trade	   between	  
Euboea	   and	   the	   Chersonese.	   As	   has	   been	  mentioned,	   the	   League	   had	   allied	   with	  
Philip	  in	  357,	  having	  previously	  sought	  a	  union	  with	  Athens.	  However,	  in	  his	  speech	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Against	  Aristocrates,	  most	  likely	  delivered	  in	  352,238	  Demosthenes	  mentions	  that	  the	  
Olynthians	  “became	   [Athens’]	   friends.”239	  Given	   that	   the	   line	  before,	  Demosthenes	  
notes	   that	   “they	  were	  his	   allies	   and	   through	  him	  were	   at	  war	  with	   [Athens],”	   this	  
presumably	   means	   that	   peace	   was	   agreed	   between	   Olynthus	   and	   Athens.	   The	  
reason	  Demosthenes	  gives	  for	  this	  is	  the	  Olynthians	  seeing	  Philip	  as	  “too	  great	  to	  be	  
trusted.”	  This	  would	   indeed	  be	  the	  only	  reasonable	  explanation,	  as	   the	  Chalcidians	  
would	  have	  been	  well	  aware	  of	  the	  advancement	  he	  had	  enjoyed	  since	  357	  against	  
Macedon’s	  neighbours,	  and	  ran	  through	  his	  involvement	  with	  the	  Thessalian	  League.	  
	  
If	  a	  treaty	  was	  signed	  between	  Athens	  and	  the	  League	  in	  352	  then	  one	  can	  be	  
sure	  that	  Philip’s	   reaction	  was	  not	  aggressive.	  Upon	  returning	   from	  Thessaly	   in	   the	  
autumn	  of	  that	  year	  he	  invaded	  the	  territory	  of	  the	  Thracian	  king	  Cersebleptes.240	  He	  
did	   apparently	   enter	   Olynthian	   territory,	   but	   not	   until	   351.241	   Importantly,	   Philip	  
apparently	  did	  not	  force	  Olynthus	  to	  rescind	  its	  peace	  with	  Athens,242	  so	  at	  most	  he	  
presumably	   reminded	   the	   city	   of	   the	   terms	   of	   its	   alliance	  with	   him,243	   and	  maybe	  
demanded	   assurances	   they	   would	   be	   adhered	   to,	   which	   his	   entry	   into	   Olynthian	  
territory	  doubtless	  helped	  to	  extract.	  
	  
The	   alliance	   continued	   until	   349,	   when	   war	   apparently	   broke	   out	   over	   an	  
different	  matter.	  
	  
“After	  this	  Philip	  attacked	  the	  people	  of	  Olynthus	  for	  having	  shown	  compassion	  and	  given	  
shelter	  to	  two	  of	  his	  half-­‐brothers	  after	  he	  had	  murdered	  the	  third.	  These	  were	  the	  sons	  of	  
his	  stepmother,	  and	  Philip	  desperately	  wished	  to	  do	  away	  with	  them	  as	  potential	  claimants	  
to	  the	  throne.”244	  
	  
One	  cannot	  dismiss	  completely	  the	  idea	  that	  Philip	  used	  this	  situation	  as	  a	  pretext	  to	  
attack	  an	  ally	  he	  no	   longer	  trusted,	  but	  to	  demand	  the	  surrender	  of	  such	  men	  was	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  Schol.	  Aesch.	  2.81.	  
241	  Dem.	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hardly	   unreasonable.245	   A	   loyal	   ally	   would	   be	   unlikely	   to	   harbour	   men	   who	   were	  
enemies	   of	   an	   allied	   ruler,	   and	   certainly	   not	   refuse	   to	   surrender	   them.	   Indeed,	   it	  
would	  seem	  more	   likely	   that	  by	  doing	  such	   things,	  Olynthus	  provoked	   the	  conflict.	  
Certainly,	  if	  the	  city	  was	  afraid	  of	  eventual	  subjugation	  to	  Philip,	  a	  stand	  against	  him	  
presumably	   had	   more	   chance	   sooner	   rather	   than	   later.	   The	   League’s	   military	  
strength	  –	  1,000	  cavalry	  and	  more	  than	  10,000	  infantry	  –	  was	  more	  than	  twice	  that	  
of	  383/2,	  when	  the	  League	  was	  dissolved	  following	  defeat	  by	  Sparta,246	  so	  it	  would	  
be	   understandable	   if	   Olynthus	   wished	   to	   make	   a	   stand.	   That	   said,	   Philip	   could	  
assemble	   significantly	  more	   troops	  with	  ease,	   and	   fewer	   than	  half	   of	   the	   League’s	  
forces	  were	  Olynthian.	  Olythus	  could	  hope	  for	  Athenian	  support,	  but	  it	  would	  take	  a	  
long	   time	   to	   reach	   the	   city.247	   In	   a	   situation	   one	   could	   argue	   that	   Olynthus	   was	  
unlikely	   to	  have	  provoked	  a	  conflict	  with	  a	  Macedonian	   force	   that	  was	  still	   its	  ally,	  
but	  equally	  that	  Philip	  did	  not	  do	  so	  as	  he	  could	  have	  done	  in	  352	  but	  did	  not	  do	  so.	  
	  
War	   was	   the	   outcome	   however,	   whichever	   party	   sought	   it	   more.	   Philip’s	  
tactic	   upon	   invading	   the	   Chalcidice	   in	   349	   was	   to	   dissect	   the	   League	   by	   moving	  
against	  its	  numerous	  smaller	  members.248	  Only	  one	  such	  city	  is	  recorded	  as	  resisting,	  
and	  was	   destroyed.249	  Olynthus	   itself	   remained	   secure,	   and	   late	   in	   the	   summer	  of	  
349	  was	   reinforced	   by	   the	   Athenian	   general	   Chares,	   who	   brought	  with	   him	   2,000	  
peltasts	   and	   38	   triremes,	   eight	   of	   which	   were	   specially	   commissioned	   for	   the	  
purpose.250	  Such	  a	  force	  was	  the	  first	  of	  three	  expeditions	  sent	  by	  Athens,	  and	  whilst	  
each	  one	  would	  no	  doubt	  have	  boosted	  Olynthian	  morale	   and	  extended	   the	   city’s	  
resistance	  to	  a	  Macedonian	  siege,251	  the	  forces	  hardly	  seem	  intended	  to	  help	  the	  city	  
go	   on	   the	   offensive	   against	   Philip.	   Philip	   being	   able,	   around	   the	   time	   of	   the	   first	  
                                         
245	  Griffith	  1979,	  315.	  
246	  Dem.	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247	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  1979,	  315.	  
248	  On	  Philip’s	  tactics,	  see	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  Diod.	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250	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  second	  expedition	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  150	  cavalry	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  18	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  third	  2,000	  hoplites,	  300	  cavalry	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  17	  triremes	  (Philoch.	  ibid,	  F50	  and	  51).	  The	  third	  expedition	  did	  not	  
reach	  Olynthus	  before	  the	  city’s	  fall,	  due	  to	  poor	  weather	  condition,	  possibly	  the	  northerly	  Etesian	  winds.	  See	  
Cawkwell	  1962,	  130f.	  






expedition’s	  arrival,	   to	   return	   to	  Thessaly	   to	  deal	  with	  a	   revolt	   in	  Pherae,	   indicates	  
this.252	  
	  
Whether	   Athens	   was	   unable	   to	   send	   greater	   forces	   to	   Olynthus’	   aid,253	   or	  
disinterested	   in	   doing	   so	   –	   the	   second	   expedition’s	   leader	   being	   one	   Charidemus,	  
‘the	   general	   of	   the	   Hellespont’	   suggests	   that	   what	   troops	  were	   sent	   were	  merely	  
redirected	   from	   existing	   forces	   rather	   than	   especially	   assembled	   –	   her	   ability	   to	  
support	  the	  Chalcidian	  city	  was	  diminished	  by	  becoming	  involved	  in	  Euboea.	  In	  348,	  
Plutarchus,	   the	   tyrant	   of	   the	   Euboean	   city	   of	   Eretria,	   was	   overthrown.	   His	  
connections	   at	   Athens254	   led	   to	   forces	   being	   sent	   to	   support	   him	   in	   what	   was	   no	  
doubt	   expected	   to	   be	   a	   straightforward	   political	   intervention.	   The	   Athenian	   force	  
was	  very	  nearly	  lost	  however,	  and	  a	  general	  uprising	  ensued	  across	  the	  whole	  island.	  
More	  troops	  were	  sent	  as	  Athens	  became	  embroiled	  in	  an	  operation	  that	  lasted	  well	  
into	  the	  summer	  of	  348.	  By	  the	  end	  all	  but	  one	  Euboean	  city	  was	  independent,	  and	  
Athens	  was	  forced	  to	  pay	  fifty	  talents	  in	  ransom	  to	  secure	  the	  return	  of	  its	  men.255	  
	  
Aeschines	  and	  Plutarch	  both	  claim	  that	  Philip	  was	   responsible	   for	  arranging	  
the	   revolt	   in	   Euboea	   to	   distract	   the	   Athenians	   from	   reinforcing	   Olynthus	   more	  
thoroughly,	  and	   there	   is	   some	  evidence	   to	  support	   this	  view.256	   In	  most	   likely	  351,	  
several	  letters	  from	  Philip,	  originally	  addressed	  “to	  the	  Euboeans”,	  had	  been	  read	  to	  
the	   Athenian	   Assembly.257	   Their	   content	   is	   not	   recorded,	   but	   given	   the	   probable	  
unpopularity	   of	   the	   Athenian-­‐backed	   tyrant	   Plutarchus,	   Philip	   would	   presumably	  
have	   been	   attempting	   to	   foment	   discontent	   by	   highlighting	   Athens’	   recent	   poor	  
record	   of	   defending	   her	   allies	   in	   the	   north.258	   Philip’s	   attacks	   on	   Olynthus	   itself	  
rather	   than	   her	   Chalcidian	   allies	   began	   around	   the	   time	   of	   Athens’	   Euboean	  
entanglement,259	  and	   the	   revolutionary	  Euboean	   leader	  Callias	   immediately	   turned	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to	   Philip	   for	   help	   once	   the	   revolt	   in	   Eretria	   began.260	   However,	   much	   of	   this	   is	  
circumstantial.	   Philip’s	   letters	   of	   351	   are	   not	   proof	   of	   involvement	   three	   years	  
later.261	  Callias’	  appealing	  to	  Philip	  could	  have	  been	  inspired	  by	  the	  memory	  of	  the	  
letters	   or	   by	   the	   simple	   fact	   that	   Athens	   was	   at	   war	   with	   Philip.	   As	   for	   Philip’s	  
beginning	   attacks	   against	   Olynthus	   soon	   after	   the	   Euboean	   revolt	   began,	   such	   a	  
point	  marked	  his	  return	  from	  Thessaly.262	  If	  he	  had	  engineered	  the	  events	  in	  Euboea,	  
surely	  he	  would	  have	  been	  in	  position	  somewhat	  earlier	  to	  take	  maximum	  advantage	  
of	   them?	  Perhaps	  most	   tellingly	   though,	   the	  scholiast	  commentating	  on	  Aeschines’	  
account	  makes	  no	  mention	  of	  Philip	  in	  his	  brief	  summary	  of	  the	  events	  in	  Euboea.263	  
Similarly,	  Demosthenes,	  speaking	  proudly	  in	  346	  of	  how	  he	  was	  the	  only	  one	  to	  have	  
opposed	   the	   Athenian	   intervention	   in	   Euboea,	   makes	   no	   such	   reference	   to	   the	  
king.264	  If	  Philip	  had	  been	  involved	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  see	  why	  Demosthenes	  would	  not	  
have	  sought	  to	  resist	  him	  in	  an	  area	  so	  close	  to	  Attica.265	  
	  
Demosthenes’	  opposition	  suggests	  that	  he	  saw	  Euboea	  as	  a	  distraction	  from	  
the	   real	   issue	  of	  Olynthus.266	  That	   the	  Athenians	   ignored	  him	  suggests	   the	  general	  
feeling	   was	   the	   opposite.	   As	   has	   been	   said,	   the	   forces	   sent	   to	   Olynthus	   were	  
apparently	   diverted	   from	   elsewhere	   rather	   than	   newly	   assembled,267	   and	  
Demosthenes	   later	  derided	   the	  Athenians	   for	  being	  content	   to	  accept	  “so-­‐and-­‐so’s	  
mercenaries	  have	  won	  a	  victory”	  as	  sufficient	  news	  from	  Olynthus.268	  Whether	  this	  
was	   a	   result	   of	   miscalculation	   or	   a	   deliberate	   feeling	   that	   Olynthus	   could	   not	   be	  
saved,	  or	  perhaps	  was	  not	  worth	  the	  effort,	  the	  result	  was	  the	  city’s	  swift	  capture	  by	  
Philip.	  Two	  victories	  upon	  his	  return	  to	  the	  Chalcidice	  in	  348	  were	  soon	  followed	  by	  
the	   capture	   of	   nearby	   Torone	   and	   more	   importantly,	   Mecyberna,	   the	   harbour	   of	  
Olynthus.269	  The	  precise	  date	  of	  the	  Olynthus’	  capture	  is	  unknown,	  but	  Demosthenes	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mentions	   that	   the	   entire	   war	   lasted	   less	   than	   a	   year.270	   A	   significant	   number	   of	  
Olynthian	   forces	   had	   surrendered	   to	   Philip	   when	   the	   city	   chose	   to	   fight	   on	   after	  
Mecyberna’s	   capture,271	   but	   those	   that	   remained	   were	   enslaved	   with	   the	   civilian	  
populace.	  Olynthus	  was	  destroyed	  and	  the	  Chalcidian	  League	  disbanded.272	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(i)	  Lead	  Up	  to	  the	  Peace	  
	  
The	   fall	  of	  Olynthus	  did	  not	  on	   its	  own	  mean	   the	  war	  between	  Athens	  and	  
Macedon	  was	  over.	  However,	  Philip	  had	  tried	  several	  times	  before	  the	  Olynthian	  war	  
to	   end	   the	   conflict,	   and	   following	   his	   dissolving	   of	   the	   Chalcidian	   League,	   he	   tried	  
again.273	   It	   is	   likely	   that	  his	  uncompromising	   treatment	  of	   the	   captured	  Olynthians	  
was	   intended	  as	   a	   clear	  warning	   that	  Athens	   should	  not	   refuse	  his	   offers	   again.274	  
Olynthus	  had,	  after	  all,	  rejected	  his	  terms	  following	  his	  capture	  of	  Mecyberna,	  just	  as	  
Athens	  had	  refused	  his	  overtures	  before	  349.275	   In	  such	   light	  Olynthus’	  destruction	  
could	  well	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  warning	  for	  the	  Athenians	  not	  to	  waste	  their	  last	  chance.	  
	  
Athens’	   aims	   had	   always	   been	   different	   to	   Philip’s	   however.	  Whilst	   he	   had	  
not	   faced	   the	   slightest	   Athenian	   challenge	   to	   his	   control	   of	   Amphipolis	   since	  
capturing	   it	   in	  357,	  a	  belief	   in	  a	  hereditary	  and	  legal	  right	  to	  the	  city276	  was	  central	  
enough	   to	   the	  Athenian	  mindset	   that	   the	  war	  with	  Philip	  was	  seen	  as	   ‘the	  war	   for	  
Amphipolis.’277	  Consequently,	  the	  city	  did	  not	  figure	  at	  all	  in	  the	  peace	  Philip	  sought,	  
but	  an	  end	  to	  the	  war	  that	  did	  not	  see	  it	  back	  in	  Athenian	  hands	  was	  unacceptable	  at	  
Athens.	   It	   was	   such	   sentiment	   that	   saw,	   instead	   of	   increased	   interest	   in	   Philip’s	  
overtures,	   the	   prosecution	   of	   Philocrates	   in	   late	   348	   for	   suggesting	   that	   Philip	   be	  
permitted	   to	   send	   ambassadors	   to	   Athens,278	   and	   efforts	   to	   bring	   about	   a	   Greek	  
coalition	   against	   the	   king.279	   Even	   such	   measures	   receiving	   a	   complete	   lack	   of	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  Aesch.	  2.15-­‐16.	  See	  Ellis	  1976,	  99f;	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  2001,	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  Griffith	  1979,	  327.	  
275	  Dem.	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  423,	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  two	  years	  later	  (5.18.5),	  though	  control	  of	  the	  city	  was	  never	  reasserted.	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  370/69	  (Asch.	  2.32;	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  19.253).	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  Cawkwell	  1980,	  101f;	  Griffith	  1979,	  231f.	  
277	  Isoc.	  5.1	  in	  346;	  Aesch.	  2.70	  in	  343.	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  Aesch.	  2.12,	  17.	  That	  said,	  Philocrates	  was	  acquitted	  so	  comprehensively,	  with	  Demosthenes	  speaking	  in	  his	  
favour,	  that	  his	  prosecutors	  were	  forced	  to	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  the	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  the	  court’s	  time	  –	  Aesch.	  2.14,	  3.62.	  






support	  elsewhere	  was	  not	  enough;280	  to	  make	  Athens	  face	  reality	  required	  further	  
developments.	  
	  
The	   first	   of	   several	   additional	   matters	   that	   converged	   around	   the	   time	   of	  
Olynthus’	   fall	   included	   recent	   developments	   near	   the	   Chersonese.	   The	   region	   had	  
always	  been	  a	  key	  concern	  for	  Athens,	  as	  it	  was	  through	  it	  that	  the	  grain	  supply	  on	  
which	   the	   city	   relied	   came.	   To	   secure	   this	   supply,	   the	   Athenian	   general	   Chares	  
campaigned	   in	   the	   region	   in	   353,	   and	   had	   established	   relations	  with	   the	   Thracian	  
king	  Cersebleptes.	  The	  result	  had	  been	  the	  Thracian	  ceding	  all	  cities	  in	  the	  region	  but	  
one	   to	   him.281	   Settlers	   had	   followed	   in	   352.282	   However,	   Philip	   had	   campaigned	  
against	   Cersebleptes	   the	   same	   year	   as	   a	   result	   of	   Chares’	   actions,	   and	   his	   success	  
meant	  that	  Athens	  was	  in	  danger	  of	  losing	  its	  grain	  supply.283	  
	  
Events	  at	  Phocis	  also	  gave	  much	  food	  for	  thought.	  Financial	  problems	  and	  the	  
looming	  spectre	  of	  Philip	  and	  the	  Boeotians	  meant	  that	  in	  347,	  a	  faction	  who	  hoped	  
to	   distance	   the	   city	   from	   the	   accusations	   of	   sacrilege	   had	   deposed	   the	   leading	  
general	  Phalaecus	  and	  his	  political	  allies.	  Control	  of	  the	  passes	  at	  Thermopylae	  was	  
offered	   to	   Athens	   and	   Sparta.284	   Both	   began	   preparing	   troops,	   but	   Phalaecus,	  
“unable	  to	  defend	  himself	  successfully	  against	  the	  charge	  of	  sacrilege,	  and	  unwilling	  
to	   serve	  as	   scapegoat	   for	   it,”	   retained	  command	  of	   the	  Phocian	  mercenary	   forces.	  
With	  Thermopylae	  under	  his	  control,	  he	  dismissed	  the	  Athenian	  and	  Spartan	  forces	  
when	   they	   arrived.285	   Athens	  was	   thus	   not	   even	   able	   to	   directly	   influence	   the	   key	  
matter	  of	  influencing	  Philip’s	  entry	  into	  southern	  Greece.	  To	  this	  Philip	  added	  further	  
pressure	   by	   returning	   to	   Thessaly	   in	   347	   and	   besieging	   the	   cities	   of	   Halus	   and	  
Pharsalus.286	  By	  doing	   so	  he	  brought	  his	  army	  and	  siege	   train	  within	  easy	   reach	  of	  
the	  pass.	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When	  Philip	  again	  sent	  news	  that	  he	  still	  hoped	  for	  an	  alliance	  with	  the	  city,	  
Philocrates	  reintroduced	  his	  proposal	  to	  send	  ambassador	  to	  Philip,	  and	  ten	  envoys	  
were	  dispatched	  to	  Macedon.287	  In	  343	  Demosthenes	  attempted	  to	  claim	  that	  
	  
“at	   the	   outset	   [Philip]	  was	   desirous	   of	   peace,	   for	   his	  whole	   country	  was	   overrun	   by	  
marauders,	   	   and	  his	   ports	  were	  blockaded,	   so	   that	  he	   got	  no	  advantage	   from	  all	   his	  
wealth.”	  
	  
This	  should	  be	  ignored,	  as	  Diodorus	  describes	  in	  detail	  how,	  following	  the	  capture	  of	  
Olynthus,	   Philip	   “celebrated	   the	   Olympian	   festival…and	   offered	   magnificent	  
sacrifices;	   and	   he	   organised	   a	   great	   festive	   assembly	   at	   which	   he	   held	   splendid	  
competitions.”288	  
	  
(ii)	  The	  First	  Embassy	  
	  
The	  envoys,	  who	  included	  Aeschines,	  Demosthenes	  and	  Philocrates,289	  were	  
received	   by	   Philip	   as	   he	   prepared	   to	   campaign	   once	   more	   in	   Thrace.290	   The	   king	  
reportedly	   acted	   politely,	   heard	   all	   ten	   envoys	   speak,	   and	   responded	   at	   length.291	  
The	  terms	  he	  proposed	  are	  not	  listed	  by	  any	  surviving	  source.	  However,	  their	  details	  
can	   be	   gleaned	   from	   subsequent	   references	   elsewhere.	   Thus	   they	   can	   be	   seen	   to	  
have	  included:	  
	  
1. That	  both	  parties	  should	  retain	  what	  territory	  they	  each	  held	  at	  the	  
time	  of	  the	  alliance’s	  official	  agreement.292	  
2. That	   as	   well	   as	   a	   peace	   treaty,	   the	   two	   parties	   should	   sign	   an	  
alliance,	  which	  should	  not	  be	  subject	  to	  any	  time	  limit.293	  
3. That	  this	  alliance	  should	  be	  defensive	  in	  nature.294	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  Dem.	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  Aesch.	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4. That	  both	  parties	  should	  not	  support	  pirates	  in	  any	  way,	  and	  should	  
unite	  against	  them	  if	  necessary.295	  
	  
The	   only	   disagreement	   arose	   over	   the	   Athenians’	   concern	   regarding	   Amphipolis,	  
which	   Philip	   dismissed,	   claiming	   the	   city	   by	   right	   of	   conquest.296	   Instead,	   he	  
promised	  the	  return	  of	  Athenian	  hostages	  taken	  at	  Olynthus	  if	  peace	  were	  agreed.297	  
	  
	   It	  was	  with	  these	  terms	  that	  the	  ambassadors	  returned	  to	  Athens,	  along	  with	  
Philip’s	  assurances	  that	  he	  would	  not	  invade	  the	  Chersonese	  as	  part	  of	  his	  Thracian	  
campaign	  whilst	  the	  Athenian	  people	  were	  debating	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  peace.298	  They	  
were	  either	  accompanied	  or	  followed	  soon	  after	  by	  Macedonian	  envoys,	  to	  oversee	  
the	   expected	   Athenian	   approval	   of	   the	   peace	   and	   alliance.	  With	   them	   apparently	  
came	  a	  letter	  from	  Philip	  in	  which	  he	  reportedly	  stated	  
	  
“I	  would	  write	  more	  explicitly	  of	  the	  benefits	  I	  intend	  to	  confer	  on	  you,	  if	  I	  were	  certain	  
that	  the	  alliance	  will	  be	  made.”299	  
	  
It	  would	   seem	   that,	   inspired	   by	   this	   and	   the	   impression	   Philip	   had	   given	  when	   he	  
received	  the	  Athenian	  embassy,	  most,	  if	  not	  all	  the	  envoys	  spoke	  enthusiastically	  in	  
favour	  of	   the	  peace	  upon	  returning	  to	  Athens.	   It	   is	  certainly	  seems	  that	  Aeschines,	  
Demosthenes	   and	   Philocrates	   did	   so;300	   Demosthenes	   in	   particular	   ensured	   safe	  
passage	  for	  the	  Macedonian	  envoys	  through	  Attica,	  arranged	  for	  them	  to	  have	  seats	  
that	  the	  theatre,	  moved	  that	  they	  be	  officially	  received	  when	  they	  arrived,	  and	  that	  
the	  Assembly	  meet	  to	  debate	  the	  matter	  of	  the	  peace	  and	  alliance.301	  	  
	  
	   In	   343	   Demosthenes	   accused	   Aeschines	   of	   writing	   Philip’s	   letter	   himself,	  
having	  being	  bribed	  to	  do	  so	  by	  the	  king.302	  This	  is	  surely	  to	  be	  rejected	  as	  a	  product	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of	   Demosthenes’	   attempts	   to	   smear	   Aeschines’	   reputation,	   both	   because	   of	   the	  
above	   support	   he	   showed	   for	   the	   peace	   settlement	   the	   letter	   advocated,	   and	  
Aeshines’	  strong	  counter-­‐argument:	  
	  
“[Demosthenes]	   says	   that	   I	   went	   down	   the	   Loedias	   river	   to	   Philip	   in	   a	   canoe	   by	  
night...and	  that	   time	  and	  again	   I	  had	  private	   interviews	  with	  Philip	   in	   the	  daytime,	  but	  
[he]	  accuses	  me	  of	  paddling	  down	  the	  river	  in	  the	  night	  –	  the	  need	  of	  a	  midnight	  letter	  
was	  so	  urgent.”	  
	  
	   The	  Assembly	  duly	  approved	  the	  peace	  and	  alliance	  with	  Philip.	  Although	  this	  
agreement	   was	   officially	   between	   Athens	   and	   her	   allies,	   and	   Philip	   and	   his	   allies,	  
Cersebleptes	  and	  the	  cities	  of	  Halus	  and	  Phocis	  were	  not	  included.303	  As	  part	  of	  his	  
indictment	   of	   Aeschines	   in	   343,	   Demosthenes	   accused	   his	   fellow	   orator	   of	  
deliberately	   excluding	   these	   three,	   as	   Philip’s	   envoys	   Parmenio	   and	   Antipater	   had	  
reportedly	   warned	   that	   inclusion	   of	   the	   Phocians	   in	   any	   agreement	  would	   violate	  
Philip’s	  recently	  agreed	  treaty	  with	  the	  Boeotians	  and	  Thessalians.304	  However,	   it	   is	  
far	  from	  certain	  that	  the	  matter	  was	  ever	  raised.	  Firstly,	  the	  matter	  of	  Phocis	  and	  the	  
Sacred	  War	   was	   in	   no	  way	   explicitly	   connected	  with	   the	   ‘War	   for	   Amphipolis’,	   as	  
there	   is	   no	   obvious	   reason	   for	   Phocis	   to	   have	   arisen	   in	   discussions	   at	   Athens	   or	  
Macedon.	  As	  mentioned	  above,	  association	  with	  Phocis	  was	  dangerous	  due	   to	   the	  
accusations	  of	   sacrilege,	  and	  Demosthenes	  himself	  makes	   clear	   that	   the	  Athenians	  
were	  aware	  of	  this:	  
	  
“The	  second	  precaution…is	  to	  avoid	  giving	  the	  self-­‐styled	  Amphictyones	  now	  assembled	  
any	  call	  or	  excuse	  for	  a	  crusade	  against	  us.305	  
	  
Moreover,	   Demosthenes	   undermines	   himself	   by	   changing	   the	   nature	   of	   his	  
accusation	   at	   different	   points	   in	   his	   speech.	   	   His	   first	   accusation	   is	   that	  when	   the	  
decision	  was	  first	  made	  to	  seek	  peace	  with	  Philip,	  before	  the	  First	  Embassy	  had	  even	  
been	   dispatched,	   Aeschines	   and	   Philocrates	   attempted	   to	   draw	   up	   a	   treaty	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containing	  a	  clause	  explicitly	  excluding	  Phocis	  from	  any	  agreement.	  This	  supposedly	  
provoked	  a	  furious	  public	  response,	  and	  	  
	  
“when	  these	  men	  had	  failed	  to	  draw	  up	  the	  treaty,	  as	  they	  first	  tried	  to	  do…Philocrates	  
[was]	   compelled	  by	   you	   to	   erase	   those	  words	   and	  write	   expressly	   “the	  Athenians	   and	  
their	  Allies”.”306	  
	  
However,	   later	   the	   claim	   changes	   to	   Philocrates	   and	   Aeschines	   having	   made	   the	  
attempted	  exclusion	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  Second	  Embassy.307	  Such	  inconsistency	  makes	  
the	   claim	   hard	   to	   believe,	   and	   Demosthenes	   further	   weakens	   his	   position	   by	  
admitting	  that	  he	  has	  no	  evidence	  to	  support	  the	  accusation.	  
	  
	   It	  is	  also	  worth	  noting	  that	  at	  almost	  exactly	  the	  same	  time	  as	  the	  Athenians	  
were	   debating	   the	   peace,	   Philip	   invaded	   Thrace	   and	   defeated	   Cersebleptes.308	  
Although	   news	   cannot	   have	   reached	   Athens,	   Demosthenes	   and	   the	   other	   envoy	  
would	  undoubtedly	  have	  been	  aware	  of	  Philip’s	  planned	  campaign	  when	   they	  met	  
him	  in	  Macedon.	  Attempting	  to	  include	  Cersebleptes	  in	  the	  peace	  and	  alliance	  would	  
have	   been	   as	   purposeless	   as	   Phocis	   under	   such	   circumstances.	   Indeed,	   Aeschines	  
claims	   that	  Demosthenes	   himself	   spoke	   against	   such	   inclusion	  when	  Cersebleptes’	  
ambassador	  arrived	  in	  Athens	  soon	  afterwards	  to	  make	  a	  last-­‐minute	  plea.309	  
	  
(iii)	  The	  Second	  Embassy	  
	  
	   Having	  approved	  the	  peace	  and	  alliance,	  the	  Athenians	  dispatched	  the	  same	  
ten	  envoys	   to	  Macedon	   to	  oversee	   the	   taking	  of	   the	  oaths	  by	  Philip	  and	  his	  allies.	  
However,	   they	   were	   forced	   to	   wait	   three	   months	   before	   Philip	   arrived	   at	   Pella	  
following	  his	  conquest	  of	  Thrace.310	  They	  were	  joined	  in	  this	  time	  by	  embassies	  from	  
Sparta,	   Thebes	  and	  Thessaly.311	   The	   concern	  of	   all	  was	  Philip’s	  plans	   regarding	   the	  
conclusion	  of	  the	  Sacred	  War;	  the	  Spartans	  in	  particular,	  at	  risk	  from	  accusations	  of	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sacrilege	  through	  association	  with	  Phocis,	  would	  have	  been	  keen	  to	  gain	  assurances	  
of	   protection	   from	   the	   Boeotians.	   This	   they	   apparently	   gained,	   on	   condition	   that	  
they	  did	  not	  become	  involved	  in	  Philip’s	  plans	  for	  central	  Greece.312	  
	  
	   When	  Philip	  did	  return	  to	  Pella,	  he	   further	  delayed	  his	  and	  his	  allies’	   taking	  
the	   oath	   to	   seal	   the	   treaty	   with	   Athens,	   and	   instead	   requested	   all	   the	   envoys	  
accompany	   him	   into	  Greece	   to	   aid	   him	   in	   settling	   a	   dispute	   between	   the	   cities	   of	  
Pharsalus	  and	  Halus.	  Only	  when	  the	  parties	  reached	  Pherae,	  three	  days’	  march	  from	  
Thermopylae,	   did	   Philip	   and	  his	   allies	   take	   the	  oath	   to	   seal	   the	  peace.313	   Thus	   the	  
Athenian	   envoys	   returned	   home	   having	   ended	   a	   conflict,	   but	   “to	   an	   atmosphere	  
heavy	  with	  the	  fear	  of	  war.”314	  
	  
	   A	  debate	  has	  arisen	  amongst	  modern	  scholars	  concerning	  Philip’s	  intentions	  
with	   regard	   to	   the	   close	   of	   the	   Sacred	  War,	   and	   in	   particular	   the	   role	   he	   hoped	  
Athens	   to	   play	   in	   it	   and	   the	   aftermath.	   The	   issue	   has	   concerned	   whether	   the	  
submission	   of	   Phocis,	   and	   Philip’s	   apparent	   attempt	   to	   prevent	   full	   Athenian	  
awareness	  until	  the	  last	  possible	  moment	  by	  delaying	  his	  taking	  the	  oath	  was	  part	  of	  
his	  genuine	  plan,	  or	  a	  carefully	  planned	  façade	  that	  hid	  an	  intention	  to	  abandon	  his	  
Boeotian	   allies	   in	   favour	   of	   Athens.	   The	   chief	   proponent	   of	   the	   latter	   idea,	  M.	  M.	  
Markle,	  has	  argued	  that	  
	  
“Philip	  had	   two	  alternative	  plans	   in	  346.	   ‘Plan	  A’	  was	  with	   the	  aid	  of	   the	  Athenians	   to	  
turn	  on	  Thebes.	  By	  this	  move,	  he	  would	  reduce	  the	  power	  of	  the	  second	  greatest	  city	  in	  
Greece	  and	  thus	  eliminate	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  combination	  of	  Athens	  and	  Thebes,	  which	  
might	  be	  sufficiently	  powerful	  to	  block	  his	  ambitions.	  If	  ‘Plan	  A’	  failed	  because	  of	  a	  lack	  
of	  Athenian	  co-­‐operation,	  ’Plan	  B’	  would	  be	  adopted.	  ‘Plan	  B’	  was	  to	  satisfy	  his	  existing	  
allies,	  especially	  Thebes,	  by	  landing	  hard	  on	  the	  Phocians.”315	  
	  
The	  method	  would	  be	  that	  Philip	  would	  announce	  a	  policy	  of	   leniency	  towards	  the	  
great	   majority	   of	   the	   Phocians,	   with	   punishment	   reserved	   for	   Phalaecus	   and	   his	  
mercenaries.	  By	  this	  Philip	  would	  confirm	  Athenian	  support	  for	  him,	  as	  Athens	  would	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have	   been	   eager	   to	   punish	   the	  man	  who	  withdrew	   the	   Phocian	   invitation	   to	   take	  
control	  of	  Thermopylae.	   It	  would	  also	  provoke	  a	  furious	  Thebes	   into	  attacking	  him,	  
to	   which	   the	   Athenians	   would	   respond	   with	   a	   surprise	   attack	   in	   the	   rear.	   Once	  
Thebes	  had	  capitulated	  Athens	  and	  Philip	  would	  approach	  Thermopylae	   from	  both	  
sides	  and	  capture	  Phalaecus	  in	  a	  pincer	  movement.	  
	  
Markle’s	  evidence	  for	  this	   is	  found	  primarily	   in	  the	  promises	  allegedly	  made	  
by	  Aeschines	  to	  the	  Athenian	  Assembly	  upon	  the	  return	  of	  the	  Second	  Embassy.	   In	  
343	  Demosthenes	  claimed	  that	  Aeschines	  reassured	  the	  populace,	  which	  was	  greatly	  
concerned	  about	  Philip’s	  proximity	  to	  Thermopylae,	  by	  announcing	  that	  
	  
“…thanks	  to	  [Aeschines’]	  diplomacy…within	  two	  or	  three	  days	  you	  would	  hear	  the	  news	  
of	   the	   beleaguerment	   of	   Thebes,	   independently	   of	   the	   rest	   of	   Boeotia,	   of	   the	  
repopulation	  of	  Thespiae	  and	  Plataea	  [both	  previously	  destroyed	  by	  Thebes],	  and	  of	  the	  
recovery	  of	  Apollo’s	   treasure,	   not	   from	   the	  Phocians,	   but	   from	   the	   Thebans,	  who	  had	  
planned	  the	  seizure	  of	  the	  temple.”316	  
	  
In	   his	   defence	   speech	  Aeschines	  denies	   having	  made	   such	   statements,	   but	  Markle	  
convincingly	  rejects	  this,	  pointing	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  Demosthenes	  had	  made	  reference	  
to	   them	   in	   his	   speech	   On	   the	   Peace,	   given	   only	   two	   months	   after	   the	   Second	  
Embassy’s	  return.317	  It	  is	  hard	  to	  accept,	  as	  Markle	  argues,	  that	  Demosthenes	  could	  
have	  made	   such	   references	   so	   soon	  after	   the	  events	   in	  question	  unless	   they	  were	  
accurate.	  The	  issue	  that	  inevitably	  rears	  its	  head,	  as	  it	  does	  with	  all	  Demosthenic	  and	  
Aeschinic	   claims	  made	   regarding	   the	   events	   of	   346,	   is	   one	   of	   potential	   alteration	  
after	   original	   presentation.	   As	   J.	   Buckler	   has	   highlighted,	   published	   versions	   of	  
ancient	   speeches	   frequently	   included	   material	   inserted	   after	   their	   original	  
presentation,	  and	  were	  often	  revised	  to	  give	  a	  better	  impression	  than	  they	  did	  at	  the	  
time.318	  On	   the	   Peace’s	   publication	   date	   is	   unknown,	   so	   it	   is	   always	   possible	   that	  
Demosthenes	  introduced	  claims	  of	  promises	  by	  Aeschines	  to	  create	  an	  impression	  of	  
continuity	   with	   On	   the	   False	   Embassy	   of	   343	   (which	   was	   itself	   probably	   revised	  
before	  publication).	  However,	  given	  that	  the	  claims	  appear	   in	  the	  opening	  sections	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of	  On	   the	  Peace	   it	   is	   difficult	   to	  believe	   that	   they	  were	  not	  present	   in	   the	  original	  
version,	  as	  they	  clearly	  occupy	  an	  important	  place	  in	  the	  speech’s	  message.	  
	  
	   In	   addition	   to	   this,	   the	   idea	   of	   Aeschines	   having	   made	   such	   claims	   to	   the	  
Assembly	   is	   consistent	   with	   other	   statements	   made	   around	   the	   time;	   in	   his	  
prosecution	  of	  Timarchus,	  delivered	  soon	  after	  On	  the	  Peace	  he	  says	  of	  Philip	  
	  
“If	   in	  what	  he	  does	  towards	  us	  in	  the	  future	  he	  shall	  fulfil	  the	  promise	  of	  what	  he	  now	  
says,	  he	  will	  make	  praise	  of	  him	  a	  safe	  and	  easy	  thing.”319	  
	  
Later	   in	   the	   same	   speech	  he	  also	   refers	  proudly	   to	   “the	  peace	  which	  was	  brought	  
about	  by	  Philocrates	  and	  myself.”320	  
	  
Assuming	  then	  that	  Aeschines	  did	  make	  promises	  to	  the	  Assembly,	  Markle’s	  
interpretation	  is	  that	  the	  Athenian	  envoys	  had	  grasped	  they	  nature	  of	  Philip’s	  ‘Plan	  
A,’	   and	   confirmed	   this	   to	   him	   with	   a	   strongly	   anti-­‐Theban	   speech	   at	   Pella.321	  	  
Aeschines	  advised	  Philip	  that	  “Thebes	  should	  be	  Boeotian,	  not	  Boeotian	  Theban;”322	  
he	   argued	   that	   only	   Phalaecus	   and	   his	  mercenaries	   should	   be	   held	   to	   account	   for	  
sacrilege,	   and	   the	  blameless	  populace	   go	  unpunished;323	   and	  he	   spoke	   in	  detail	   of	  
the	  traditions	  of	  the	  Amphictyones,	  stressing	  in	  particular	  the	  laws	  stating	  that	  
	  
“Men	  of	  ancient	   times	  swore	   that	   they	  would	   raze	  no	  city	  of	   the	  Amphictyonic	   states,	  
nor	   shut	   them	   off	   from	   flowing	  water	   either	   in	  war	   or	   peace,	   [and]	   if	   anyone	   should	  
violate	  this	  oath,	  they	  must	  march	  out	  against	  such	  a	  one	  and	  raze	  his	  cities.324	  
	  
That	  Aeschines	  claimed	  “it	  was	  not	   right	   that	  we	  should	  overlook	  the	   fact	   that	   the	  
cities	  in	  Boeotia	  were	  lying	  in	  ruins”	  is	  a	  clear	  signal	  that	  Thebes	  could	  and	  should	  be	  
punished	  for	  her	  actions	  just	  as	  much	  as	  Phocis.325	  Upon	  returning	  to	  Athens,	  Philip	  
had	  every	  reason	  to	  expect	   ‘Plan	  A’	  to	  succeed.	  That	   it	  did	  not	  was	  entirely	  due	  to	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Demosthenes	   who,	   convinced	   that	   the	   greater	   long-­‐term	   danger	   to	   Athens	   was	  
Philip,	  was	  determined	   to	   retain	   the	  option	  of	   an	  alliance	  with	  Thebes	  against	   the	  
Macedonian.326	  Thus	  when	  Philip	  sent	  a	  letter	  to	  his	  new	  Athenian	  allies	  requesting	  
they	  march	  out	  to	  aid	  him	  in	  dealing	  with	  Phocis327	  –	  though	  in	  reality	  putting	  ‘Plan	  
A’	  into	  effect	  –	  Demosthenes	  persuaded	  the	  Athenians	  to	  stay	  behind	  their	  walls	  for	  
fear	   of	   any	   army	   being	   sent	   out	   being	   taken	   hostage	   by	   a	   treacherous	   Philip.	   In	  
support	   of	   this	   he	   could	   point	   to	   the	   still-­‐unreturned	   Olynthian	   hostages,	   whose	  
passage	   home	   Philip	   had	   promised	   vaguely	   would	   occur	   before	   the	   time	   of	   the	  
Panathenaea.328	  
	  
	   In	  this	  interpretation	  of	  Philip’s	  intentions	  Markle	  is	  joined	  by	  J.	  R.	  Ellis,	  who	  
agrees	  that	  Philip’s	  working	  with	  the	  Thessalians	  and	  Boeotians	  against	  Phocis	  would	  
result	   in	   the	   restoration	   of	   Thebes	   to	   a	   position	   of	   pre-­‐eminence	   in	   Greece.	   Any	  
alliance	  between	  Athens	  and	  Thebes	  presented,	  in	  Ellis’	  view,	  the	  greatest	  threat	  to	  
Philip,	  so	  avoiding	  any	  such	  union	  should	  be	  the	  king’s	  priority.329	  Ellis	  also	  assumes	  
that	  the	  promises	  given	  to	  the	  Assembly	  by	  Aeschines	  must	  have	  come	  from	  Philip	  
himself.330	  However,	  Demosthenes	  claimed	  multiple	   times	   in	  343	   that	  he	  heard	  no	  
such	  promises	   from	  Philip.331	  Although	  this	  may	  be	  an	  untruth	  on	  his	  part	   to	  place	  
the	   blame	   for	  misleading	   the	   Athenians	   entirely	   on	   Aeschines	   and	   Philocrates,	   no	  
evidence	  suggests	  it	  was	  not	  the	  case.	  
	  
	   The	   rebuttal	   of	  Markle	   and	   Ellis’	   interpretation	  of	   Philip’s	   intentions	   in	   346	  
has	  come	  chiefly	  from	  G.	  Cawkwell,	  who	  has	  raised	  several	  potential	  issues.332	  Firstly,	  
there	  is	  the	  question	  of	  the	  Thessalians.	  If	  Philip	  were	  to	  have	  allowed	  the	  majority	  
of	  Phocians	  to	  go	  unpunished,	  could	  Thessaly	  not	  be	  expected	  to	  react	  in	  the	  same	  
way	  as	   it	  was	  apparently	  hoped	  Thebes	  would?	  The	  matter	   is	   a	  difficult	  one;	  Both	  
Markle	   and	   Ellis	   have	   highlighted	   the	   fact	   that	   we	   Thebes	   to	   be	   substantially	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weakened	   they	  would	  very	   likely	   replace	   the	   city	   at	   the	  head	  of	   the	  Amphictyonic	  
League,333	  and	  Markle	  has	  pointed	   to	  Demosthenes’	  assertion	   that	   the	  Thessalians	  
“desired	   to	   become	  masters…of	   the	   pylaea	   and	   of	   affairs	   at	   Delphi.”334	   However,	  
Aeschines	   declares	   that	   at	   Pella	   the	   Thessalians	   were	   confident	   that	   Philip’s	   next	  
campaign	   would	   be	   “on	   their	   behalf”.335	   Also,	   one	   should	   not	   underestimate	   the	  
nature	  of	  anti-­‐Phocian	  feeling	  within	  Thessaly.	  As	  Cawkwell	  puts	   it	  “the	  hatred	  was	  
of	  an	  ancient	  origin	  [and]	  apart	  from	  the	  Locrians,	  who	  were	  neighbours	  of	  Phocis,	  
the	   only	   member	   of	   the	   Amphictyony	   to	   support	   Thebes	   was	   Thessaly.”336	   The	  
ultimate	   interests	   of	   the	   Thessalians	   must	   remain	   uncertain	   then,	   but	   Markle	   is	  
probably	   correct	   to	   emphasise	   the	   fact	   that	   Philip’s	   influence	   was	   derived	   from	  
exploiting	   inherent	   divisions	   in	   Thessaly,	   and	   supporting	   certain	   cities	   over	   others;	  
Larissa	   and	   Pharsalus	   over	   Pherae	   and	   Halus	   are	   clear	   examples.337	   The	   fact	   that	  
following	  the	  Sacred	  War	  the	  Thessalians	  received	  only	  control	  of	  one	  of	  the	  three	  
forts	   at	   Thermopylae	   as	   compensation	   strongly	   suggests	   Philip	   was	   not	   under	  
substantial	  pressure	  from	  them.338	  
	  
	   Cawkwell	   also	   highlights	   the	   apparent	   reliance	   of	   the	   success	   ‘Plan	   A’	   on	  
Athenian	   land	   forces	   being	   able	   to	   defeat	   those	   of	   Thebes.	   Until	   Thebes	   was	  
defeated	  Philip	  was	  forced	  to	  wait	  to	  the	  west	  of	  Thermopylae,	  unable	  to	  pass	  into	  
central	  Greece	  without	  Athenian	  assistance	   in	  trapping	  Phalaecus.339	  Here	  Markle’s	  
response	  is	  less	  convincing;	  an	  Athenian	  army	  had	  stopped	  Philip	  at	  Thermopylae	  in	  
352	  following	  his	  victory	  at	  the	  Crocus	  Plain,	  but	  it	  does	  not	  obviously	  follow	  that	  he	  
would	  have	  thereafter	  thought	  of	  them	  as	  a	  formidable	  enough	  force	  to	  defeat	  the	  
army	  of	  Thebes,	  the	  most	  powerful	  city	  in	  central	  and	  southern	  Greece.340	  However,	  
Athens	   was	   presumably	   meant	   to	   operate	   with	   the	   element	   of	   surprise,	   and	   the	  
Thebans	  were	  sufficiently	  exhausted	  by	  the	  war	  with	  Phocis	  that	  they	  were	  forced	  to	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turn	   to	  Philip	   to	  bring	   it	   to	  a	   close.	   In	  addition,	  Markle	   suggests	   that	   the	  Athenian	  
navy	  may	  well	  have	  been	  expected	  to	  ferry	  Macedonian	  forces	  around	  to	  the	  east	  of	  
Thermopylae	   to	   strengthen	   their	   own	   army.341	   Whilst	   there	   is	   no	   evidence	   to	  
support	  this,	  there	  is	  no	  reason	  why	  it	  could	  not	  have	  been	  considered.	  
	  
	   Ellis	  and	  Markle’s	  case	  is	  thus	  indeed	  a	  compelling	  one.	  Perhaps	  the	  element	  
most	  in	  its	  favour	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  offers	  an	  explanation	  for	  Philip’s	  insistence	  on	  an	  
alliance	  with	  Athens	  as	  well	  as	  a	  peace	  agreement.	  In	  essence,	  Philip’s	  long-­‐term	  aim	  
was	  an	  assault	  on	  the	  Persian	  empire,	  in	  which	  an	  alliance	  with	  Athens	  was	  crucial.	  
Ellis	   and	   Markle	   differ	   slightly	   in	   their	   reasoning;	   for	   the	   former	   an	   alliance	   with	  
Athens	   meant	   access	   to	   its	   powerful	   fleet,	   which	   was	   vital	   for	   any	   successful	  
expedition	  into	  Asia	  Minor.342	  For	  the	  latter,	  the	  focus	  was	  ensuring	  that	  there	  was	  
no	   chance	   of	   any	   rebellion	   or	   resistance	   in	   Greece	   whenever	   he	   began	   such	   a	  
campaign.343	  
	  
	   Ellis’	  interpretation	  must	  surely	  be	  rejected	  however.	  J.	  Buckler	  has	  made	  the	  
point	   that	   an	   alliance	   with	   a	   city,	   which	   had	   for	   over	   a	   decade	   been	   his	   enemy,	  
would	  not	  simply	  grant	  Philip	  automatic	  access	  to	  its	  fleet;	  it	  is	  far	  more	  likely	  that	  he	  
would	   need	   to	   dominate	   Athens	   to	   achieve	   this.344	   Furthermore,	   Buckler	   claims,	  
there	  is	  no	  reason	  to	  think	  Philip	  sought	  the	  fleet.	  His	  son,	  Alexander,	  overcame	  the	  
threat	   of	   the	   Persian	   navy	   by	   assaulting	   its	   various	   bases	   by	   land,	   and	   largely	  
avoiding	   naval	   engagements.	   This	   latter	   point	   is	   not	   certain	   however;	   it	   does	   not	  
automatically	  follow	  that	  just	  because	  Alexander	  did	  one	  thing,	  Philip	  planned	  to	  the	  
same.	  It	  is	  perfectly	  fair	  to	  assume	  that,	  lacking	  any	  serious	  naval	  forces	  of	  his	  own,	  
Philip	  would	  have	  looked	  to	  secure	  those	  of	  Athens	  in	  expectation	  of	  moving	  against	  
Persia.	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   A	  point	  that	  offers	  greater	  support	  for	  Buckler’s	  argument	  is	  the	  timing.	  It	  is	  
difficult	  to	  believe	  that	  in	  346	  Philip	  was	  already	  planning	  a	  Persian	  expedition.345	  For	  
such	  a	  campaign	  to	  be	  considered	  Philip	  would	  have	  had	  to	  be	  sure	  that	  no	  problems	  
would	  arise	  in	  Europe	  once	  he	  crossed	  the	  Hellespont.	  As	  has	  been	  said,	  Athens	  had	  
been	   an	   enemy	   for	   over	   ten	   years,	   and	   Philip	   had	  only	   just	   brought	   Thrace	   under	  
control.	  In	  this	  context	  Markle’s	  interpretation	  –	  that	  Philip	  certainly	  sought	  to	  cross	  
to	  Asia	  eventually,	  but	  in	  346	  was	  concerned	  with	  ensuring	  no	  such	  uprisings	  could	  
ever	   occur	   –	   seems	   preferable.	   However,	   an	   alternative	   theory	   offers	   a	   more	  
immediate	  explanation	  for	  Philip’s	  insistence	  on	  an	  alliance	  with	  Athens.	  Buckler	  has	  
pointed	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   Philip	   first	   made	   it	   known	   he	   would	   welcome	   peace	  
immediately	  after	  the	  fall	  of	  Olynthus.	  
	  
“As	   events	   would	   soon	   prove,	   Philip	   had	   poised	   his	   army	   for	   a	   massive	   invasion	   of	  
eastern	  Thrace.	  The	  Athenian	  fleet	  posed	  a	  considerable	  threat	  to	  his	  goals	  here,	  for	   it	  
could	   with	   virtual	   impunity	   intervene	   to	   imperil	   his	   lines	   of	   communication	   with	  
Macedonia,	   to	   reinforce	   various	   points	   along	   the	   Thracian	   coast,	   or	   to	   engage	   him	  
directly…Moreover,	   since	   the	   Athenians	   were	   allies	   of	   the	   Thracians	   about	   to	   be	  
attacked,	   Philip	  must	  make	   a	   separate	   peace	  with	   Athens	   in	   the	   hope	   of	   dividing	   the	  
two…In	  brief,	  Philip	  planned	  to	  neutralise	  the	  Athenian	  navy	  by	  diplomacy.”346	  
	  
Such	  an	  explanation	  is	  greatly	  strengthened	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  can	  point	  to	  definite	  
events	   that	   occurred	   in	   the	   immediate	   aftermath	   of	   the	   First	   Athenian	   Embassy.	  
Markle	  and	  Ellis’	   interpretations,	   irrespective	  of	  how	  well	   the,	  are	  ultimately	  based	  
on	   an	   assumption	   that	   Philip	   had	   on	   a	   future	   Persian	   campaign	   –	   which	   finds	   no	  
support	  in	  any	  of	  the	  sources.	  
	  
	   This	   is	   not	   to	   say	   one	   cannot	   question	   Buckler’s	   theory.	   An	   immediate	  
problem	  arises	  concerning	  the	  promises	  Aeschines	  made	  to	  the	  Athenian	  Assembly	  
upon	   the	   Second	  Embassy’s	   return.	   It	   has	  been	  established	   that	   they	  were	   almost	  
certainly	   not	   an	   invention	   by	   Demosthenes;347	   thus	   if	   Philip	   had	   no	   intention	   of	  
abandoning	   Thebes,	   refounding	   Thespiae	   and	   Plataea,	   and	   allowing	   Phocis	   to	   go	  
unpunished,	  and	  presumably	  gave	  no	  impression	  that	  he	  would,	  why	  did	  Aeschines	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suggest	  that	  he	  did?	  Unfortunately	  all	  one	  can	  say	  with	  reasonable	  certainty	  is	  that	  
Philip	  never	  promised	  anything	  to	  the	  Athenians.348	  The	  options	  would	  appear	  to	  be	  
either	   that	  Aeschines	   invented	   the	  promises	  himself,	  or	   that	  others	  had	  given	  him	  
reason	  to	  think	  they	  would	  be	  fulfilled.	  The	  latter	  would	  seem	  more	  likely;	  such	  an	  
impression	  would	  have	  to	  have	  come	  from	  those	  close	   to	   the	  king,	  and	  thus	  could	  
well	  have	  occurred	  whilst	  the	  ambassadors	  waited	  at	  Pella.	  Unfortunately	  the	  lack	  of	  
evidence	   means	   that	   further	   reliable	   insight	   is	   impossible	   to	   gain.	   The	   best	  
interpretation	  in	  this	  frustrating	  situation	  is	  perhaps	  that,	  aware	  that	  Philip’s	  earlier	  
letter	  had	  promised	  “benefits,”	  and	  desperate	  to	  believe	  anything	  that	  would	  allow	  
Athens	   to	   not	   end	   up	   abandoning	   her	   ally	   to	   Philip	   and	   the	   Boeotians,	   Aeschines	  
seized	  upon	  whatever	  he	  had	  been	  told,	  irrespective	  of	  how	  likely	  it	  seemed.	  
	  
	   Such	   guilt	   for	   abandoning	   Phocis	   is	   inherent	   in	   the	   accusations	   of	  
Demosthenes	   in	   343.	   By	   this	   time	   Phocis	   had	   been	   taken	   and	   by	   the	   order	   the	  
Amphictyonic	  Council,	  its	  citizens	  dispersed	  and	  saddled	  with	  payments	  of	  60	  talents	  
to	  Delphi	  each	  year.349	  All	  Boeotian	  cities	  that	  had	  allied	  with	  it	  had	  been	  destroyed	  
and	   their	   citizens	   enslaved.350	   There	   was	   never	   a	   chance	   of	   persuading	   Philip	   to	  
include	  Phocis	  in	  Athens’	  alliance	  with	  him,	  yet	  Demosthenes	  accuses	  Aeschines	  and	  
Philocrates	  of	  preventing	   it.	  Such	  actions	  suggest	  guilt	  at	   the	  situation,	  despite	   the	  
fact	  that	  to	  have	  sided	  will	  Phocis	  would	  have	  doomed	  Athens	  to	  complete	  isolation	  
and	  maybe	  even	  destruction.	  
	  
	   Such	   feeling	   can	   also	   be	   observed	   in	   Aeschines’	   speech	   at	   Pella.	   If	   one	  
assumes	   the	   Athenians	   had	   indeed	   not	   received	   any	   impression	   of	   a	   change	   in	  
Philip’s	  allegiance,	  the	  context	  of	  Aeschines’	  speech	  changes	  entirely.	  Rather	  than	  a	  
cryptic	  message	  of	  comprehension	  and	  acceptance	  of	   ‘Plan	  A,’	   it	   is	  a	  clear	  plea	   for	  
leniency.	  The	  emphasis	  on	  Thebes’	  supposed	  illegal	  razing	  of	  other	  Boeotian	  cities	  is	  
                                         
348	  As	  stated	  by	  Dem.	  19.37,	  39,	  42-­‐43,	  45,	  48,	  68.	  If	  he	  had,	  and	  had	  failed	  to	  deliver	  on	  them,	  Demosthenes	  
would	  surely	  have	  seized	  the	  opportunity	  to	  denigrate	  him	  for	  it.	  Instead,	  he	  places	  the	  blame	  for	  such	  promises	  
squarely	  at	  the	  feet	  of	  Aeschines	  and	  Philocrates.	  
349	  Phocian	  surrender:	  Dem.	  19.62;	  Diod.	  16.59.3.	  Its	  being	  handed	  over	  to	  the	  Council:	  Dem.	  19.63,	  Diod.	  
16.59.4.	  Punishment:	  Diod.	  16.60.2.	  






intended	  not	  to	  give	  reason	  for	  an	  assault	  on	  its	  forces,	  but	  to	  downplay	  the	  severity	  
of	  Phocis’	  crimes.351	  
	  
Soon	  after	  the	  Second	  Embassy’s	  return,	  Philip	  sent	  two	  letters	  requesting	  his	  
new	  allies	  send	  out	  forces	  to	  aid	  him	  in	  bringing	  the	  Sacred	  War	  to	  a	  close.352	  That	  
the	  Athenians	  chose	  to	  follow	  Demosthenes’	  warnings	  that	  any	  army	  sent	  out	  risked	  
being	   seized	   by	   Philip	   and	   the	   Thebans	   on	   charges	   of	   sacrilege	   so	   soon	   after	  
Aeschines’	   suggestions	   that	   the	   opposite	   would	   occur	   demonstrates	   they	   saw	   his	  
claims	  as	  unrealistic,	  desperate	  hopes.	  With	  Theban	  support	  Philip	  did	  not	  need	  help	  
from	  Athens	  in	  gaining	  passage	  to	  central	  Greece	  or	  securing	  Phocis’	  surrender.	  The	  
request	  was	   a	   test	   of	  Athens’	   loyalty	   to	   its	   new	  ally.	   By	   staying	   behind	   their	  walls	  
they,	  like	  Sparta,	  confirmed	  their	  abandonment	  of	  Phocis	  and	  avoided	  the	  fate	  of	  the	  
Boeotian	  cities	  that	  had	  supported	  Phocis.353	  
                                         
351	  Aesch.	  2.114-­‐117,	  122.	  
352	  Dem.	  19.51;	  Aesch.	  2.137.	  








	   The	   purpose	   of	   this	   essay	   was	   to	   gain	   insight	   into	   the	   nature	   of	   Philip’s	  
relations	  with	  Athens	  from	  the	  start	  of	  his	  reign	  until	  346.	  Specifically,	  the	  question	  
was	   whether	   a	   fair	   assessment	   of	   his	   aims	   could	   be	   obtained	   from	   the	   surviving	  
source	  material.	  
	  
	   It	  would	  seem	  that	  Philip’s	  attitude	  towards	  Athens	  in	  the	  period	  359-­‐346	  is	  
characterised	  by	  deception,	  and	  by	  the	  vague	  promises	  of	  much,	  but	  the	  delivery	  of	  
very	  little.	  As	  the	  outset	  of	  his	  reign,	  when	  he	  was	  most	  desperate,	  Philip	  withdrew	  
Macedonian	   forces	   from	   Amphipolis.	   The	   move	   cost	   him	   little	   –	   the	   forces	   were	  
most	   likely	   required	   to	   supplement	   those	   few	   he	   had	   left	   following	   his	   brother’s	  
crushing	  defeat	  at	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  Illyrians	  –	  but	  successfully	  undermined	  Athenian	  
support	   for	   the	   pretender	   Argeus.	   This	   represents	   arguably	   the	   only	   example	   of	  
Philip	   genuinely	   offering	   the	   Athenians	   something,	   as	   if	   they	   had	   acted	   on	   his	  
withdrawal	   it	   would	   have	   been	   difficult	   for	   him	   to	   dislodge	   them	   from	   the	   city.	  
Thereafter,	   with	   his	   position	   stronger,	   Philip	   always	   promised	   one	   thing	   but	  
delivered,	  if	  anything,	  another.	  
	  
	   Immediately	   after	   he	   had	   secured	   his	   throne	   from	   rival	   claimants	   and	  
threatening	   neighbours,	   this	   took	   the	   form	   of	   outright	   deception.	  When	   he	   acted	  
where	   Athens	   had	   not	   and	   recaptured	   Amphipolis,	   his	   immediate	   promise	   to	   the	  
Athenians	  was	  that	  he	  would	  once	  again	  withdraw.	  The	  impression	  in	  letters	  sent	  to	  
the	  Assembly	  was	  that	  he	  desired	  Athenian	  friendship.	  His	  move,	  instead	  of	  fulfilling	  
his	  promise,	  was	  to	  attack	  Pydna,	  demonstrating	  that	  the	  whole	  image	  as	  a	  façade,	  
maintained	  to	  buy	  him	  the	  time	  to	  obtain	  an	  alliance	  with	  the	  Chalcidian	  League.	  In	  
this	  he	  circumvented	  a	  potential	  union	  between	  the	  league	  and	  Athens.	  
	  
	   The	  objective	  early	  on	  then	  was	   to	  dislodge	  Athens	   from	   its	  holdings	   in	   the	  
north	  Aegean.	  As	  these	  represented	  direct	  threats	  to	  Philip	  outright	  deception	  was	  






be	   subtler.	  When	   Olynthus	   fell	   to	  Macedonian	   siege,	   having	   thought	   better	   of	   its	  
alliance	  and	  turned	  to	  Athens,	  Philip	  let	  it	  be	  known	  that	  would	  welcome	  peace.	  The	  
indication	   that	  Athens	  should	  come	  to	   terms	   took	   the	   form	  of	  both	  a	  carrot	  and	  a	  
stick.	  The	  taking	  of	  Athenian	  forces	  as	  hostages	  when	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  population	  was	  
sold	  into	  slavery	  gave	  the	  impression	  of	  genuineness;	  in	  this	  he	  repeated	  his	  sparing	  
of	   the	   Athenian	   cleuruchs	   when	   Potidaea	   was	   captured	   and	   turned	   over	   the	  
Chalcidians.	   However,	   the	   fate	   of	   the	   city’s	   population	   gave	   an	   altogether	   sterner	  
warning	  of	  what	  might	  eventually	  occur	  should	  his	  overtures	  be	  rejected.	  
	  
	   The	  peace	   itself	  was	  extremely	  basic	   in	   its	   terms;	  Philip	  did	  not	  seek	   in	  any	  
way	   to	   exploit	   the	   fact	   that	   Athens	   had	   singularly	   failed	   to	   even	   offer	   a	   serious	  
military	   challenge	   to	   the	  Macdeonian.	   Indeed,	   Philip	   enjoyed	   the	   luxury	   of,	   during	  
the	   siege	   of	   Olynthus,	   of	   being	   so	   unthreatened	   by	   the	   newly	   arrived	   Athenian	  
reinforcements	   that	   he	   could	  move	   to	   put	   down	   a	   revolt	   at	   Pherae.	   The	   question	  
therefore	   inevitably	  arises	  of	  why	  Philip	   took	   the	   time	  to	  seek	  peace	  when	  he	  did,	  
and	  why	  he	  also	  demanded	  an	  alliance.	  
	  
	   As	   has	   been	   seen,	   there	   are	   differing	   interpretations	   amongst	   scholars.	  
However,	   it	   is	   far	  more	   in	   keeping	  with	  what	   had	   gone	   before	   that	   Philip	   had	   an	  
immediate	  aim,	  and	  by	  seeking	  peace	  and	  an	  alliance	  was	  concerned	  primarily	  with	  
ensuring	   Athens	   could	   do	   nothing	   to	   prevent	   it.	   This	   can	   be	   found	   in	   the	   form	   of	  
Thrace,	   which	   Philip	   attacked	   immediately	   after	   outlining	   his	   terms	   to	   the	   First	  
Athenian	  Embassy.	  The	   timing	  of	   this	  allowed	  him	   to	  conduct	  his	   campaign	  before	  
the	  Athenians	  could	  react	  –	  news	  of	  Cersebleptes’	  defeat	  came	  just	  as	  the	  Athenians	  
had	  voted	  to	  accept	  the	  terms	  –	  and	  whilst	  they	  were	  unwilling	  to,	  busy	  as	  they	  were	  
considering	   the	   question	   of	   peace.	   The	   letter	   that	   followed	   the	   envoys	   to	  Athens,	  
deliberately	   vague	   in	   its	   promise	   of	   “benefit,”	   served	   to	   ensure	   this	   situation,	  








	   Such	  a	  reading	  of	  matters	  is	  preferable	  to	  the	  alternative	  interpretation;	  that	  
Philip	   sought	   to	  abandon	  his	  Theban	  allies	  and	   their	   cause	   in	   favour	  of	  an	  alliance	  
with	  Athens.	  Although	  there	  is	  much	  to	  recommend	  such	  a	  theory	  in	  principal,	   it	   is	  
undermined	  by	   the	   fact	   that	   its	   fundamental	   assumption	  –	   that	  Philip	  was	  already	  
acting	   with	   a	   potential	   Persian	   invasion	   in	   mind	   –	   is	   completely	   unsupported.	   In	  
addition,	   there	   is	   no	   evidence	   that	   the	   matter	   of	   Phocis	   or	   the	   Sacred	  War	   ever	  
formed	   part	   of	   Philip’s	   negotiations	   with	   the	   Athenians.	   Only	   with	   the	   Thracian	  
campaign	  complete	  did	  Philip	   turn	  his	  attention	   fully	   to	   this	  matter,	  and	  only	   then	  
did	   Athens’	   allegiance	   to	   Phocis	   become	   a	   potential	   issue.	   By	   this	   time	   it	   was	  
academic	  however;	   although	  any	  action	  on	  Athens’	  part	  was	  a	  potential	  breach	  of	  
the	  new	  alliance	  with	  Philip,	  such	  a	  move	  was	  pointless	  due	  to	  the	  king’s	  siding	  with	  
the	  Boeotians.	  
	  
	   Thus	  Philip’s	  attitude	  towards	  the	  Athenians	  was	  not,	  it	  seems,	  guided	  by	  any	  
overarching	  aim	  or	  policy.	  Instead	  his	  behaviour	  was	  one	  of	  outward	  friendship,	  with	  
the	  intention	  of	  deceiving	  them	  long	  enough	  to	  effect	  whatever	  campaign	  he	  had	  in	  















The	   murder	   of	   Philip	   II,	   which	   occurred	   in	   336	   amid	   the	   celebration	   of	   a	  
religious	  festival,	  and	  the	  wedding	  of	  his	  daughter	  and	  brother-­‐in-­‐law,	  is	  a	  fascinating	  
and	   complex	   subject.	   The	   assassin	   was	   an	   Orestian,	   Pausanias,	   one	   of	   Philip’s	  
bodyguards	   and	   former	   pages.	   Despite	   the	   existence	   of	   a	  motive	   in	   the	   sources	   –	  
Philip’s	   failure	  to	  punish	  his	  general,	  Attalus,	   for	  abusing	  Pausanias	  –	  scholars	  both	  
ancient	   and	   modern	   have	   suspected	   the	   involvement	   of	   others.	   This	   chapter	   will	  
attempt	   to	   assess	   the	   motives	   for	   and	   likelihood	   of	   each	   potential	   conspirator’s	  
involvement.	  	  
	  
First	   to	   be	   considered	   will	   be	   Philip’s	   wife,	   Olympias,	   and	   son,	   Alexander.	  
Shortly	  before	  his	  death,	  Philip	  married	   for	  a	   seventh	   time,	   taking	  as	  his	  bride	   the	  
ward	  and	  possibly	  niece	  of	  Attalus.	  The	  remarks	  of	  the	  general	  at	  the	  wedding	  feast	  
are	  reported	  in	  the	  sources	  to	  have	  enraged	  Alexander	  as	  they	  suggested	  his	  position	  
as	   heir-­‐apparent	   to	   Philip	   was	   under	   threat.	   Whether	   Attalus’	   remarks	   were	  
intended	   in	   such	   a	   way,	   whether	   Alexander	   was	   indeed	   in	   the	   position	   of	   heir-­‐
apparent,	  and	  if	  so,	  whether	  his	  displacement	  was	  at	  all	  likely	  will	  be	  investigated	  in	  
this	  section.	  Olympias’	  position	  at	  court,	  and	  the	  relationship	  between	  her	  and	  Philip	  
will	   also	   be	   investigated,	   to	   see	   what,	   if	   anything,	   she	   enjoyed	   and	   stood	   to	   lose	  
were	  Alexander’s	  fears	  justified.	  	  
	  
The	   next	   section	   will	   focus	   on	   those	   men	   who	   were	   executed	   following	  
Alexander’s	   accession,	   on	   a	   charge	   of	   involvement	   in	   Philip’s	   death.	   Two	   brothers	  
from	  the	  northern	  Macedonian	  kingdom	  of	  Lyncestis	  were	  so	  accused,	  whilst	  a	  third	  
brother	   reportedly	   escaped	   punishment,	   despite	   being	   guilty,	   by	   being	   the	   first	   at	  
court	   to	   publicly	   demonstrate	   support	   for	   Alexander	   in	   the	   aftermath	   of	   Philip’s	  
murder.	   In	   addition,	   Amyntas	   Perdicca,	   son	   of	   Perdiccas	   III	   and	   Philip	   II’s	   nephew,	  







and	  Aristomedes	  of	  Pherae	  fled	  to	  the	  court	  of	  Darius.	  This	  section	  will	  attempt	  to	  
discern	  firstly	  the	  motives	  for	  such	  men	  to	  have	  been	  involved	  in	  such	  a	  conspiracy,	  
and	   secondly	   whether	   any	   or	   all	   of	   them	   were	   actually	   guilty	   of	   the	   charges	   of	  
treason.	  	  
	  
The	  final	  section	  will	  assess	  Pausanias	  himself,	  his	  motives,	  and	  the	  likelihood	  
of	   his	   having	   acted	   alone	   rather	   than	   with	   the	   encouragement	   or	   assistance	   of	  
others.	  The	  events	  that	  led	  to	  Attalus’	  abuse	  of	  the	  Orestian	  are	  distinctly	  suspicious,	  
involving	  Pausanias’	  driving	   to	   suicide	  an	   identically	  named	  colleague	  due	   to	  Philip	  
favouring	  the	  latter	  over	  the	  former	  as	  a	  lover.	  The	  timing	  of	  this	  is	  confused,	  which	  
has	   led	   some	  modern	   scholars	   to	   suspect	   a	   lengthy	   gap	   between	  Attalus’	   abusing	  
Pausanias	  as	  revenge	  for	  his	  namesake’s	  suicide,	  and	  Pausanias’	  murder	  of	  Philip	  for	  
not	  punishing	  Attalus.	  As	  a	  result	  the	  idea	  that	  others	  were	  involved	  in	  reawakening	  
Pausanias’	  grievances	  and	  encouraging	  him	  to	  finally	  take	  action	  against	  the	  king	  has	  








II.	  Alexander	  &	  Olympias	  
	  
(i)	  Heir	  Apparent?	  
	  
It	  has	  commonly	  been	  assumed	  by	  modern	  scholars	  that	  Alexander	  was,	  until	  
Philip’s	   marriage	   to	   Cleopatra	   in	   337,	   the	   unquestioned	   heir	   to	   the	   throne	   of	  
Macedon.354	  Indeed,	  the	  presumption	  has	  formed	  the	  basis	  of	  theories,	  both	  ancient	  
and	  modern,	  connecting	  Alexander	  and	  Olympias	  with	  Philip’s	  murder.355	  	  
	  
The	  Assembly	  of	  the	  Macedones,	  the	  citizen	  council,	  selected	  Macedonian	  kings	  
on	  the	  basis	  of	  acclamation.356	  An	  endorsement	  from	  the	  previous	  king	  would	  very	  
likely	  have	  been	  enough	  to	  earn	  this	  support,	  but	  such	  a	  recommendation	  was	  in	  no	  
way	   limited	   by	   the	   concept	   of	   primogeniture.	   Good	   relations	   between	   Philip	   and	  
Alexander	  would	   thus	   have	   been	   important.	   Care	   for	   his	   son’s	  welfare	   is	   certainly	  
evident	   in	  Philip’s	  hiring	  of	  Aristotle	  as	  Alexander’s	  tutor	   in	  343,	  when	  the	  boy	  was	  
13.357	  If	  Alexander	  were	  only	  to	  learn	  academic	  subjects,	  tutors	  would	  have	  sufficed.	  
However,	   the	   apparently	   unparalleled	   choice	   of	   a	   renowned	   philosopher	   for	   him	  
demonstrates	  not	  only	  a	  wish	  to	  give	  Alexander	  the	  finest	  academic	  upbringing,	  but	  
also	  to	  ensure	  that	  he	  was	  educated	  on	  a	  wider	  range	  of	  matters,	  something	  surely	  
done	  with	  succession	  in	  mind.358	  
	  
This	  education	  ended	  in	  340	  when	  Philip,	  before	  departing	  for	  Byzantium	  and	  
Perinthus,	   summoned	   Alexander	   to	   Pella	   and	   granted	   him	   charge	   of	   the	   Royal	  
Seal.359	  Such	  an	  appointment	  was	  essentially	  that	  of	  regent	  as	  it	  allowed	  Alexander	  
to	  conduct	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  business	  at	  court.360	  The	  regency	  implies	  at	  the	  very	  least	  that	  
Philip	  wished	  to	  test	  Alexander	  with	  further	  responsibility,	  or	  that	  he	  already	  trusted	  
him	  with	  it.	  By	  extension,	  this	  suggests	  an	  interest	  by	  Philip	  in	  Alexander	  eventually	  
                                         
354	   For	   example	   Badian	   1963,	   244;	   Bosworth	   1993,	   19;	   Ellis	   1981,	   129f;	   Hamilton	   1965,	   120	   and	   1973,	   32;	  
Hammond	  2004,	  6-­‐7.	  
355	  Just.	  9.7.3;	  Plut.	  Alex.	  9.4.	  
356	  Hammond	  1979,	  152f.	  See	  also	  1989,	  21-­‐4,	  60-­‐70,	  166-­‐70.	  
357	  Plut.	  Alex,7.1-­‐2.	  
358	  Plut.	  Alex.	  7-­‐8.	  
359	  Plut.	  Alex.	  9.1	  







handling	   the	   role	   fully.	   This	   is	   supported	   by	   presence	   of	   Antipater	   as	   only	   an	  
advisor,361	  even	  though	  he	  had	  previously	  acted	  as	  regent	  himself.362	  
	  
Philip’s	   sending	   for	   Alexander	   soon	   after	   to	   be	   involved	   in	   the	   Scythian	  
conflicts	   that	   followed	   the	   failed	   sieges	   at	   Byzantium	   and	   Perinthus363	   suggests	   a	  
wish	   to	   give	   his	   son	   experience	   in	   the	   field.	   This	   again	   strengthens	   the	   idea	   of	  
Alexander	   being	   Philip’s	   intended	   heir.	   Such	   intentions	   are	   even	   more	   evident	   in	  
Alexander’s	   involvement	   at	   Chaeronea	   two	   years	   later,	   when	   he	   commanded	   the	  
Companion	   Cavalry,364	   and	   afterwards,	   when	   he,	   with	   Antipater	   and	   Alcimachus,	  
accompanied	   the	   ashes	   of	   the	   dead	   Athenians	   back	   to	   their	   home	   city.365	   Whilst	  
there	  are	  other	  aspects	  to	  be	  considered	  below,	  an	  initial	  examination	  would	  seem	  
to	  demonstrate	  both	  Philip’s	   keenness	   for	  his	   son	   succeeding	  him,	   and	  his	   faith	   in	  
Alexander’s	  ability	  to	  successfully	  do	  so.366	  
	  
(ii)	  Queen	  of	  Queens?	  
	  
It	   has	   also	   been	   commonly	   held	   that	   any	   involvement	  Olympias	   had	   in	   her	  
husband’s	   murder	   was	   inspired	   by	   Philip’s	   marriage	   to	   Cleopatra	   in	   337.	   Such	   a	  
union,	   it	   has	   been	   held,	   threatened	   her	   position	   as	   foremost	   of	   Philip’s	   multiple	  
wives	   within	   the	  Macedonian	   court.	   Thus	   it	   is	   appropriate	   to	   assess	   whether	   her	  
position	  was	  as	  has	  been	  suggested	  and	  if	  so,	  how	  secure	  she	  was	  in	  it.	  
	  
There	   is	   an	   unfortunate	   lack	   of	   evidence	   for	   Olympias’	   standing	   at	   court	  
during	  Philip’s	  reign.	  Her	  few	  appearances	  in	  the	  sources	  are	  very	  likely	  influenced	  by	  
her	  actions	  and	   those	  of	  others	  during	  and	  after	  Alexander’s	   reign.	  For	   less	  biased	  
indications	  of	  her	  position,	  one	  should	  consider	  the	  possibility	  of	  any	  affection	  in	  her	  
marriage	   to	   Philip.	   As	   this	  was	   something	   usually	   absent	   from	   ancient	   unions,	   the	  
                                         
361	  As	  implied	  by	  Isoc.	  Ep.	  4.	  Cf.	  Plut.	  Alex.	  9.1.	  Schachermeyer	  1973,	  93	  n.	  74	  argues	  that	  Theopompus	  FGrH	  115	  
F217	  shows	  Antipater	  was	  absent	  at	  least	  some	  of	  the	  time.	  
362	  During	  Philip’s	  campaign	  against	  the	  Thracians	  from	  342.	  Cf.	  Berve	  	  n.	  94	  for	  references.	  
363	  Just.	  9.1.8.	  
364	  Plut.	  Alex.	  9.2.	  
365	  Plut.	  Alex.	  9.3.	  
366	   Badian	   1963,	   244	   feels	   that	  Alexander	  was	   recognised	   as	   crown	  prince	   from	  a	  much	   earlier	   age,	   and	   such	  







presence	  of	  such	  emotion	  could	  have	  led	  to	  her	  being	  more	  prominent	  at	  court	  than	  
other	  wives,	  and	  perhaps	  even	  other	  males.	   For	   the	   same	   reason,	  one	  should	  also	  
attempt	  to	  assess	  the	  significance	  of	  her	  being	  the	  mother	  to	  Alexander.	  	  
	  
Plutarch	  claims	  that:	  
	  
…Philip	   fell	   in	   love	   with	   Olympias…at	   the	   time	   when	   they	   were	   both	   initiated	   into	   the	  
mysteries	  at	  Samothrace.	  He	  was	  then	  a	  young	  man	  and	  she	  an	  orphan,	  and	  after	  obtaining	  
the	  consent	  of	  her	  brother	  Arybbas,	  Philip	  betrothed	  himself	  to	  her.367	  
	  
That	  an	  engagement	  or	  some	  similar	  understanding	  was	  arranged	  is	  not	  impossible.	  
However,	   it	   must	   have	   taken	   place	   between	   365	   and	   361	   if	   it	   occurred	   at	   all,	   as	  
before	  then	  Philip	  was	  a	  hostage	  at	  Thebes,368	  and	  afterwards	  he	  would	  have	  been	  
over	  21,	  and	  thus	  too	  old	  to	  be	  initiated	  into	  the	  cult.369	  Alexander	  was	  born	  in	  the	  
summer	   of	   356,370	   so	   it	  would	   seem	   likely	   that	  Olympias	  was	  married	   to	   Philip	   at	  
least	  nine	  months	  earlier,	  probably	  at	  some	  point	  in	  357.	  Athenian	  girls	  tended	  to	  be	  
married	  between	  the	  ages	  of	  14	  and	  18.	  If	  one	  uses	  this	  range	  as	  a	  guide,	  Olympias	  
would	  have	  to	  have	  been	  born	  between	  375	  and	  371.	  This	  would	  mean	  between	  365	  
and	  361	  she	  could	  have	  been	  anywhere	  between	  six	  and	  fourteen	  years	  old.	   	  Even	  
the	  latter	  is	  at	  the	  low	  end	  of	  the	  usual	  Athenian	  range,	  and	  given	  that	  Argead	  girls	  
seem	   to	   frequently	   have	  married	   when	   distinctly	   older	   than	   fourteen,371	   it	   would	  
seem	   perfectly	   possible	   that	   a	   future	   union	   was	   planned	   at	   or	   soon	   after	   the	  
mysteries	  at	  Samothrace.	  E.	  Carney	  has	  argued	  that	  such	  an	  arrangement	  would	  not	  
have	  been	  permitted	  as	  Philip’s	  brother,	  Perdiccas	  III,	  was	  on	  the	  throne	  and	  feared	  
Philip’s	   political	   position	   being	   strengthened.372	   However,	   this	   is	   unconvincing	   as	  
Philip	   demonstrated	   no	   such	   fears	   during	   his	   own	   reign	   when	  making	   the	   similar	  
move	   of	   marrying	   his	   daughter,	   Cleopatra,	   to	   Olympias’	   brother,	   Alexander	   I	   of	  
Epirus.373	  	  
	  
                                         
367	  Plut.	  Alex.	  2.1.	  
368	  Diod.	  15.67.4;	  Just.	  6.9.6,	  7.5.1.	  
369	  Hamilton	  1965,	  2.	  
370	  Plut.	  Alex.	  3.5.
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  Greenwalt	  1988,	  93-­‐7.	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  Carney	  2006,	  12.	  







The	   attendance	   of	  Olympias’	   uncle,	   Arrybas’	   suggests	   a	   political	  motive	   for	  
the	   meeting’s	   place,	   as	   does	   the	   site.	   Samothrace	   was	   an	   island	   with	   a	   cult	   that	  
appears	  largely	  unknown	  to	  northern-­‐western	  Greeks;374	  consequently	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  
chance	  meeting	  that	  resulted	  in	  a	  whirlwind	  romance	  seems	  highly	  unlikely.	  
	  
Whilst	   it	   is	  thus	  possible	  that	  such	  an	  arrangement	  occurred,	   it	  being	  based	  
on	  affection	  would	  be	  contrary	  to	  usual	  marriage	  practice,	  where	  elites	  married	  for	  
the	  procreation	  of	  heirs	  and	  the	  cementing	  of	  political	  arrangements.375	   In	   fact,	  an	  
alternative	  motive	   for	   the	   arrangement	   can	   easily	   be	   found.	   Both	  Macedonia	   and	  
Molossia	  had	  to	  contend	  with	  frequent	  incursions	  from	  Illyrian	  tribes;	  indeed,	  Philip	  
came	   to	   the	   throne	   as	   a	   result	   of	   Perdiccas	   III’s	   death	   in	   a	   crushing	   defeat	   to	   an	  
Illyrian	   army	   in	   359.	   Any	   arrangement	   that	   inspired	   strengthened	   opposition	   was	  
thus	  beneficial	  to	  both.376	  
	  
Plutarch’s	  other	  attempt	  to	  demonstrate	  affection	  between	  Philip	  and	  Olympias	  
is	  similarly	  unconvincing.	  He	  states	  that:	  
	  
“At	  another	  time	  a	  serpent	  was	  seen	  stretched	  out	  at	  Olympias’	  side	  as	  she	  slept,	  and	  it	  was	  
this	  more	  than	  anything	  else,	  we	  are	  told,	  which	  weakened	  Philip’s	  passion	  and	  cooled	  his	  
affection	  to	  he,	  so	  that	  from	  that	  time	  on	  he	  seldom	  came	  to	  sleep	  with	  her.”377	  
	  
Such	   an	   anecdote	   should	   be	   disregarded.378	   Quite	   apart	   from	   the	   fact	   that	   the	  
serpent	  is	  supposedly	  Zeus	  in	  disguise,379	  the	  whole	  episode	  demands	  Philip	  to	  have	  
publicly	  explained	  his	  ‘loss	  of	  interest’	  at	  some	  point,	  which	  is	  surely	  unlikely.380	  The	  
story	  is	  most	  likely	  a	  product	  of	  Alexander’s	  visit	  to	  Siwah	  in	  331:381	  
	  
“When	   Alexander	   had	   crossed	   the	   desert	   and	   arrived	   at	   the	   shrine,	   the	   high	   priest	   of	  
Ammon	  welcomed	  him	  on	   the	   god’s	   behalf	   as	   a	   father	   greeting	   his	   son.	   Alexander’s	   first	  
question	  was	  to	  ask	  whether	  any	  of	  his	  father’s	  murderers	  had	  escaped	  punishment.	  At	  this	  
                                         
374	  Carney	  2006,	  13	  n.	  60.	  
375	  See	  Pomeroy	  1975,	  5-­‐33	  and	  Walcott	  1987,	  62f	  amongst	  others.	  
376	  Dell	  1970,	  115-­‐26.	  Cf.	  Errington	  1975,	  49;	  Griffith	  1979,	  215.	  
377	  Plut.	  Alex.	  2.6.	  
378	  Plut.	  Alex.	  2.4.	  Develin	  1981,	  92;	  Fredricksmeyer	  1990,	  300	  n.	  3;	  Griffith	  1979,	  677	  n.	  3;	  Hamilton	  1969,	  4	  and	  
Heckel	  1981,	  52	  all	  regard	  the	  story	  as	  having	  some	  element	  of	  truth,	  but	  fail	  to	  justify	  such	  beliefs.	  
379	  Plut.	  Alex.	  3.1.	  
380	  Carney	  1992,	  171	  n.	  5.	  







the	   high	   priest	   commanded	   him	   to	   speak	   more	   guardedly,	   since	   his	   father	   was	   not	   a	  
mortal.”382	  
	  
Assertions	  of	  his	  divine	  origin	  can	  reasonably	  be	  seen	  to	  originate	   from	  this	  event,	  
and	  it	  is	  in	  this	  context	  such	  an	  anecdote	  should	  surely	  be	  viewed.	  
	  
It	  thus	  cannot	  be	  assumed	  then	  that	  any	  standing	  enjoyed	  by	  Olympias	  in	  the	  
royal	  household	  prior	  to	  337	  was	  a	  result	  of	  affection	  between	  her	  and	  Philip.	  This	  is	  
not	   to	   rule	   out	   all	   possibility	   of	   such	   attraction,	   but	   to	   state	   that	   nothing	   can	   be	  
found	  to	  firmly	  indicate	  Philip	  and	  Olympias’	  feelings	  for	  each	  other	  either	  way.	  
	  
What	   then	  of	   the	   idea	  of	  Olympias	   achieving	   a	   superior	   position	   to	  Philip’s	  
other	  wives	  due	  to	  being	  mother	  to	  Alexander?	  She	  was	  not	  Philip’s	  first	  wife,	  nor	  his	  
last.	  There	  seems	  to	  have	  been	  no	  official	  hierarchy	  or	  positions	  amongst	  the	  wives	  
of	  a	  monarch	  in	  Macedon.	  
	  
That	  the	  production	  of	  a	  suitable	  heir	  would	  give	  a	  wife	  a	  position	  superior	  to	  
that	   of	   other	   spouses	   however	   is	   understandable.	   All	   such	   women	  were	  married,	  
politics	   apart,	   for	   reasons	   of	   procreation;	   success,	   whether	   the	   child	   was	  male	   or	  
female,	  was	  of	  great	  significance.	  Daughters	  at	  the	  very	  least	  could	  be	  married	  off	  to	  
secure	   political	   alliances,383	   but	   a	   male	   child	   could	   succeed	   his	   father,	   and	   would	  
elevate	  the	  mother’s	  position	  further	  through	  her	  connection	  to	  the	  potential	  future	  
king.	  That	   there	  was	  no	  alternative	   to	  Alexander,	  his	   stepbrother	  Arrhidaeus	  being	  
mentally	  unfit	  for	  rule,384	  would	  only	  have	  strengthened	  any	  position	  Olympias	  held.	  
	  
If	   one	   assumes	   from	   the	   above	   that	   Olympias	   enjoyed	   a	   position	   of	  
superiority,	   how	   secure	  would	   she	   have	   been	   in	   it?	   As	   has	   been	   discussed,	   Philip	  
began	  seriously	  to	  indicate	  his	  preference	  for	  Alexander	  as	  his	  heir	   in	  340	  when	  he	  
appointed	   his	   son	   regent,	   and	   continued	   to	   make	   similar	   gestures	   until	   shortly	  
before	  his	  death.	  There	  was	  no	  official	  position	  for	  Alexander	  to	  be	  appointed	  to	  that	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  see	  below,	  section	  (vi).	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would	   officially	   confirm	   his	   being	   heir	   to	   the	   throne,385	   so	   his	   involvement	   at	  
Chaeronea	  in	  338,	  for	  example,	  was	  merely	  the	  latest	  and	  most	  public	  indication	  yet	  
of	  Philip’s	  intentions.	  This	  means	  Olympias	  may	  only	  have	  enjoyed	  whatever	  benefits	  
resulted	   from	   Philip’s	   apparent	   preference	   for	   Alexander	   being	   his	   heir	   for	  
approximately	   three	   years.	   It	   could	   be	   argued	   that	   such	   a	   short	   period	   of	   time,	  
particularly	   in	   what	   was	   by	   337	   around	   twenty	   years	   of	   marriage,	   could	   have	  
prevented	   any	   serious	   feelings	   of	   security	   from	   developing	   in	   Olympias’	   mind.	  
However,	  even	   in	  337,	  Alexander’s	  position	  was,	  seemingly	  unchallenged,	  and	  thus	  
so	   presumably	   was	   hers.	   Any	   child	   of	   Cleopatra’s	   would	   be	   of	   little	   concern	   for	  
another	  16	  years	  at	  least,	  assuming	  it	  did	  not	  die	  in	  infancy.	  Olympias’	  position	  was	  
dependent	  on	   that	  of	  her	   son,	  and	  whilst	   there	   seems	   little	   reason,	  Alexander	   still	  
being	  a	   child,	   for	  her	   to	  have	   stood	  markedly	  above	  Philip’s	  other	  wives	  until	  340,	  
her	  standing	  thereafter	  would	  surely	  have	  been	  distinctly	  apart.	  This	  at	  least	  seems	  
to	  have	  faced	  little	  challenge	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  king’s	  death.	  
	  
(iii)	  A	  New	  Wife	  
	  
“And	   after	   all	   these,	   being	   violently	   in	   love,	   [Philip]	   married	   Cleopatra,	   the	   sister	   of	  
Hippostratus	  and	  niece	  of	  Attalus.	  By	  bringing	  her	  also	  home	  to	  Olympias,	  he	  threw	  his	  life	  
into	  confusion.”386	  
	  
In	  337,	  despite	  all	  that	  had	  occurred	  since	  340,	  Alexander’s	  position	  was	  apparently	  
undermined	  when	  Philip	  took	  a	  new	  wife.387	  It	  is	  alleged	  by	  several	  sources	  that	  his	  
choice	   of	   bride	   was	   determined	   by	   falling	   violently	   in	   love.	   Such	   a	   move	   caused,	  
Athenaeus	   suggests,	   insecurity	   at	   court,	   not	   least	   in	   the	   minds	   of	   Olympias	   and	  
Alexander.	   They	   particularly	   feared	   Philip’s	   personal	   attachment	   to	   his	   new	   wife	  
passing	   to	   any	   son	   born	   to	   her,	   as	   the	   infant	   could	   well	   threaten	   Alexander’s	  
position.	   The	   frictions	   connected	   with	   this	   marriage	   and	   their	   potential	  
interpretations	   will	   be	   discussed	   below,	   but	   first	   one	   should	   examine	   why	   Philip	  
should	  have	  married	  again,	  and	  his	  choice	  of	  bride.	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Athenaeus’	   Deipnosophistae	   claims	   that	   Philip	   αἰεὶ κατὰ	   πόλεμου	   ἐγάμει,	   or	  
“always	   contracted	  marriages	   to	   do	  with	   or	   ‘in	   relation	   to’	  war”.388	   His	   source	   for	  
Philip’s	   marriages	   and	   wives	   was	   Satyrus389	   and	   detailed	   analysis	   of	   this	   claim	   is	  
crucial,	  as	  only	  Athenaeus	  makes	  it,	  and	  as	  Philip’s	  marriage	  to	  Cleopatra	  supposedly	  
represented	   a	   change	   from	   such	   a	   policy,	   much	   of	   the	   supposed	   uproar	   that	  
followed	  hangs	  on	  it.	  One	  should	  study	  Athenaeus’	  entire	  claim,	  which	  in	  fact	  runs	  
	  
“Philip	   of	  Macedon	   did	   not,	   like	   Darius	   (the	   one	   overthrown	   by	   Alexander,	   who,	   though	  
fighting	   got	   the	   survival	   of	   his	   whole	   empire	   took	   360	   concubines	   around	   with	   him,	   as	  
Dicaerchus	  recounts	  of	  the	  third	  book	  of	  the	  History	  of	  Greece),	  take	  women	  along	  to	  war,	  
Philip	  rather	  took	  on	  each	  occasion	  used	  to	  contract	  marriages	  to	  do	  with	  war.”	  
	  
Although	   Satyrus	  was	   frequently	   guilty	   of	   focussing	  on	   scandal	   at	   the	  Macedonian	  
court,	  he	  would	  have	  had	  no	  cause	  to	  invent	  reasons	  for	  Philip’s	  marriages.	  It	  would	  
therefore	  be	  fair	  to	  assume	  that	  Athenaeus’	  account	  is	  to	  be	  relied	  upon.	  However,	  
A.	   Tronson	   has	   argued	   that	   whilst	   the	   first	   half	   of	   this	   sentence	   was	   written	   by	  
Satyrus	   and	   copied	   verbatim,	   the	   second	   was	   an	   insertion	   by	   Athenaeus.390	   The	  
argument	   is	   that	   in	   the	   first	   part	   Satyrus	   outlines	   what	   Philip	   did	   not	   do	   and	   the	  
second	  is	  Athenaeus’	  presumption	  of	  what	  he	  did.	  	  
	  
As	  has	  been	  previously	  outlined,	  Athenaeus’	   reference	   to	  Philip’s	  marriages	  
occurs	  during	  an	  extended	  conversation	  concerning	  the	  virtues	  of	  married	  women.	  
As	   part	   of	   this,	   book	   13	   features	   a	   discussion	   of	   bigamy.	   A	   distinction	   is	   made	  
between	   the	   tolerance	   of	   ‘barbarian’	   wives	   for	   their	   husbands’	   concubines	   and	  
monogamy,	  and	  the	  intolerance	  of	  Greek	  wives	  for	  such	  things.391	  Philip	  is	  presented	  
as	   traditionally	  having	  married	   in	  connection	  with	  wars,	  but	  by	  marrying	  Cleopatra	  
for	  reasons	  of	  affection,	  he	  upset	  the	  established	  order	  that	  had	  formed	  around	  his	  
polygamous,	   but	   politically	  motivated	   lifestyle,	   and	   ‘threw	   his	   life	   into	   confusion.’	  
The	   claim	   of	   Athenaeus’	   interpolation	   of	   Satyrus’	   text	   therefore	   stands	   or	   falls	   on	  
whether,	   in	   seeking	   to	  make	   Satyrus’	   version	   of	   events	   fit	   his	   agenda,	   Athenaeus	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edited	  out	  or	  played	  down	  certain	  aspects	  of	  the	  former’s	  narrative.	  The	  only	  way	  to	  
determine	   this,	   and	   thus	   whether	   Philip	   actually	   did	   always	   marry	   for	   reasons	  
connected	   with	   warfare,	   is	   to	   examine	   the	   summary	   that	   follows	   on	   the	  
Deipnosophistae	  of	  Philip’s	  marriages.	  
	  
The	   first	  point	  of	  note	   is	   the	   lack	  of	   association	  of	   the	  marriages	  with	   specific	  
conflicts;	  only	  the	  case	  of	  Philip’s	  sixth	  wife,	  Meda,	  has	  any	  such	  connection:	  
	  
“And	   then,	  when	  he	   [Philip]	   conquered	  Thrace,	  Cothelas,	   the	   king	  of	   the	  Thracians,	   came	  
over	  to	  him	  bringing	  his	  daughter	  Meda	  and	  many	  gifts.”	  
	  
Given	  his	  prior	  statement,	  Athenaeus	  presumably	  expected	  the	  reader	  to	  assume	  an	  
association	  with	  warfare	   in	   each	   case.392	  Whether	   this	   is	   justifiable	   however	   is	   far	  
from	   certain.	   The	   first	   wife	   mentioned,	   Audata	   the	   Illyrian,	   ought	   to	   exemplify	  
Athenaeus’	  claim,	  as	  he	  would	  hardly	  begin	  with	  an	  example	  that	  did	  otherwise.393	  
As	  has	  been	  discussed,	  Philip’s	  conflict	  with	  Illyria	  early	  on	  in	  his	  reign	  means	  that	  a	  
resultant	  marriage	   is	   very	   likely.394	   Concerning	   the	   second	  wife	   however,	   only	   the	  
briefest	  description	  is	  given:	  
	  
“And	  then	  [Philip]	  married	  Phila,	  the	  sister	  of	  Derdas	  and	  Machatas.”	  
	  
Such	   a	   cursory	   mention	   could	   be	   seen	   to	   suggest	   a	   situation	   that	   did	   not	   fit	  
Athenaeus’	   claim	   of	  marriage	   to	   do	  with	   warfare.395	   However,	   the	   lack	   of	   further	  
explanation	  and	  Phila’s	  absence	  from	  the	  other	  sources	  is	  not	  proof	  of	  this,	  so	  one	  is	  
forced	   to	   leave	   the	   matter	   unresolved.	   Philip	   reportedly	   married	   the	   Thessalians	  
Nicesipolis	  of	  Pherae	  and	  Philinna	  of	  Larisa	  because	  “he	  wanted	  to	  appropriate	  the	  
Thessalian	  people	  as	  well,	  on	  grounds	  of	  kinship.”	  One	  can	  again	  say	  little	  other	  than,	  
noting	  the	  lack	  of	  any	  mention	  of	  warfare	  in	  connection	  with	  either	  union.	  
	  
The	  political	  motives	   for	  the	  marriage	  to	  Olympias	  are	  given	  –	  “he	  acquired	  
the	  kingdom	  of	  the	  Molossians”	  –	  but	  once	  more,	  there	  is	  no	  mention	  of	  any	  conflict.	  
It	   is	   also	   very	   obvious	   that	   Athenaeus	  makes	   no	  mention	   of	   Philip	   and	   Olympias’	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meeting	   in	   Samothrace	   or	   the	   affectionate	   origins	   of	   their	  marriage	   that	   Plutarch	  
gives,	   despite	   both	   authors	   probably	   using	   Satyrus	   as	   a	   source.396	   The	   obvious	  
assumption	  is	  that	  Athenaeus	  left	   it	  out	  of	  his	  account,	  as	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  love	  match	  
would	  clash	  with	  his	  agenda	  of	  only	  the	  Cleopatra	  marriage	  being	  a	  love	  match,	  and	  
causing	  uproar	  as	  a	  result.	  
	  
What	  appears	  from	  Athenaeus’	  list	  then,	  is	  the	  lack	  of	  support	  for	  his	  claim	  of	  
Philip	  marrying	   only	   in	   connection	   with	   warfare,	   to	   the	   point	   where	   he	   seems	   to	  
have	   deliberately	   omitted	   parts	   of	   Satyrus’	   narrative	   to	   make	   the	   facts	   fit	   his	  
contention.397	  This	  notion	  finds	  support	   in	  the	  fact	  that	  a	  wider	  examination	  of	  the	  
Deipnosophistae	   demonstrates	   a	   propensity	   on	   Athenaeus’	   part	   to	   edit	   his	   source	  
material.398	  
	  
Armed	   with	   such	   knowledge,	   what	   can	   one	   say	   about	   Philip’s	   marriage	   to	  
Cleopatra?	  For	  Athenaeus	  it	  was	  a	  love	  match,	  an	  opinion	  he	  shares	  with	  Plutarch.399	  
Whilst	   some	   scholars	   have	   accepted	   this	   view,400	   it	   possesses	   a	   problem.	   Plutarch	  
claims	   that	   the	   match	   was	   unsuitable	   because	   Cleopatra	   “was	   far	   too	   young	   for	  
him”,	   but	   at	   46,	   the	   idea	   of	   Philip	   as	   an	   old	   man	   conceiving	   an	   “unreasonable	  
passion”	   in	  his	  dotage	  is	  surely	  unreasonable.	  Athenian	  men	  typically	  married	  from	  
the	   age	   of	   30	   onwards,	   a	   point	   at	   which	   they	   became	   eligible	   to	   vote.	   For	   a	  
Macedonian	  to	  be	  judged	  too	  old	  to	  marry	  at	  only	  16	  years	  older	  would	  be	  strange	  
indeed.	  At	  any	  rate,	  no	  accusations	  of	  his	  being	  too	  old	  surround	  his	  recent	  marriage	  
to	  the	  no	  doubt	  similarly	  aged	  Meda.	  It	  seems	  perfectly	  feasible	  that	  Plutarch,	  or	  his	  
source,	   sought	   an	   irrational	   explanation	   for	   something	   that	   seemed	   itself	  
irrational,401	   firstly	   because	   of	   the	   lack	   of	   political	   benefit	   that	   resulted	   from	   the	  
match	   and	   secondly	   because	   of	   the	   problems	   that	   arose	   subsequently.	   A	   clear-­‐
thinking	  man	  would	   have	   seen	   this,	   so	   Philip	  must	   have	   lost	   his	   senses	   and	   fallen	  
                                         
396	  See	  Tronson	  1984,	  124	  n.	  52.	  
397	  Athenaeus’	  treatment	  of	  Philip	  and	  Cleopatra’s	  wedding	  banquet,	  and	  Alexander’s	  quarrel	  with	  Attalus	  will	  be	  
discussed	  below	  in	  section	  (iv).	  
398	  Tronson	  1984,	  125	  n.	  54.	  
399	  Plut.	  Alex.	  9.4.	  
400	  Borza,	  1992,	  208;	  Fredricksmeyer	  1990,	  301;	  Hammond	  1994,	  172,	  although	  2004,	  22-­‐3	  has	  him	  less	  certain.	  







madly	  in	  love.	  The	  fact	  is	  however	  that	  such	  problems	  can,	  as	  will	  be	  demonstrated,	  
be	  seen	  to	  result	  not	  from	  the	  match	  itself,	  but	  rather	  others’	  responses	  to	  it,	  and	  in	  
turn	   the	   responses	   of	   others	   to	   them.402	   Also,	   perfectly	   sensible	   reasons	   can	   be	  
presented	  for	  the	  union.	  
	  
Despite	   six	   previous	   marriages,	   Philip	   had	   just	   four	   surviving	   daughters	   by	  
337,	  and	  more	  importantly,	  only	  two	  sons.	  Of	  the	  latter,	  only	  Alexander	  would	  have	  
been	   judged	   fully	   capable	   of	   succeeding	   his	   father,	   as	   the	   other,	   Arrhidaeus,	   was	  
mentally	   disabled.403	   Philip’s	   most	   recent	   marriage	   had	   proved	   childless,	   and	   his	  
previous	  five	  wives	  were	  most	  likely	  too	  old	  to	  provide	  further	  children.404	  This	  might	  
not	  have	  been	  such	  an	  issue,	  were	  Philip	  not	  planning	  to	  launch	  himself	  against	  the	  
Persian	  empire,	  most	  likely	  taking	  the	  heir	  apparent	  along	  with	  him,	  thus	  significantly	  
increasing	   the	   chances	   of	   another	   heir	   being	   needed.	   The	   marriage	   of	   Amyntas,	  
Philip’s	   nephew,	   to	   Cynanne,	   his	   daughter	   by	   Audata405	   suggests	   the	   matter	   of	  
succession	   was	   on	   the	   king’s	   mind,406	   as	   does	   the	   union	   of	   Olympias’	   brother,	  
Alexander	  of	  Epirus,	  to	  her	  daughter,	  Cleopatra.407	  
	  
If	  a	  new	  wife	  was	  needed,	  why	  Cleopatra?	  Philip	  must	  have	  known	  the	  choice	  
of	   a	  Macedonian	   bride	  would	   inevitably	   create	   tensions	   and	   unease	   between	   the	  
families	  and	  factions	  at	  court.	  Despite	  this,	  such	  a	  move	  makes	  a	  certain	  amount	  of	  
sense.	  If	  procreation	  were	  the	  primary	  aim,	  the	  Macedonian	  court	  would	  have	  been	  
the	   first	  place	   for	  Philip	   to	  seek	  a	  bride.	  His	  departure	  to	  Persia	  was	  beckoning,	  so	  
swiftness	   of	   choice	   would	   have	   been	   necessary;	   it	   was	   surely	   much	   simpler	   to	  
choose	  from	  the	  immediate	  surroundings	  of	  the	  court	  at	  which	  Philip	  was	  present	  at	  
the	   time	   than	   go	   through	   the	   no	   doubt	   more	   lengthy	   rigmarole	   of	   finding	   an	  
available	  sister	  or	  daughter	  of	  an	  allied	  ruler.	  	  
                                         
402	  See	  section	  (iv)	  
403	  Carney	  2001.	  
404	  None	  of	  Philip’s	  marriages	  can	  be	  dated	  exactly,	  but	  given	  Alexander’s	  birth	  was	   in	  the	  summer	  of	  356,	  the	  
union	  with	  Olympias	  was	  probably	  in	  the	  summer	  or	  autumn	  of	  357.	  Thus	  the	  marriage	  was	  around	  20	  years	  old	  
by	  337,	  and	  Olympias	  most	   likely	  approaching	  40.	  As	  she	  was	  Philip’s	   fifth	  wife,	   it	   is	  reasonable	  to	  assume	  her	  
predecessors	  were	  even	  older.	  
405	  Arr.	  succ.	  Al.	  22;	  Polyaen.	  8.60.	  
406	  Hammond	  1980b,	  167.	  
407	  Diod.	  16.91.4.	  For	  the	  move’s	  potential	  role	  as	  a	  reconciliatory	  or	  even	  cautionary	  measure	  by	  Philip	  following	  








Cleopatra	   was	   the	   niece	   and	   ward	   of	   Philip’s	   general	   Attalus.408	   The	   total	  
absence	   of	   Attalus	   from	   the	   sources	   prior	   to	   Cleopatra’s	   marriage	   has	   led	   to	  
questioning	  of	  his	  standing	  at	  court,	  and	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  union	  represented	  
an	   advance	   for	   his	   family.409	   The	   potential	   political	   influences	   of	   Attalus	   will	   be	  
examined	   below,	   so	   it	   is	   suffice	   to	   say	   here	   that	   he	   was	   subsequently	   sent	   to	  
establish	   a	  Macedonian	   bridgehead	   in	   Asia	   with	   Parmenio,410	   a	   responsibility	   that	  
would	  not	  have	  been	  given	  to	  one	  who	  was	  in	  any	  way	  distrusted.	  
	  
Thus	   there	   seems	   no	   immediate	   reason	   to	   question	   the	   status	   of	   Attalus’	  
family.	  If	  Philip	  had	  married	  one	  whose	  status	  was	  markedly	  below	  his	  own,	  mention	  
would	  surely	  have	  been	  made	  of	  the	  fact	  by	  the	  sources,	  if	  for	  no	  other	  reason	  than	  
to	   strengthen	   the	  claim	  of	  a	   love	  match.	  The	  appointment	  of	  Parmenio	  as	  Attalus’	  
companion	   in	   leading	   Philip’s	   advance	   force	   into	   Asia	   shows	   that	   this	   was	   not	   a	  
position	  for	  a	  rank	  outsider,	  only	  there	  because	  of	  his	  connections.	   It	   is	  also	  worth	  
noting	  that	  Attalus	  apparently	  married	  one	  of	  Parmenio’s	  daughters	  shortly	  before	  
departing	   on	   his	   command;	   a	   definite	   level	   of	   social	   standing	   would	   have	   been	  
required	  to	  allow	  such	  a	  match.411	  
	  
It	   seems	   then	   that	   perfectly	   acceptable	   reasons	   can	   be	   found	   for	   Philip’s	  
marrying	  again,	  and	  for	  his	  choice	  of	  bride,	  without	  even	  considering	  the	  possibility	  
that	   genuine	   attraction	   may	   well	   have	   been	   the	   key	   factor	   in	   Philip’s	   choice.	   No	  
evidence	   exists	   to	   reasonably	   contradict	   the	   image	   of	   Cleopatra	   as	   a	   woman	   of	  
suitable	  age	  and	  social	  standing	  for	  Philip’s	  next	  wife,	  conveniently	  positioned	  at	  the	  
most	  obvious	  place	  for	  him	  to	  seek	  one.	  
	  
	  
                                         
408	  Ath.	  13.557d;	  Paus.	  8.7.7;	  Plut.	  Alex.	  9.6.,	  though	  Just.	  9.5.9	  has	  Cleopatra	  as	  Attalus’	  sister.	  At	  any	  rate,	  he	  
was	  certainly	  her	  guardian.	  
409	  Hamilton	  1973,	  40	  appears	  to	  question	  the	  suitability	  of	  Cleopatra’s	  social	  position,	  and	  Hammond	  2004,	  21	  
describes	  the	  marriage	  as	  ‘introducing	  a	  commoner	  family	  into	  the	  royal	  circle.’	  Carney	  1992,	  174	  suggests	  that	  
the	  choice	  of	  Attalus’	  ward	  over	  a	  member	  of	  either	  Parmenio’s	  or	  Antipater’s	  families	  may	  have	  been	  made	  to	  
prevent	  tension	  developing	  between	  the	  two	  should	  one	  be	  taken	  from	  a	  female	  rather	  than	  the	  other.	  
410	  Diod.	  17.2.4.	  







(iv)	  Happiness	  Shattered?	  
	  
There	  thus	  seems	  little	  reason	  for	  Alexander	  or	  Olympias	  to	  have	  been	  overly	  
concerned	   by	   Philip’s	   marrying	   Cleopatra.	   Almost	   immediately	   however,	   a	  
spectacular	   breakdown	   in	   relations	   apparently	   occurred.	   The	   occasion	   was	   a	  
banquet,	  most	  likely	  in	  late	  337.412	  Such	  allegations	  require	  detailed	  examination	  as	  
if	   true,	   they	   seriously	   undermine	  what	   has	   been	   presumed	   thus	   far	   about	   Philip’s	  
intentions	  and	  Alexander	  and	  Olympias’	  situations.	  
	  
As	  Plutarch	  presents	  matters,413	  during	  the	  wedding	  feast	  Attalus	  drunkenly	  
suggested	  that	  all	  Macedonians	  should	  pray	  for	  the	  birth	  of	  a	   legitimate	  successor.	  
An	   infuriated	   Alexander	   replied,	   “What	   am	   I	   then,	   a	   bastard?”	   and	   threw	   a	   cup	  
(specifically	   a	   skyphos)	   at	   Attalus.	   Furious	   with	   his	   son,	   Philip	   rose	   and	   drew	   his	  
sword,	   but	   drunkenly	   tripped	  whilst	   advancing	   on	   Alexander.	   His	   son	   sarcastically	  
quipped	  “This	  is	  a	  man	  set	  to	  cross	  from	  Europe	  to	  Asia,	  who	  can’t	  even	  get	  from	  one	  
couch	   to	   another.”	   He	   then	   left	   immediately	   with	   his	   equally	   angry	   mother	   for	  
Epirus,	  and	  thence	  on	  alone	  to	  Illyria.	  
	  
Athenaeus’	   version	   is	   similar,414	   but	   has	   Attalus	   explicitly	   saying	   “Now	  
legitimate	  princes	  and	  not	  bastards	  shall	  be	  born”,	  with	  Alexander	  throwing	  a	  cup	  at	  
him	  without	  responding	  verbally,	  and	  Attalus	  throwing	  another	  (this	  time	  a	  poterion)	  
back.	  Notably,	  Philip	  makes	  no	  appearance.	  Alexander	  and	  Olympias	  again	  leave	  for	  
Epirus	  and	  Illyria,	  though	  separately.	  
	  
Justin’s	   account	   is	   the	   least	   detailed415	   saying	   only	   that	   Alexander	   quarrelled	  with	  
Attalus	  and	  then	  with	  Philip,	  who	  chased	  him	  with	  a	  sword	  and	  had	  to	  be	  dissuaded	  
                                         
412	  Just.	  9.5.8-­‐9	  says	  Attalus,	  Parmenio	  and	  Amyntas	  led	  the	  advanced	  Macedonian	  force	  to	  Persia	  shortly	  after	  
Philip’s	  marriage,	   in	  spring	  336.	  As	  will	   	  be	  seen	   in	  section	   (v),	  Alexander’s	   involvement	  with	   the	  Carian	  satrap	  
Pixodarus	  most	  likely	  occurred	  following	  the	  force’s	  arrival	  in	  Asia,	  by	  which	  time	  Alexander	  must	  have	  returned	  
from	   his	   time	   in	   Illyria	   (see	   below).	   To	   allow	   for	   this,	   the	   wedding	   most	   likely	   occurred	   in	   late	   337,	   with	  
Alexander’s	  time	  in	  Illyria	  being	  over	  the	  winter	  of	  337/6.	  
413	  Plut.	  Alex.	  9.4-­‐5.	  
414	  Ath.	  13.557	  d-­‐e.	  







from	   killing	   him.	   Alexander	   again	   left	   with	   Olympias	   for	   Epirus,	   before	   travelling	  
alone	  on	  to	  Illyria.	  
	  
The	  three	  versions	  agree	  absolutely	  on	  only	  two	  things.	  First,	  that	  Philip	  failed	  
to	   support	   his	   son	   against	   Attalus’	   insults;	   indeed,	   two	   of	   the	   accounts	   have	   him	  
siding	  with	  his	  father-­‐in-­‐law	  and	  against	  his	  son.	  Second,	  the	  fact	  that	  Alexander	  and	  
Olympias	  left	  Macedon	  immediately	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  banquet’s	  events.416	  Detailed	  
analysis	  of	  each	  source’s	  origins	  should	  be	  conducted	  to	  assess	  exactly	  which	  aspects	  
and	  variations	  are	  to	  be	  trusted.	  
	  
As	  has	  been	  previously	  mentioned,	  Athenaeus	  helpfully	  states	  that	  amongst	  
his	   sources	   he	   used	   a	   biography	   of	   Philip	   by	   the	   third	   century	   writer	   Satyrus.417	  
Identifying	  Plutarch’s	  and	  Justin’s	  sources	   is	  more	  difficult.	  Their	  contexts,	   interests	  
and	  biases	  are	  of	  great	  importance,	  but	  cannot	  be	  examined	  before	  a	  name	  is	  found,	  
and	   in	   this	   the	  difficulty	   lies.	   In	  his	   1991	  article	   examining	   the	  ultimate	   sources	  of	  
Justin’s	   Epitome	   of	   the	   Philippic	   History	   of	   Pompeius	   Trogus,	   N.	   G.	   L.	   Hammond	  
concluded	   that	   the	   similarities	   between	   Justin	   9.7.1-­‐4	   and	   Athenaeus	   13.557	   d-­‐e	  
meant	  both	  authors	  must	  have	  used	  Satyrus	  as	  their	  source	  for	  such	  passages.418	  The	  
argument	   has	  much	  merit;	   both	   extracts	   have	   Alexander	   quarrelling	   with	   Attalus,	  
and	   the	   throwing	   of	   cups	   as	   part	   of	   the	   disagreement.	   The	   lack	   of	   details	   such	   as	  
Philip’s	   drawn	   sword	   in	   Justin’s	   account	   could	   well	   be	   due	   to	   the	   work	   being	   an	  
epitome;	  Justin	  himself	  confesses	  to	  including	  “what	  was	  most	  worth	  knowing…and	  
[omitting]	  what	  was	  neither	  pleasurable	  to	  learn	  nor	  necessary	  as	  an	  example.”419	  
	  
                                         
416	  Carney	  2006,	  31;	  cf.	  1992,	  175.	  
417	  Ath.	  13.557	  b.	  
418	   Hammond	   1991,	   496-­‐508.	   Cf.	   1994	   14-­‐15;	   1983,	   89f.	   Hammond’s	   argument	   is	   confusing	   however;	   having	  
attributed	  the	  passage	  to	  Satyrus	  (p407-­‐8,	  502),	  he	  goes	  on	  to	  include	  it	  in	  a	  group	  of	  excerpts	  that	  he	  ascribes	  to	  
Cleitarchus	  (p500),	  a	  move	  that	  goes	  unexplained	  (p503-­‐4).	  When	  the	  passage	  is	  referred	  to	  again,	  it	  has	  become	  
9.8.1-­‐3	  rather	  than	  9.7.1-­‐3.	  Presumably	  the	  former	  is	  the	  extract	  Hammond	  was	  referring	  to	  all	  along,	  with	  the	  
latter	  always	  meant	  to	  be	  attributed	  to	  Cleitarchus.	  Putting	  the	  confusion	  down	  to	  typographical	  error	  is	  difficult	  
however,	  as	  the	  mistake	  occurs	  multiple	  times	  and	  recurs	  in	  Hammond’s	  Philip	  of	  Macedon	  (1994),	  14-­‐15.	  It	  may	  
be	  that	  confusion	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  author	  during	  writing	  is	  to	  blame.	  







An	   issue	   remains	  however.	   Justin’s	   version	  of	  events	   shares	  with	  Plutarch’s	  
an	   explicit	   association	   of	   Philip	   with	   Attalus’	   views,	   as	   in	   both	   the	   king	   draws	   his	  
sword	  against	  his	  son.	  As	  a	  result,	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  both	  Plutarch	  and	  Justin	  used	  the	  
same	  source.420	   If	   so,	   this	   creates	  a	  new	  problem.	   If	  Plutarch	  and	   Justin	  both	  have	  
Philip	   siding	   actively	  with	  Attalus	   and	  against	  Alexander,	   how	  can	   they	  have	   come	  
from	  the	  same	  source	  as	  Athenaeus,	  who	  has	  Philip	  doing	  nothing	  of	   the	  kind?	  An	  
answer	  can	  perhaps	  be	  found	  in	  Plutarch	  and	  Justin’s	  being	  concerned	  with	  Philip’s	  
murder,	  and	  explicitly	   linking	  the	  quarrel	  with	   it.	  Athenaeus’	   interest	  however	  was,	  
as	   has	   been	   discussed,	   how	   Philip	   “threw	   his	   life	   into	   confusion”	   by	  marrying	   for	  
non-­‐political	   reasons.	  The	   idea	  of	  Philip	  upsetting	  his	  own	  household	  by	  drunkenly	  
aggravating	   his	   son	   could	   be	   seen	   to	   detract	   from	   the	   idea	   of	   his	  marriage	   alone	  
causing	  the	  problems.	  Given	  that	  the	  distinct	  possibility	  of	  Athenaeus’	  manipulating	  
his	   source	   material	   has	   already	   been	   demonstrated	   one	   could	   suspect	   similar	  
behaviour	   here.	   In	   short,	   all	   three	   could	   have	   used	   the	   same	   source	  material,	   but	  
whilst	  Plutarch	  and	  Justin	  took	  Satyrus	  at	  his	  word,	  Athenaeus	  included	  only	  part	  of	  
the	  account	  to	  make	  the	  events	  fit	  his	  work’s	  agenda.	  
	  
Other	  inconsistencies	  in	  the	  accounts	  do	  not	  seriously	  obstruct	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  
common	   source.	  Who	   threw	  what	   cup	   first,	   like	   the	   different	   versions	   of	   Attalus’	  
words	  or	  offered	  by	  Athenaeus	  and	  Plutarch,	  may	  well	  be	  the	  result	  of	  attempts	  to	  
increase	   the	   dramatic	   effect	   of	   their	   respective	   accounts.	   Indeed,	   it	   is	   perfectly	  
possible	   that	   both	   versions	  may	   have	   been	   completely	   invented,	   and	   Satyrus	  may	  
have	   only	   related	   that	   a	   quarrel	   occurred,	   perhaps	   or	   perhaps	   not	   including	   the	  
words	   ‘bastard’	   (nothos)	   and	   ‘legitimate’	   (gnesion).421	   Plutarch’s	   addition	   of	   a	  
sarcastic	  quip	  on	  Alexander’s	  part	  could	  well	  be	  down	  to	  a	  wish	  to	  give	  the	  focus	  of	  
his	  biography	  the	  ‘last	  line	  in	  the	  scene’	  before	  departing.	  
	  
                                         
420	  Hammond	  Philip,	  15.	  
421	   Carney	   2006,	   32	   is	   correct	   to	   suggest	   that	   whilst	   most	   details	   of	   the	   quarrel	   might	   vary	   or	   suffer	  
embellishment	   in	   the	   memories	   of	   those	   who	   were	   present,	   the	   use	   of	   such	   serious	   words	   to	   a	   person	   of	  







Assuming	  then	  that	  the	  three	  accounts	  came	  from	  the	  same	  source	  material,	  
is	  it	  likely	  that	  the	  incident	  actually	  occurred?	  One	  can	  say	  first	  that	  any	  attempt	  to	  
suggest	   that	   the	   argument	   and	   its	   details	   were	   all	   subsequently	   invented	   or	  
exaggerated	  for	  ulterior	  reasons	  is	  to	  be	  rejected.	  J.	  R.	  Ellis	  has	  attempted	  to	  make	  
such	   an	   argument,	   positing	   that	   it	   originated	   in	   335/4	   in	   connection	   with	   the	  
execution	   of	   Attalus,	   the	   justification	   for	   which	   would	   otherwise	   have	   been	   “on	  
shaky	   ground.”422	   However,	   as	   Carney	   has	   mentioned,	   many	   Macedonian	   nobles	  
would	  have	  been	  present	  at	   the	  actual	  banquet	   in	  337,	  and	  so	  would	  have	  known	  
that	  Attalus	  had	  not	  criticised	  Alexander.	  Consequently,	  Alexander	  could	  hardly	  have	  
hoped	  to	  convince	  them	  otherwise	  only	  two	  years	  later.423	  
	  
Based	  on	  this,	  something	  presumably	  occurred,	  but	  what	  exactly,	  and	  why?	  
The	  idea	  of	  a	  drunken	  argument	  is	  very	  possible.424	  The	  Macedonians	  were	  infamous	  
in	   the	   Greek	   world	   for	   drinking	   their	   wine	   akratos,	   or	   undiluted,	   a	   practice	   that	  
resulted	  in	  greater	  and	  swifter	  drunkenness.425	  Alexander’s	  murder	  of	  Cleitus	  in	  328	  
at	   a	   banquet	   shows	   that	   drunken	   arguments	   certainly	   occurred	   at	   such	  occasions,	  
and	   could	   escalate	   with	   potentially	   lethal	   consequences.426	   However,	   two	   issues	  
arise.	  First,	  why	  would	  Attalus	  apparently	  provoke	  Alexander,	  and	  more	  importantly,	  
what	   did	   he	  mean	   by	   such	   remarks?	   Second,	   why	   did	   Philip	   apparently	   side	   with	  
Attalus,	  effectively	  endorsing	  his	  slurs	  on	  Alexander’s	  legitimacy	  as	  heir?	  
	  
The	   reasoning	   behind	   Attalus’	   ‘praying	   for	   heirs’	   is	   itself	   easy	   enough	   to	  
comprehend.	  His	  niece	  had	   just	  married	  the	  king	  of	  Macedon;	   that	  he	  would	  hope	  
any	  son	  she	  might	  have	  would	  become	  king	  is	  understandable,	  however	  remote	  the	  
possibility	  of	  it	  occurring.	  However,	  his	  choice	  of	  language	  is	  less	  easy	  to	  understand.	  
Whether	   one	   uses	   Plutarch’s	   or	   Athenaeus’	   version,	   Attalus	   can	   be	   seen	   to	   have	  
questioned	   the	   legitimacy	   of	   Alexander’s	   claim	   to	   the	   throne.	   This	   has	   been	  
                                         
422	  Ellis	  1981,	  110,	  135.	  On	  Attalus’	  execution,	  see	  below,	  section	  (v).	  
423	  Carney	  1992,	  175.	  
424	  Heckel	  1981,	  52.	  
425	  See	  Borza	  1983,	  46-­‐50.	  







interpreted	   as	   both	   a	   slur	   on	   Olympias’	   fidelity	   as	   a	   wife,427	   and	   on	   her	   non-­‐
Macedonian	  origins.428	  Both	  hypotheses	  demand	  investigation.	  
	  
The	  idea	  of	  the	  drunken	  outburst	  representing	  an	  attack	  on	  Olympias’	  conjugal	  
loyalty	  is	  easily	  dealt	  with.	  Only	  Justin	  offers	  any	  support	  for	  such	  a	  claim:	  
	  
“For	  [Alexander’s]	  mother,	  Olympias,	  had	  confessed	  to	  her	  husband,	  Philip,	  that	  it	  was	  not	  
by	  him	  that	  she	  had	  conceived	  Alexander,	  but	  by	  a	  huge	  serpent.	  Moreover,	  shortly	  before	  
his	   death,	   Philip,	   had	   publicly	   declared	   that	   Alexander	  was	   not	   his	   son,	   and	   had	   for	   that	  
reason	  repudiated	  Olympias	  as	  guilty	  of	  adultery.”429	  
	  
To	   begin	   with,	   the	   idea	   of	   divorce	   is	   unique	   to	   Justin,430	   and	   can	   be	   put	   down	   to	  
Greek	  misunderstanding	  of	  Philip’s	  polygamy.431	  As	   for	  Philip’s	  disowning	  of	  his	  son	  
as	  a	  result	  of	  his	  mother’s	  actions,	  the	  anecdote	  appears	  in	  the	  context	  of	  Alexander’s	  
visit	   to	  Siwah.	  As	  has	  been	  discussed	  above,	   the	  story	  of	   the	  snake	   is	   	  most	   likely	  a	  
product	  of	  attempts	  to	  emphasise	  Alexander’s	  divinity	  following	  the	  visit.	  Even	  if	  one	  
does	  not	  assume	  this,	  there	  are	  more	  obvious	  problems	  with	  the	  story.	  As	  has	  been	  
seen,	  Plutarch	  relates	  the	  same	  tale432	  but	  only	  has	  Philip	  losing	  interest	  in	  Olympias	  
as	  a	  result,	  not	  treating	  the	  incident	  as	  adultery.	  More	  importantly,	  even	  if	  he	  had	  not	  
spent	  considerable	  time	  and	  effort	  grooming	  Alexander	  as	  his	  heir,	  for	  Philip	  to	  have	  
disowned	   the	   only	   visible	   successor	   he	   had	   would	   make	   no	   sense.	   Indeed,	   he	  
continued	  to	  treat	  Alexander	  as	  his	  trusted	  lieutenant	  until	  his	  death.	  It	  is	  also	  worth	  
noting	  that	  if	  Attalus	  is	  taken	  to	  be	  questioning	  Alexander’s	  parentage,	  his	  claim	  that	  
no	   legitimate	  sons	  had	  been	  born	  must	  be	  extended	  to	  Arrhidaeus	   too.	  This	   seems	  
highly	  unlikely,	  as	  nothing	  exists	  in	  the	  sources	  to	  suggest	  his	  mother’s	  fidelity	  was	  in	  
question.	  More	  than	  anything	  else	  however,	  unless	  Olympias’	  fidelity	  was	  the	  subject	  
of	   considerable	   suspicion	   within	   the	   Macedonian	   court,	   Attalus’	   remarks	   would	  
surely	  have	  caused	  bemusement	  at	  the	  dinner	  table	  rather	  than	  struck	  a	  chord.	  The	  
absence	   in	  the	  sources	  of	  accusations	  of	  adultery	  surely	   indicates	  that	  such	  an	   idea	  
was	  not	  prevalent	  at	  court,	  and	  that	  Attalus	  may	  have	  meant	  something	  else.	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  Hamilton	  1969,	  24;	  Lane	  Fox	  1973,	  503;	  Bosworth	  1988,	  21.	  Cf.	  Carney	  2006	  153	  n.	  86.	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  Badian	  1963,	  244-­‐5;	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  1965,	  120;	  1973,	  40.	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  Just.	  11.11.3-­‐5.	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  See	  also	  Just.	  9.5.9,	  9.7.2.	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  Ellis	  1981,	  118;	  Develin	  1981,	  93;	  Fears	  1975,	  126.	  







Perhaps	  then,	  as	   J.	  R.	  Hamilton	  and	  W.	  Heckel	  have	  suggested,	  he	  meant	  to	  
question	  Alexander’s	  legitimacy	  by	  disparaging	  Olympias’	  non-­‐Macedonian	  origins.433	  
Alexander’s	   Asian	   wives	   apparently	   received	   little	   respect	   from	  Macedonian	   elites	  
during	  his	  reign.434	  It	  is	  not	  impossible	  that	  such	  prejudices	  existed	  to	  some	  degree	  in	  
the	  minds	  of	  Attalus	  and	  other	  individuals	  towards	  non-­‐Macedonians.	  Even	  if	  this	   is	  
what	   Attalus	   meant	   however,	   there	   is	   no	   evidence	   that	   there	   was	   widespread	  
support	   for	   such	   a	   view.435	   This	   has	   not	   prevented	   the	   idea	   giving	   rise	   in	   some	  
scholars’	  minds	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  an	  influential	  political	  faction	  at	  court,	  with	  the	  desire	  
for	  a	  ruler	  of	  ‘pure	  Macedonian	  blood’	  at	  its	  heart	  and	  Attalus	  at	  its	  head.436	  
	  
Such	  a	  theory	  is	  a	  result	  of	  attempts	  to	  explain	  Philip’s	  marriage	  to	  Cleopatra,	  
Attalus’	   language	   at	   the	   banquet,	   his	   behaviour	   following	   Philip’s	   death	   and	  
Alexander’s	  response	  to	  it.	  In	  its	  favour,	  it	  can	  point	  to	  several	  things.	  Shortly	  before	  
his	  niece’s	  wedding,	  Attalus	  had	  married	  a	  daughter	  of	  Parmenio;437	  consequently,	  as	  
one	  historian	  would	  have	   it,	   “the	   two	   families	   looked	   like	  establishing	  a	   formidable	  
junta	   at	   court.”438	   Philip’s	   marriage	   to	   Cleopatra	   could	   have	   been	   the	   result	   of	  
pressure	  from	  such	  a	  faction.	  The	  appointment	  of	  the	  previously	  unheralded	  Attalus,	  
her	  uncle,	  to	  joint	  command	  of	  Philip’s	  advanced	  Asian	  force	  could	  be	  seen	  to	  show	  
the	  new	  influence	  of	  the	  faction,	  not	  least	  because	  his	  co-­‐commander	  was	  no	  other	  
than	  his	  new	  father-­‐in-­‐law	  Parmenio.439	  
	  
Such	  a	   theory	  sounds	  very	  attractive,	  but	   in	   terms	  of	   racial	  matters	  at	   least,	  
unfortunately	   lacks	  evidence.	  Attalus’	   statement	  apart,	   there	   is	  no	   indication	   in	   the	  
sources	  of	  any	  racial	  dislike	  of	  Olympias	  or	  objection	  to	  Alexander.	  However,	  the	  idea	  
becomes	   much	   more	   plausible	   if	   one	   assumes	   that	   such	   a	   group	   was	   motivated	  
purely	  by	  political	  ambition.	  If	  Cleopatra	  were	  to	  bear	  a	  son,	  and	  Alexander’s	  position	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  Hamilton	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  120,	  cf.	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  40;	  Heckel	  1981,	  52	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  view,	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  explicit	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  See	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  42;	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as	  heir-­‐apparent	  could	  be	  undermined,	  one	  or	  more	  members	  of	   the	  faction	  would	  
stand	   an	   excellent	   chance	   of	   controlling	   the	  Macedonian	   throne	   as	   regent	   should	  
Philip	  die	  whilst	  in	  Asia.	  	  
	  
If	   such	   a	   faction	   existed,	   one	  might	   ask	  why	  had	   it	   apparently	   displayed	  no	  
opposition	  to	  Alexander	  until	  now?440	  It	  is	  possible	  that	  it	  had	  only	  gained	  significant	  
influence	   at	   court	   following	   the	   ‘alliance’	   of	   Parmenio’s	   and	   Attalus’	   families,	   but	  
such	   a	   postulation	   relies	   on	   the	   latter	   being	   on	   the	   social	   and	   political	   sidelines	   at	  
court	   prior	   to	   the	  marriage,	   something	   which	   cannot	   be	   assumed.	   Far	   from	   being	  
evidence,	   Attalus’	   absence	   from	   the	   sources	   before	   Philip’s	   involvement	   with	  
Cleopatra	   can	   easily	   be	   put	   down	   to	   the	   sources’	   agendas.	   Justin	   was	   interested	  
chiefly	  in	  Philip’s	  career,	  not	  all	  the	  affairs	  of	  his	  court	  and	  its	  details,	  Athenaeus	  only	  
in	  his	  marriages,	  and	  Plutarch	  primarily	  in	  Alexander.	  In	  addition,	  all	  three	  seemingly	  
used	  Satyrus,	  whose	  work	  was	  a	  biography	  of	  Philip	   the	  man	  rather	   than	  a	  general	  
history	   of	   his	   reign.441	   Attalus’	   lack	   of	   appearances	   can	   thus	   reasonably	   be	  
understood	  without	  demanding	  an	  explicit	  reason	  for	  it.	  
	  
(v)	  Attalus’	  Treason?	  
	  
Attalus’	   actions	   following	   Philip’s	   death	   demand	   investigation,	   as	   Diodorus	   claims	  
that	   following	   the	   murder,	   Alexander	   saw	   him	   as	   a	   rival	   to	   the	   throne,	   and	  
despatched	  one	  Hecataeus	  to	  bring	  back	  or	  assassinate	  him.442	  Given	  that	  compared	  
to	  Alexander,	  Attalus	  had	  no	   realistic	  prospect	  of	  gaining	   the	   throne,	  Diodorus	  was	  
presumably	   referring	   to	   Attalus’	   chance	   of	   ruling	   as	   regent	   for	   the	   son	   he	   reports	  
Cleopatra	  having	  just	  given	  birth	  to.443	  In	  addition,	  Diodorus	  claims	  that:	  
	  
“…immediately	   after	   the	   death	   of	   Philip,	   Attalus	   actually	   set	   his	   hand	   to	   revolt	   and	   had	  
agreed	  with	  the	  Athenians	  to	  undertake	  joint	  action	  against	  Alexander,	  but	  later	  changed	  his	  
mind.	  Preserving	  the	  letter	  that	  had	  been	  brought	  to	  him	  by	  Demosthenes,	  he	  sent	  it	  off	  to	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Alexander	   and	   tried	   by	   expressions	   of	   loyalty	   to	   remove	   from	   himself	   and	   possible	  
suspicion.”444	  
	  
Such	  actions	  not	  only	  suggest	  Attalus	  genuinely	  posed	  a	  threat	  to	  Alexander,	  but	  also	  
allow	  for	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  group	  of	  supporters	  at	  court;	  he	  would	  surely	  not	  have	  
revolted	  unless	  well	  supported.	  However,	  Diodorus’	  account	  leaves	  various	  questions	  
unanswered.	   Why,	   despite	   revolting	   almost	   immediately	   after	   Philip’s	   death,	   did	  
Attalus	  apparently	  achieve	  nothing?	  Can	  such	  a	  revolt	  have	  been	  so	  swift,	  given	  the	  
timeframe	   demanded	   for	   letters	   to	   have	   been	   sent	   between	   Asia	   and	   Athens?445	  
Why,	  if	  Attalus	  was	  such	  a	  threat,	  and	  was	  in	  command	  of	  a	  considerably	  sized	  army,	  
did	  Alexander	  seemingly	  send	  a	  single	  man	  against	  him,	  and	  with	  orders	  to	  attempt	  
to	  bring	  him	  back	  alive?	  Most	  of	  all,	  how	  can	  Attalus	  have	  thought	  he	  could	  change	  
back	  to	  supporting	  Alexander	  having	  committed	  treason?	  
	  
In	  his	  1981	  article	  The	  Assassination	  of	  Philip	   II,	   J.	  R.	  Ellis	   conducted	  a	  detailed	  
examination	   of	   Attalus’	   actions	   following	   Philip’s	   death.446	   As	   has	   been	   highlighted	  
above,	  there	  are	  severe	  problems	  with	  the	  chronology	  and	  time	  frame	  of	  the	  events	  
in	   question,	   which	   Ellis	   puts	   down	   to	   severe	   compression	   of	   the	   timescale	   by	  
Diodorus.	  Plutarch,	  who	  claims	  that	  Demosthenes	  sent	  letters	  to	  “the	  king’s	  generals	  
in	  Asia”,	  supports	  the	  idea	  of	  Attalus	  having	  received	  communications	  from	  Athens.	  
That	  Attalus	  was	  apparently	  punished	  for	  this	  is	  indicated	  by	  Justin,	  who	  notes	  that:	  
	  
“Alexander	   put	   to	   death	   all	   his	   mother-­‐in-­‐law’s	   relatives	   whom	   Philip	   had	   advance	   to	  
positions	  of	  dignity	  or	  military	  command.”447	  
	  
Importantly	  though,	  Justin	  says	  that	  this	  occurred	  “when	  Alexander	  set	  out	  for	  Asia;”	  
as	  he	  dealt	  with	  uprisings	  in	  Greece	  beforehand,448	  this	  was	  not	  until	  at	  least	  late	  335.	  
This	   suggests	   that	  despite	  apparently	   rebelling	  upon	  Philip’s	  death,	  Attalus	  was	   left	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  least.	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unpunished	   for	   around	   a	   year,	   if	   not	   more.	   This	   is	   confirmed	   by	   Polyaenus,	   who	  
mentions	  that	  Attalus	  still	  held	  his	  command	  in	  335.449	  
	  
Given	  this	  lengthy	  gap	  between	  rebellion	  and	  assassination,	  Alexander	  cannot	  
have	  dispatched	  Hecataeus	  early	  on.	  This	  could	  suggest	  that	  Alexander	  was	  not	  ready	  
or	  able	  to	  move	  against	  him	  yet.	  However,	  Attalus’	   inaction	  following	  Philip’s	  death	  
suggests	   that	   upon	   becoming	   king	   Alexander	   was	   not	   concerned	   about	   Attalus’	  
loyalty.	  In	  support	  of	  this	  one	  might	  ask	  why,	  if	  Attalus	  was	  part	  of	  a	  group	  that	  was	  
in	   some	   way	   behind	   Philip’s	   murder,	   was	   he,	   and	   indeed	   Parmenio	   not	   ready	   to	  
immediately	  move	  back	  into	  Macedon,	  and	  link	  up	  with	  their	  allies	  at	  court?	  Even	  if	  
the	  faction	  existed	  but	  was	  not	  responsible	  for	  Philip’s	  murder,	  surely	  decisive	  action	  
of	  some	  sort	  could	  be	  expected.	  That	  none	  of	  this	  occurred	  suggests	  that	  Attalus	  was	  
totally	  unprepared	   for	  Philip’s	  death,	  was	   completely	  uninvolved	   in	   it,	   and	  had	  not	  
given	   Alexander	   any	   reason	   to	   seriously	   think	   otherwise,	   either	   at	   the	   banquet	   or	  
since.	  
	  
How	   then	   to	  explain	  Diodorus’	   claim	  of	   immediate	   revolt?	   In	   the	   context	  of	  
the	   above	   interpretation	   of	   Attalus	   and	   Alexander’s	   situation,	   the	   former’s	   actions	  
were	  presumably	   the	   following.	   The	   general	   received	   letters	   proposing	   a	  pact	  with	  
Athens,	   but	   rather	   than	   acting	   swiftly	   and	   decisively	   upon	   their	   contents,	   he	  
hesitated.	   In	   this	   his	  motivation	  was	   not	   by	   a	  wish	   to	   rebel	   against	   Alexander,	   but	  
uncertainty	   over	   events	   at	  Macedon.	   Given	   the	   execution	   for	   treason	   of	   Amyntas	  
Perdicca	  and	  the	  Lyncestae450	  and	  the	  revolts	  in	  Greece,	  he	  must	  have	  felt	  it	  prudent	  
not	  to	  rush	  to	  publicly	  profess	  allegiance	  to	  a	  man	  who	  could	  be	  overthrown.	  Once	  
Alexander’s	  success	   in	  Greece	  was	  clear	  however,	  Attalus	  felt	  he	  should	  confirm	  his	  
loyalty	  to	  his	  king.	  The	  letters	  would	  make	  an	  excellent	  demonstration	  of	  the	  depth	  
of	   his	   feeling;	   showing	   as	   they	   did	   how	   he	   could	   have	   sided	   with	   Alexander’s	  
enemies,	  but	  did	  not.	  He	  delayed	  too	  long	  in	  sending	  them	  however;	  Alexander	  had	  
grown	  suspicious	  of	  the	  silence	  from	  Asia,	  and	  dispatched	  Hecataeus,	  who	  carried	  out	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his	   orders	   effectively.	   If	   one	   assumes	   this,	   it	   is	   not	   unreasonable	   to	   suspect	   that	  
Diodorus	  assumed	  Attalus	  had	  revolted	   immediately	  after	  Philip’s	  death	  because	  of	  
the	  fate	  that	  befell	  him.	  In	  this	  he	  was	  possibly	  confused	  by	  his	  own	  compression	  of	  
the	  events’	  timescale.	  
	  
If	  Attalus’	  words	  did	  not	  indicate	  a	  political	  group	  at	  court,	  infidelity	  on	  Olympias’	  
part	  or	  anything	  beyond	  a	  personal	  dislike	  of	  her	  origins,	  what	  did	  they	  mean?	  One	  is	  
left	   with	   only	   one	   conclusion;	   that	   Attalus’	   language	  was	   not	   to	   be	   taken	   literally.	  
Such	  is	  the	  opinion	  of	  E.	  Carney,	  who	  argues	  that:	  
	  
“A	   much	   more	   viable	   solution	   involves	   the	   realisation	   that	   Attalus’	   legitimacy	  
language…should	   be	   understood	   in	   a	   comparative	   context.	   Today	   if	   a	   person	   labels	  
someone	  with	  a	  common	  street	  epithet,	  that	  person	  means	  to	  insult	  the	  individual	  at	  whom	  
the	  insult	  is	  directed	  but	  hardly	  intends	  to	  accuse	  the	  victim	  of	  incest	  with	  his	  mother,	  even	  
though	  the	   insult	   is	  meant	   to	  slur	   the	  mother	  as	  well.	  Attalus…may	  not	  have	   intended	  his	  
insult	  to	  be	  taken	  literally.”451	  
	  
The	   idea	   is	  ultimately	  a	  suggestion,	  and	  cannot	  be	  proven.	  However,	  given	  the	  firm	  
lack	   of	   support	   for	   all	   other	   arguments	   concerning	   Attalus’	   language,	   there	   is	   no	  
obvious	   reason	   to	   reject	   the	   proposal.	   Attalus’	   words	   were	   most	   likely	   uttered	  
drunkenly	   and	  without	   consideration	   for	   their	   consequences.	   That	   they	   revealed	   a	  
usually	   concealed	   prejudice	   against	   the	   non-­‐Macedonian	   Olympias	   and	   her	   son	   is	  
probable.	  Given	  the	  context	  however,	  it	  is	  unlikely	  the	  words	  meant	  anything	  beyond	  
Attalus’	  personal	  feeling	  that	  the	  sons	  of	  his	  niece	  would	  be	  ‘more’	  Macedonian	  and	  
thus	  ‘more’	  legitimate	  than	  Alexander.	  
	  
One	  question	  remains.	  If	  Philip	  was	  not	  subject	  to	  any	  pressure	  from	  a	  group	  
at	  court,	  why	  did	  he	  actively	  object	  to	  his	  son’s	  furious	  arguing	  with	  Attalus?	  If	  what	  
has	   already	   been	   presented	   is	   correct,	   there	   were	   no	   existing	   tensions	   between	  
father	  and	  son,	  the	  latter	  had	  no	  reason	  to	  be	  uneasy	  with	  the	  latter’s	  marriage.	  Here	  
it	   is	  appropriate	   to	   remember	   the	  context	  of	   the	  quarrel,	   the	  symposium.	  Not	  only	  
was	   it	   an	   occasion	   for	   eating	   and	   drinking,	   but	   an	   arena	   for	   conversation	   and	  
discussion.	  It	  has	  been	  established	  that	  as	  king	  Philip	  was	  not	  first	  among	  equals,	  but	  
                                         







very	   much	   a	   monarch.452	   As	   he	   was	   not	   forced	   to	   depend	   on	   official	   bodies	   or	  
councils	   for	   guidance	   on	   his	   actions,	   or	   answer	   to	   them	   for	   their	   results,	   the	  
Macedonian	   symposium	   to	   a	   large	   extent	   defined	   the	   king’s	   inner	   circle,	   and	  
demonstrated	  who	  was	   in	   favour,	   trusted	  and	  valued,	   and	  who	  was	  not.	   It	  was,	   as	  
one	  historian	  has	  put	   it,	  “the	  ground	  on	  which	  one’s	  relationship	  with	  the	  king	  and	  
others	  was	  constantly	  being	  tested.”453	  Such	  a	  competitive	  ethos	  could	  well	  explain	  
Alexander’s	  angry	  response	  to	  Attalus’	  slur.	  Whether	  it	  was	  calculatedly	  or	  drunkenly	  
uttered,	   Alexander	   perhaps	   felt	   he	   had	   to	   respond	   to	   maintain	   the	   respect	   of	   his	  
father	  and	   those	  around	  him	  who	  he	  wished	  one	  day	   to	  command	  as	  king.454	  Such	  
judgement	   could	   be	   called	   naïve,	   and	   rightly.	   Having	   spent	   at	   least	   the	   last	   three	  
years	   grooming	   his	   Alexander	   as	   his	   heir,	   Philip	   was	   hardly	   likely	   to	   start	  
reconsidering	  simply	  because	  of	  one	  courtier’s	  drunken	  remark,	  even	  if	  that	  courtier	  
was	   his	   new	   father-­‐in-­‐law.	   Inexperience	   at	   such	   an	   occasion	   could	   explain	  
Alexander’s	   foolishness,	  but	   frustration	  at	  his	   failure	   to	   recognise	   the	   reality	  of	   the	  
situation,	  and	  act	  accordingly,	  may	  nevertheless	  have	  been	  behind	  Philip’s	  criticism	  
of	  his	  son.	  
	  
There	   is	   another	  possibility.	   The	  banquet	  was	  hosted	  by	  Philip,	   this	  obliging	  
him	  to	  maintain	  certain	  standards	  of	   respect	   towards	  his	  guest	   for	   fear	  of	  violating	  
xenia.455	  As	  Philip’s	  son,	  Alexander	  would	  surely	  have	  been	  expected	  to	  do	  the	  same.	  
Disturbing	   the	   occasion	   with	   arguments	   was	   hardly	   in	   keeping	   with	   this	   however,	  
especially	   when	   the	   person	   Alexander	   was	   quarrelling	   with	   was	   the	   father	   of	   the	  
bride.	   Attalus’	   remark	   was	   hardly	   appropriate,	   and	   Philip	   may	   well	   have	   not	  
approved.	  Of	  his	  son	  and	  father-­‐in-­‐law	  however,	  he	  could	  reprimand	  the	  former.	  The	  
effect	   of	   alcohol	   no	   doubt	   worsened	   the	   judgement	   of	   all	   involved,	   probably	  
worsening	  any	  feeling	  of	  resentment	  felt	  by	  Alexander.	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(vi)	  Illyria	  and	  Epirus	  
	  
One	  would	  not	  expect	   relations	   to	  be	  beyond	  repair	   following	  such	  an	   incident	  
however.	  Alexander	  and	  Olympias	  left	  Pella	  at	  some	  point	  shortly	  after	  the	  banquet.	  
The	  emphasis	  in	  the	  sources	  is	  very	  much	  on	  their	  exit	  being	  a	  result	  of	  Attalus’	  and	  
Philip’s	  behaviour:	  
	  
“After	  this	  Olympias	  fled	  to	  the	  Molossians	  and	  Alexander	  fled	  to	  the	  Illyrians.”456	  
	  
“After	  this	  drunken	  brawl,	  Alexander	  took	  Olympias	  away	  and	  settled	  her	  in	  Epirus,	  while	  he	  
himself	  went	  to	  live	  in	  Illyria.”457	  
	  
“That	  was	  why	  Alexander	  had	  gone	  with	  his	  mother	  to	  his	  uncle	  in	  Epirus,	  and	  after	  than	  to	  
the	  kings	  of	  Illyria.”458	  
	  
Such	  a	  view	  can	  be	  observed	  amongst	  modern	  scholars,459	  but	  whether	  this	  is	  really	  
appropriate	   is	   questionable.	   Although	   Justin	   agrees	  with	   Athenaeus	   and	   Plutarch’s	  
version	  of	  events,	  he	   claims	  elsewhere	   that	   shortly	  after	  marrying	  Cleopatra,	  Philip	  
had	   “repudiated”	  Olympias	   as	   he	   “suspected	  her	   of	   adultery.”460	  As	   has	  been	   said,	  
this	  is	  to	  be	  dismissed	  as	  the	  idea	  of	  adultery,	  or	  of	  Olympias	  being	  repudiated	  clearly	  
demonstrates	  a	   failure	   to	   recognise	   that	   the	  Macedonians	  practiced	  polygamy.461	   If	  
this	  is	  what	  Justin	  sees	  as	  behind	  Alexander	  and	  Olympias’	  departure,	  then	  his	  claim	  
is	  strongly	  undermined.	  	  
	  
This	   is	   not	   the	  only	  problem.	   Justin	   also	  alleges	   that	  having	   reached	  her	  home	  
land	  of	  Epirus,	  	  
	  
“Olympias	  was	  also	  trying	  to	  induce	  her	  brother	  Alexander,	  the	  king	  of	  Epirus,	  to	  go	  to	  war,	  
and	  would	  have	   succeeded	   if	  Philip	  had	  not	   forestalled	  him	  by	  giving	  him	  his	  daughter	   in	  
marriage.”462	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The	  idea	  that	  the	  king	  of	  Epirus	  would	  consider	  attacking	  Philip,	  the	  man	  who	  put	  him	  
on	  the	  throne	  seems	  highly	  unlikely,	  and	  one	  would	  reject	  it	  but	  for	  Philip	  offering	  his	  
daughter	  to	  Alexander.	  It	  is	  this	  that	  has	  led	  some	  scholars	  to	  follow	  Justin’s	  version	  
of	  events.463	  It	  could	  be	  argued	  that	  Olympias	  felt	  insulted	  by	  Philip’s	  actions	  at	  Pella,	  
and	  that	  the	  marriage	  was	  arranged	  by	  Philip	  to	  prevent	  any	  feeling	  of	  obligation	  on	  
Alexander’s	   part	   to	   defend	   his	   family’s	   honour	   in	   any	   way.464	   However,	   this	   still	  
seems	  unlikely.	  Either	  way,	  it	  has	  been	  demonstrated	  above	  that	  there	  is	  no	  need	  to	  
assume	  that	  Olympias	  was	  so	  upset	  by	  Philip	  marrying	  again	  to	  attempt	  such	  a	  radical	  
move	  
	  
A	   reference	   by	   Arrian	   suggests	   an	   alternative	   motive	   for	   Olympias	   becoming	  
upset:	  
	  
“Alexander	   fell	   under	   Philip’s	   suspicion	   when	   the	   latter	   married	   Eurydice	   and	   treated	  
Alexander’s	  mother	  with	  dishonour.”465	  
	  
This	   gives	   two	   important	   facts.	   Firstly,	   that	   Cleopatra	   was	   apparently	   renamed	  
‘Eurydice’	  after	  marrying	  Philip,	  and	  that	  Philip	  offended	  Olympias	  at	  the	  same	  time.	  
Although	   a	   Roman	  writer,	   Arrian	   cannot	   have	  made	   the	   same	  mistake	   as	   Justin	   of	  
assuming	  the	  marriage	  was	  the	  cause	  of	  offence,	  as	  he	  states	  in	  his	  preface	  that	  he	  
used	  the	  works	  of	  the	  Macedonians	  Ptolemy	  and	  Aristobulus.466	  As	  both	  would	  have	  
understood,	   unlike	   Justin’s	   sources,	   the	   concept	   of	   polygamy	   in	   Macedon,	   the	  
offence	  must	  have	  been	  something	  else.	  The	  statement	  could	  be	  taken,	   like	  others’	  
references,	  to	  refer	  to	  Philip’s	  behaviour	  at	  the	  banquet.	  No	  mention	  is	  made	  of	  this	  
however,	  and	  Arrian	  provides	  a	  more	   likely	  alternative;	   ‘Eurydice’	  was	   the	  name	  of	  
Philip’s	  mother.467	  As	  has	  been	  discussed,	  Olympias	  had	  most	  likely	  enjoyed	  a	  greater	  
prominence	  compared	  to	  Philip’s	  other	  wives	  for	  at	  least	  the	  previous	  three	  years	  as	  
a	  result	  of	  being	  mother	  to	  Philip’s	  heir	  apparent.	  To	  grant	  Cleopatra	  the	  name	  of	  the	  
most	  recent	  queen	  mother	  could	  thus	  have	  been	  taken	  as	  a	  slight	  by	  Olympias,	  even	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if	  it	  was	  not	  intended	  as	  one.468	  Quite	  why	  Philip	  did	  it	  can	  never	  be	  known;	  perhaps	  
he	  was	  deeply	  enamoured	  with	  his	  young	  bride	  and	  sought	  to	  make	  a	  grand	  gesture	  
of	   love	   to	  her.	   If	   true	  however,	   it	  would	  mean	   that	  Olympias’	  departure	   from	  Pella	  
would	   surely	   have	   been	   more	   of	   a	   demonstration	   of	   indignation	   rather	   than	   an	  
enraged	  dash	  in	  search	  of	  vengeance.469	  	  
	  
Alexander’s	   going	  with	  her	   to	  Epirus	   can	  be	   seen	  as	  a	   show	  of	   support,	  but	  
need	  not	  be	  interpreted	  as	  anything	  more	  serious.	  There	  is	  circumstantial	  evidence	  to	  
support	  Alexander	  going	  on	  to	  Illyria;	  as	  will	  be	  seen,	  the	  death	  of	  the	  former	  royal	  
page,	  Pausanias,	  came	   in	  battle	  against	   the	   Illyrians	  shortly	  before	  Philip’s	  death,470	  
and	   Alexander	   was	   also	   obliged	   to	   deal	   with	   Illyrian	   uprisings	   upon	   acceding.471	   It	  
would	  make	  far	  more	  sense	  for	  Alexander’s	  accompanying	  his	  mother	  to	  have	  been	  
deliberately	  decided.	  The	  idea	  that	  Alexander	  or	  Olympias	  would	  or	  could	  just	  travel	  
to	  Epirus	  on	  a	  whim	  and	  without	  preparation	  or	  protection	   is	  hard	   to	  believe,	  as	   is	  
the	  notion	  of	  Alexander	  going	  to	  the	  Illyrians	  without	  purpose	  or	  permission.472	  It	   is	  
surely	  far	  easier	  to	  believe	  that	  it	  had	  already	  been	  arranged	  for	  Alexander	  to	  travel	  
to	  the	  Illyrian	  kingdoms,	  and	  he	  chose	  to	  accompany	  his	  mother	  to	  Epirus	  as	  a	  show	  
of	  support	  before	  doing	  so.	  
	  
Why	  then	  did	  the	  marriage	  between	  Cleopatra	  and	  Alexander	  of	  Epirus	  occur	  
with	  such	  convenient	   timing?	  One	  could	  see	   it	  as	  a	  conciliatory	  gesture;	   to	  assuage	  
whatever	  offence	  Philip	  had	  caused	  Olympias	  by	  giving	  Cleopatra	  the	  name	  (or	  title)	  
‘Eurydice.’	  However,	  it	  is	  more	  likely	  that	  the	  move	  was	  part	  of	  an	  effort	  by	  Philip	  to	  
increase	   the	   number	   of	   potential	   male	   heirs	   to	   the	   Macedonian	   throne.	   As	   has	  
already	  been	  discussed,	   it	  was	  very	   likely	   that	   this	  was	  behind	  his	  own	  marriage	   to	  
Cleopatra.	   In	   further	   support	   for	   this	   idea,	   one	   can	   point	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   Philip	  
arranged	  the	  marriage	  of	  his	  daughter,	  Cynanne,	  to	  Amyntas	  Perdicca,	  his	  nephew,	  at	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approximately	   the	   same	   time.473	   Also,	   as	   will	   be	   seen	   below,	   Philip	   welcomed	   the	  
offer	  of	  a	  marriage	  alliance	  between	  the	  daughter	  of	  the	  Carian	  satrap	  Pixodarus	  and	  
his	   son	   Arrhidaeus.474	   Given	   that	   Philip	   was	   planning	   to	   depart	   for	   Asia,	   and	   very	  
possibly	   take	   Alexander	   with	   him,	   this	   is	   surely	   a	   more	   acceptable	   reason	   for	   the	  
timing	  of	  Alexander	  of	  Epirus’	  marriage.	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III.	  Persian	  Satraps	  and	  Elder	  Brothers	  
	  
It	  has	  been	  seen	  so	  far	  that	  there	  would	  appear	  to	  be	  little	  reason	  to	  assume	  
that	   the	   relationship	   between	   Philip	   and	   Alexander	   was	   riven	   with	   tension	   and	  
suspicion,	   as	   has	   been	   presumed	   by	  many	   in	   the	   past.	   No	   firm	   evidence	   has	   been	  
presented	   for	   the	   king	   to	   have	   been	   considering	   replacing	   Alexander	   as	   his	   heir-­‐
apparent	  or,	  more	  importantly,	  for	  Alexander	  to	  have	  seriously	  suspected	  his	  father	  
had	  such	  intentions.	  
	  
One	  bizarre	  incident	  suggests	  otherwise	  however.	  In	  most	  likely	  spring	  336,	  not	  
long	  after	  Alexander’s	  return	  to	  Pella,	  
	  
“Pixodarus,	  the	  satrap	  of	  Caria	  tried	  to	  form	  a	  family	  union	  with	  Philip,	  hoping	  by	  this	  means	  
to	   insinuate	   himself	   into	   a	  military	   alliance.	   His	   plan	   was	   to	   offer	   the	   hand	   of	   his	   eldest	  
daughter	   to	   Philip’s	   son	   Arrhidaeus,	   and	   he	   sent	   Aristocritus	   to	   Macedonia	   to	   try	   to	  
negotiate	  the	  match.	  Alexander’s	  mother	  and	  his	  friends	  sent	  him	  a	  distorted	  account	  of	  this	  
manoeuvre,	  making	  out	  that	  Philip	  was	  planning	  to	  settle	  the	  kingdom	  upon	  Arrhidaeus	  by	  
arranging	  a	  brilliant	  marriage	  and	  treating	  him	  as	  a	  person	  of	  great	  consequence.	  Alexander	  
was	  disturbed	  by	  these	  stories	  and	  sent	  Thessalus,	  the	  tragic	  actor,	  to	  Caria	  to	  tell	  Pixodarus	  
that	   he	   should	   pay	   no	   attention	   to	   Arrhidaeus,	   who	   was	   not	   only	   an	   illegitimate	   son	   of	  
Philip’s	   but	   was	   weak-­‐minded	   as	   well:	   instead,	   he	   should	   offer	   his	   daughter’s	   hand	   to	  
Alexander.	   Pixodarus	   was	   far	   more	   pleased	   with	   this	   suggestion	   than	   with	   his	   original	  
proposal.	  When	  Philip	  discovered	   this,	  he	  went	   to	  Alexander’s	   room,	   taking	  with	  him	  one	  
Philotas	  the	  son	  of	  Parmenio,	  one	  of	  the	  prince’s	  companions.	  There	  he	  scolded	  his	  son	  and	  
angrily	  reproached	  him	  for	  behaving	  so	  ignobly	  and	  so	  unworthily	  of	  his	  position	  as	  to	  wish	  
to	  marry	   the	  daughter	  of	   a	  mere	  Carian,	  who	  was	  no	  more	   than	   the	   slave	  of	   a	  barbarian	  
king.	  As	  for	  Thessalus,	  he	  wrote	  to	  the	  Corinthians	  ordering	  them	  to	  send	  him	  to	  Macedon	  
in	  chains,	  and	  at	  the	  same	  time	  he	  banished	  four	  of	  Alexander’s	  friends,	  Harpalus,	  Nearchus,	  
Erygius	   and	   Ptolemy.	   Later	   Alexander	   recalled	   all	   of	   these	   men	   and	   raised	   them	   to	   the	  
highest	  honours.”475	  
	  
Plutarch,	  not	  the	  most	  reliable	  source,	   is	   the	  only	  authority	  to	  record	  any	  aspect	  of	  
this	   incident.	  The	  only	  part	  confirmed	  elsewhere	   is	   the	  exile	  of	  Harpalus,	  Nearchus,	  
Erygius	  and	  Ptolemy,	  which	  is	  put	  down	  to	  Arrian	  to	  their	  staying	  loyal	  to	  Alexander	  
when	  Philip	  treated	  Olympias	  “with	  dishonour.”476	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J.	  R.	  Ellis	  has	  dismissed	  the	  episode	  as	  a	  fiction,	  saying	  that	  	  
	  
“[whilst]	  there	  is	  nothing	  intrinsically	  improbable	  in	  the	  main	  substance	  of	  the	  Pixodarus	  
affair…what	  we	   are	   given	   combines	   the	   fundamentally	   explicable	   and	  plausible	  with	   a	  
notion	  that…is	  late	  and	  false	  and	  then	  provides	  it	  with	  	  a	  list	  of	  characters	  neatly	  cast	  but	  
playing	   dramatic	   roles	   devoid	   of	   any	   discernable	   link	   with	   whatever	   else	   is	   known	   of	  
them.”477	  
	  
Hammond	  has	  similarly	  rejected	  the	  story,	  feeling	  that	  “its	  unabbreviated	  form	  was	  
probably	   totally	   imaginary	   and	   Alexander’s	   part	   in	   it	   seems	   to	   bear	   the	   mark	   of	  
malicious	  fiction.”478	  However,	  both	  Carney	  and	  R.	  Develin	  have	  made	  the	  point	  that	  
“It	   is	  too	  odd	  a	  tale	  to	   invent	  and	  no	  plausible	  reason	  for	   inventing	   it	  occurs.”479	  As	  
Ellis	   acknowledges,	   the	   fundamental	   idea	   has	   considerable	   merit;	   Philip’s	   advance	  
force	  had	  most	  likely	  reached	  Asia	  by	  this	  time,	  and	  that	  a	  Carian	  satrap	  should	  seek	  
an	  alliance	  under	  such	  circumstances	  is	  unsurprising.480	  His	  being	  answerable	  to	  the	  
Persian	   king	   does	   not	   prevent	   this	   being	   the	   case.481	   Perhaps	   the	  most	   important	  
point,	   one	   which	   goes	   curiously	   unconsidered	   by	   many	   modern	   scholars,	   is	   that	  
Plutarch	  was	  writing	   a	   biography	  of	  Alexander.	   Thus	   such	   an	   event,	   though	   largely	  
unimportant	  even	  in	  his	  short	  life,	  warranted	  inclusion	  in	  Plutarch’s	  work.	  Given	  such	  
relative	   insignificance,	   it	  would	  hardly	  be	  surprising	  however	   if	   those	  writers	  whose	  
focus	   was	   Philip	   did	   not	   feel	   compelled	   to	   bother	   including	   it	   in	   their’s.	   In	   such	  
circumstances	  Plutarch’s	  being	   the	  only	  source	   is	  not	   reason	  enough	  to	  dismiss	   the	  
anecdote.	  
	  
That	  Alexander	  could	  have	  been	  persuaded	  that	  Philip	  was	  “planning	  to	  settle	  
the	  kingdom	  on	  Arrhidaeus	  however	  seems	  hard	  to	  believe.482	  Carney	  has	  attempted	  
to	  point	  to	  the	  potentially	  important	  role	  Pixodarus	  could	  play	  in	  the	  invasion	  of	  Asia	  
as	   evidence	   for	   the	   seriousness	   of	   Philip’s	   intentions.483	   However,	   this	   is	  
                                         
477	  Ellis	  1981,	  135-­‐6.	  
478	  Hammond	  1994,	  173-­‐4.	  Cf	  1980b,	  168.	  
479	  Carney	  1992,	  179f;	  Develin	  1981,	  94-­‐5.	  Cf.	  Badian	  1963,	  245.	  
480	  Ellis	  1981,	  136.	  On	  the	  timing,	  see	  Heckel	  1981,	  55;	  amongst	  others.	  
481	  Hammond	  1994,	  174.	  
482	  Griffith	  1979,	  681.	  







unconvincing.	   The	   arrangement	   was	   not	   in	   any	   way	   a	   “brilliant	   marriage,”	   and	  
Arrhidaeus	   had	   received	   no	   treatment	   until	   now	   to	   suggest	   he	   was,	   in	   Philip’s	  
opinion,	  “a	  person	  of	  great	  consequence.”	  If	  this	  were	  the	  case,	  why	  would	  Alexander	  
have	   reacted	   as	   he	   did?	   Carney	   has	   suggested	   that	   Philip	   deliberately	   chose	  
Arrhidaeus	  to	  marry	  Pixodarus’	  daughter	  as	  a	  reminder	  to	  Alexander	  that	  the	  latter’s	  
display	   of	   support	   for	   Olympias	   was	   an	   act	   of	   insubordination	   that	   should	   not	   be	  
repeated.	   Alexander’s	   offer	   to	   the	   Carian	   was	   thus	   intended	   as	   a	   response	   to	   his	  
father	   in	   kind.484	   Fredricksmeyer	   has	   similarly	   argued	   that	   the	   competitive	  
atmosphere	  that	  existed	  between	  father	  and	  son	  predisposed	  Alexander	  to	  challenge	  
his	  father’s	  intentions.485	  However,	  there	  is	  little	  evidence	  to	  suggest	  that	  Alexander	  
should	  have	  felt	  so	  compelled	  to	  resort	   to	  such	  a	  move	  that,	   if	  nothing	  else,	  would	  
demonstrate	  a	  remarkable	  lack	  of	  long	  term	  consideration	  for	  his	  future.	  
	  
More	  attractive	  is	  the	  idea	  that	  Pixodarus	  had	  no	  preference	  which	  of	  Philip’s	  
sons	  was	  married	  to	  his	  daughter.	  Indeed	  one	  could	  suspect	  that	  he	  may	  have	  had	  no	  
idea	  how	  many	  sons	  Philip	  had,	  and	  offered	  his	  daughter	  without	  any	  specification	  to	  
ensure	  the	  alliance	  with	  which	  he	  was	  concerned.	  In	  support	  of	  this	  one	  can	  point	  to	  
Alexander’s	   instruction	   of	   Thessalus	   to	   inform	   Pixodarus	   of	   Arrhidaeus’	   mental	  
deficiencies.	   This	  would	   suggest	   that	  Pixodarus	  was	  unaware	  of	   this,	   and	   therefore	  
presumably	  knew	  little	  or	  nothing	  of	  Philip’s	  sons.486	  As	  Philip	  took	  multiple	  wives,	  it	  
is	  even	  possible	   that	   the	  Carian	   initially	  offered	  his	  daughter	   to	   the	  king	  himself.	   In	  
such	  circumstances	  Philip	  may	  well	  have	  chosen	  Arrhidaeus	   for	   the	  union	  as	   it	  was	  
not,	   as	   has	   been	   said,	   a	   hugely	   significant	   arrangement.	   Philip’s	   upbraiding	   of	  
Alexander	  suggests	  he	  had	  loftier	  aims	  for	  his	  son.	  	  
	  
Although	   Philip	   would	   probably	   have	   been	   frustrated	   by	   Alexander	   acting	  
contrary	   to	   these	   intentions,	  any	  anger	  he	  would	  have	   felt	  would	  surely	  have	  been	  
caused	  by	  the	  political	  implications	  of	  Alexander’s	  behaviour.	  The	  prince’s	  message	  to	  
                                         
484	  Carney	  1992,	  180.	  
485	  Fredricksmeyer	  1990,	  303.	  
486	  Although	  in	  Alexander’s	  mind	  this	  presumably	  made	  him	  a	  better	  candidate	  for	  the	  marriage,	  if	  Pixodarus	  was	  







Pixodarus	  would	  have	  created	  confusion	  and	  undermined	  Philip’s	  authority,	  and	  the	  
sincerity	  of	  his	  proposed	  arrangements	  with	  the	  Carian.	  	  
	  
The	   question	   that	   remains	   is	   of	   course	  why	   Alexander	   should	   have	   offered	  
himself	  to	  Pixodarus	  if	  he	  was	  far	  from	  unsure	  of	  his	  position.	  In	  answer	  to	  this	   it	   is	  
possible	  that	  given	  his	  position,	  he	  felt	  he	  was	  being	  overlooked.	  It	  is	  surely	  feasible	  
that	   the	   still	   young	   Alexander	   failed	   to	   recognise	   the	   relative	   insignificance	   of	   a	  
marriage	  to	  the	  daughter	  of	  Pixodarus,	  and	  felt	  he,	  as	  heir-­‐apparent,	  should	  be	  the	  
one	   involved	   in	   the	  union.	   This	   interpretation	   runs	   counter	   to	  Plutarch’s	   version	  of	  
events,	  but	  this	  is	  not	  a	  version	  to	  be	  taken	  literally.	  The	  timeframe	  has	  clearly	  been	  
heavily	   compressed	   –	   it	   is	   unclear	   exactly	   how	   long	   after	   the	   banquet	   affair	   and	  
Alexander’s	   journey	   to	   the	   Illyrians	   the	  matter	   occurred,	   and	   particularly,	   when	   in	  
relation	   to	  Olympias’	   return	   to	  Macedon487	   –	   and	   various	   aspects	   of	   the	   affair	   are	  
obviously	   imagined.	   There	   is	   no	  way,	   for	   example,	   that	  Plutarch	   could	  have	   known	  
what	  Philip	  shouted	  at	  Alexander	  when	  the	  king	  went	  to	  his	  son’s	  room.	  
	  
This	   is	  of	  course	  speculation	  to	  a	  great	  degree,	  but	   it	  must	  be	  said	  that	  such	  
an	   interpretation	   is	  perfectly	   feasible.	  Alternative	  views	  demand	  Alexander	   to	  have	  
feared	  for	  his	  position	  as	  Philip’s	  heir	  and	  for	  serious	  tension	  to	  have	  existed	  between	  
the	  two	  prior	  to	  the	  event.	  Such	  a	  version	  of	  events	  seemingly	  originates,	  as	  has	  been	  
discussed,	   from	   the	   account	  of	   the	  marriage	  banquet	   taken	   from	  Satyrus.	   It	  would	  
seem	  clear	  from	  the	  common	  elements	  –	  Philip	  being	  furious	  with	  his	  son,	  Alexander	  
fearful	   for	  his	  position,	  conversations	  related	  verbatim	  –	  that	  Plutarch	   is	  continuing	  
to	  use	  Satyrus	  as	  his	  source	  for	  the	  Pixodarus	  affair.488	  At	  the	  very	  least	  his	  narration	  
of	   the	  matter	   is	  written	  with	  Satyrus’	  viewpoint	   firmly	   in	  mind.	  Given	  how	  much	  of	  
Satyrus’	   account	   should	   be	   seriously	   questioned,	   one	   should	   be	   suspicious	   of	  
Plutarch’s	  presentation	  of	  the	  Pixodarus	  affair,	  though	  the	  occurrence	  of	  the	  events	  
themselves	  should	  most	  likely	  be	  accepted.	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   Shortly	  after	  Philip’s	  assassination,	  Heromenes	  and	  Arrhabaeus,	  two	  brothers	  
from	  the	  northern	  Macedonian	  kingdom	  of	  Lyncestis	  were	  executed	  on	  the	  charge	  of	  
being	  part	  of	  a	  conspiracy	  that	  was	  behind	  the	  murder.489	  A	  third	  brother,	  Alexander,	  
apparently	  avoided	  the	  same	  fate	  because,	  according	  to	  Arrian:	  
	  
“…after	  Philip’s	  death	  he	  was	  among	   the	   first	  of	   [Alexander’s]	   friends	   to	  come	  to	  him,	  
and,	  helping	  him	  on	  with	  his	  breastplate,	  accompanied	  him	  to	  the	  palace.”490	  
	  
Justin	  and	  Curtius	  also	  relate	  how	  Lyncestian	  Alexander	  was	  pardoned,	  though	  both	  
attribute	   it	   to	   his	   being	   “the	   first	   to	   salute”	   his	   namesake	   as	   king.491	   Although	   he	  
survived	  this	  time,	  Alexander	  was	  arrested	  at	  some	  point	  in	  334	  or	  333	  when	  a	  letter	  
was	   intercepted	   from	  the	  Persian	  king	  Darius,	  offering	  him	  1,000	   talents	  and	  aid	   in	  
securing	   the	   Macedonian	   throne	   in	   exchange	   for	   murdering	   Alexander.492	   He	   was	  
eventually	   executed	   in	   330	   in	   the	   aftermath	   of	   the	   treason	   of	   Philotas,	   son	   of	  
Alexander’s	  general	  Parmenio.493	  Also	  put	  to	  death	  on	  the	  charge	  of	  treason	   in	  336	  
was	   Amyntas	   Perdicca,	   son	   of	   Perdiccas	   III	   and	   Alexander’s	   uncle,	   for	  whom	  Philip	  
may	  have	  initially	  been	  regent	  at	  the	  start	  of	  his	  reign.494	  Several	  others	  are	  recorded	  
as	  having	  fled	  to	  the	  court	  of	  Darius	  around	  the	  same	  time.	  
	  
The	  matter	  of	  the	  Lyncestians	  has	  provoked	  different	  responses	  from	  modern	  
scholars.	  Badian	  saw	  the	  brothers	  firmly	  as	  scapegoats	  for	  Olympias	  and	  Alexander,	  
and	  were	  “taken	  entirely	  by	  surprise	  by	  the	  course	  of	  events.”495	  More	  recently	  Ellis	  
has	  suggested	  that	  the	  brothers	  were	  very	  possibly	  guilty	  of	  treasonous	  behaviour	  of	  
                                         
489	  Diod.	  17.2.1.	  
490	  Arr.	  1.25.1.	  
491	  Curt.	  7.1.6-­‐7;	  Just.	  11.2.1-­‐2.	  
492	  Arr.	  1.25.1-­‐10.	  
493	  Curt.	  7.1.9;	  Diod.	  17.80.2;	  Just.	  12.14.1.	  
494	  On	  the	  question	  of	  Philip’s	  regency,	  see	  Tronson	  1984,	  116-­‐56.	  







some	   kind.496	   Bosworth	   has	   agreed	   that	   Lyncestian	   agitation	  was	   likely,	   though	   his	  
suggestion	   that	   Philip	   ‘rejecting’	   the	   Orestian	   Olympias	   in	   favour	   of	   the	   southern	  
Macedonian	  Cleopatra	  inspired	  outrage	  in	  the	  northern	  Macedonian	  kingdoms	  seems	  
unlikely.497	  	  
	  
Such	   variation	   in	   opinion	   is	   largely	   due	   to	   the	   issue	   of	   the	   Lyncestae	  
comprising	   not	   one,	   but	   two	   questions.	   Firstly,	  whether	   or	   not	   some,	   any	   or	   all	   of	  
those	  who	   fled	  or	  were	  executed	  were	  guilty	  of	   treason.	  Secondly,	   if	   so,	  were	   they	  
therefore	   involved	   in	   Pausanias’	  murder	   of	   Philip.	   It	   is	   important	   to	   recognise	   this	  




	   The	   first	   issues	   that	   should	  be	   addressed	  are	   the	  potential	   reasons	   for,	   and	  
possibility	   of	   any	   intended	   revolt	   being	   the	   motivation	   behind	   Philip’s	   murder.	  
Lyncestis	   was	   the	   most	   northerly	   of	   all	   the	   kingdoms,	   the	   others	   being	   Elimiotis,	  
Orestis	   and	   Tymphaea,	   that	   comprised	   Upper	   Macedonia.	   This	   bloc	   formed	   the	  
barrier	   between	   the	   southern	  Macedonian	   heartland,	   and	   the	   Illyrian	   tribes	   to	   the	  
north	  and	  Molossian	  confederacy	  to	  the	  west.498	  It	  had	  seemingly	  enjoyed	  a	  lengthy	  
period	  of	  independence	  prior	  to	  its	  annexation	  by	  Philip	  (the	  exact	  of	  date	  of	  which	  is	  
unknown),	   and	   the	   few	   surviving	   references	   prior	   to	   this	   suggest	   that	   it	   had	   not	  
enjoyed	   the	  best	   relations	  with	  Lower	  Macedonia.	   Lyncestis’	  earliest	  appearance	   in	  
the	   sources	   has	   it	   in	   direct	   conflict	   with	   Macedon,	   with	   Perdiccas	   II	   using	   the	  
assistance	  of	  the	  Spartan	  general	  Brasidas	  to	  prevent	  the	  Lyncestian	  king	  Arrhabaeus	  
gaining	   independence	   in	   424.499	   Aristotle	   indicates	   that	   Archelaus	   was	   also	   at	   war	  
with	  Lyncestis	  at	  some	  point	  during	  his	  reign	  (413-­‐399).	  
	  
                                         
496	  Ellis	  1981,	  125-­‐9;	  1971,	  15-­‐24.	  
497	  Bosworth	  1971,	  93-­‐105.	  
498	  See	  Hammond	  1967,	  maps	  14	  and	  15.	  







It	   would	   apparently	   not	   have	   been	   unparalleled	   then	   if	   the	   Lyncestian	  
brothers	   had	   wished	   to	   attempt	   to	   re-­‐establish	   their	   relatively	   recently	   lost	  
independence.	   Plutarch	   remarks	   that	   following	   Philip’s	   murder,	   “all	   Macedon	   was	  
festering	  with	  revolt.”500	  As	  Alexander	  was	  the	  focus	  of	  Plutarch’s	  work,	  the	  claim	  is	  
almost	  certainly	  an	  exaggeration,	  intended	  to	  emphasise	  the	  challenges	  overcome	  by	  
the	  young	  prince.	  Despite	  this	  however,	  there	  may	  well	  have	  been	  some	  basis	  to	  the	  
claim.	  
	  
Several	  modern	  scholars	  have	  argued	  that	  rather	  than	  just	  independence,	  the	  
Lyncestae	  in	  fact	  sought	  to	  overthrow	  Philip	  and	  seize	  control	  of	  his	  kingdom.501	  Such	  
a	   theory	   relies	  heavily	  on	  Curtius,	  Diodorus	  and	   Justin’s	   references	   to	  Alexander	  as	  
“the	   Lyncestian”	   indicating	  his	   being	  of	   the	   Lyncestian	   royal	   house.502	   This	   is	   never	  
stated	   in	   the	   sources	   however,	   and	   Bosworth	   has	   argued	   that	   “…the	   use	   of	   the	  
distinguishing	  epithet	  could	  be	  only	  to	  differentiate	  him	  from	  his	  royal	  namesake.”503	  
Arrian’s	  referring	  to	  Alexander	  as	  only	  “of	  Lyncestis”	  could	  be	  seen	  to	  support	  this.504	  
Unfortunately	   though,	   neither	   argument	   can	   be	   comprehensively	   proven	   or	  
dismissed.	   Certainly	   the	   brothers	  were	   aristocrats,	   as	   is	   shown	   by	   Alexander	   being	  
well	   known	   enough	   by	   his	   royal	   namesake	   to	   rush	   straight	   to	   him	   in	   support.	  
However,	   the	   evidence	   regarding	   their	   exact	   social	   position	   is	   insufficient	   to	   say	  
anything	  other	  than	  that	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  they	  were	  Lyncestian	  royalty.	  
	  
Even	   if	   one	   assumes	   the	   Lyncestae	   were	   of	   royal	   stock,	   this	   does	   not	   make	   a	  
particularly	  strong	  case	  for	  the	  likelihood	  of	  their	  attempting	  to	  usurp	  Philip.	  With	  the	  
brief	  exception	  of	  Ptolemy	  the	  Alorite	   (368-­‐5),	  Macedon	  had	  been	  ruled	  exclusively	  
by	  the	  Argead	  dynasty	  since	  the	  fifth	  century.	  As	  Bosworth	  has	  put	  it,	  
	  
                                         
500	  Plut.	  De.	  Alex.	  Fort.	  Aut.	  327C.	  	  
501	  Badian	  1960,	  325	  and	  Fears	  1975,	  130	  n.	  63	  infer	  the	  idea,	  whilst	  Welles,	  1963,	  121	  n.	  3,	  207,	  n.	  2,	  350	  n.1	  
states	  it.	  See	  also	  Carney	  1980,	  24.	  
502	  Curt.	  7.1.5;	  Diod.	  17.32.1;	  Just.	  11.7.1.	  
503	  Bosworth	  1971,	  96	  n.	  5.	  







“…it	   seems	  highly	   implausible	   that	  dynasts	   from	   the	   small	  mountain	   state	  of	   Lyncestis	  
could	  have	  gained	  preference	  over	  the	  surviving	  male	  Argeads,	  or	  even	  the	  most	  senior	  
echelons	  of	  the	  Macedonian	  nobility.”505	  
	  
An	   alternative	   possibility	   exists	   however,	   which	   requires	   the	   examination	   of	   two	  
other	  men.	  Firstly,	  Amyntas	  Perdicca.	  Although	  a	  theoretical	  risk	  to	  Philip	  throughout	  
his	   reign,	   the	   son	   of	   Perdiccas	   III	   was	   apparently	   allowed	   to	   live	   at	   court	   without	  
issue.	   Indeed,	   late	   in	   his	   reign,	   Philip	   arranged	   his	   nephew’s	  marriage	   to	   Cynanne,	  
daughter	   of	   his	   own	  union	  with	   the	   Illyrian	  Audata.506	   Amyntas	  was	   executed	  with	  
Heromenes	   and	   Arrhabaeus	   however,	   on	   a	   charge	   of	   treason.	   Secondly,	   Amyntas	  
Antiochou,	  who	  served	  initially	  as	  a	  general	  under	  Alexander	  very	  early	  in	  the	  latter’s	  
reign,	  but	  who	  fled	  to	  Asia,	  according	  to	  Arrian,	  
	  
“…not	  because	  he	  had	  received	  any	   injury	  from	  the	  king,	  but	  from	  ill-­‐will	   towards	  him,	  
and	  thinking	  in	  not	  unlikely	  that	  he	  should	  suffer	  some	  ill	  treatment	  from	  him	  on	  account	  
of	  his	  disloyalty.”507	  
	  
A	  fragmentary	  inscription	  from	  the	  city	  of	  Lebedaea	  records	  a	  list	  of	  26	  people	  
who	  consulted	  the	  oracle	  of	  Trophonios.508	  One	  section	  is	  of	  particular	   interest,	  but	  
understanding	  it	  is	  difficult	  due	  to	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  recording.	  Only	  two	  copies	  of	  the	  
inscription	  survive	  –	  one	  from	  the	  mid-­‐17th	  century	  and	  the	  other	  the	  early	  18th	  –	  and	  
the	  original	  stonework	  has	  seemingly	  been	  lost.509	  The	  differing	  versions	  present	  the	  
relevant	  section	  thus:	  
	  
Pococke	  (1752):	  [–	  –]	  INT	  [–]	  ΓKHΔIKAΣ	  [–]	  EΔONONB	  .	  ITA	  .	  
	  
Leake	  (1835):	  	  	  [–]	  YNTA	  [–]	  ΠΠKAI	  [–]	  KEΔONΩNBAΣIΛEY	  [–]	  
	  
                                         
505	  Bosworth	  1971,	  96.	  Carney	  1980,	  25	  makes	  the	  same	  point,	  though	  less	  firmly.	  
506	  Arr.	  FGrH	  n.	  156,	  F9.22;	  Polyaen.	  8.60.	  The	  union	  is	  dated	  to	   late	   in	  Philip’s	  reign	  by	  Polyaenus’	  stating	  that	  
Amyntas	  was	  executed	  soon	  after,	  an	  act	  which	  occurred	  early	  in	  Alexander’s	  reign.	  See	  Carney	  2000,	  278	  n.	  79.	  
For	  a	  discussion	  on	  the	  various	  versions	  of	  her	  name,	  see	  Heckel	  1983-­‐4,	  193-­‐200.	  
507	  Arr.	  1.17.9.	  Cf.	  Curt.	  3.11.18,	  4.1.27;	  Diod.	  17.48.2,	  Plut.	  Al.	  20.	  
508	  IG	  vii	  3055.	  
509	  The	  earlier	  recording	  is	  found	  in	  R.	  Pococke,	  Inscriptiones	  Antiquae	  P.	  I	  c.	  5	  s.	  5	  p.	  61	  (1752)	  and	  the	  latter	  in	  
W.	  M.	  Leake,	  Travels	  in	  Northern	  Greece	  ii.	  129,	  132	  and	  pl.	  vii	  n.	  32.	  In	  addition,	  both	  are	  presented	  in	  IG	  vii	  3055	  







The	   first	   attempted	   reconstruction	   of	   this	   offered	   [Άμ]ύvτας	   [Άριδη…ω	  
Μα]κεδόνων	  βασιλεύ[ς],510	  which	  refers	  to	  an	  Amyntas	  as	  ‘king	  of	  the	  Macedonians’.	  
This	  is	  frustratingly	  vague,	  as	  theoretically	  three	  kings	  –	  Amyntas	  II	  (393/2),	  III	  (393/2-­‐
370/69),	  IV	  (Amyntas	  Perdicca,	  359-­‐6	  ?)	  –	  ruled	  Macedon	  in	  the	  fourth	  century,	  when	  
the	   inscription	   was	   most	   likely	   carved.511	   However,	   a	   subsequent	   attempt	   at	  
restoration	   offered	   instead	   [Άμ]ύvτας	   Π[ερ]δε[κ]κa	   [Μα]κεδόνων	   βασιλεύ[ς],512	   an	  
interpretation	   that	   appears	   to	   make	   better	   use	   of	   the	   available	   letters.513	   The	  
inclusion	  of	  the	  patronymic	  ‘Perdicca’	  is	  crucial	  as	  it	  rules	  out	  Amyntas	  II	  and	  III	  as	  the	  
former	  was	  the	  son	  of	  an	  Archelaus	  and	  the	  latter	  of	  an	  Arrhidaeus,	  not	  a	  Perdiccas.	  
This	  leaves	  Amyntas	  Perdicca.	  That	  he	  is	  thus	  almost	  certainly	  the	  man	  mentioned	  in	  
the	  Lebedaean	   inscription	   is	  confirmed	  by	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  second	  engraving,	   this	  
time	   from	   Oropus,	   which	   records	   a	   grant	   of	   proxeny	   to	   ‘Amyntas	   Perdicca	   the	  
Macedonian’	  (᾿Aμύvτας	  Περδίκκa	  Μακεδόνων)	  by	  the	  Oropian	  Assembly.514	  This	  has	  
been	  dated	  to	  the	  mid-­‐fourth	  century.	  Given	  this,	   it	   is	  very	  hard	  to	  believe	  that	  two	  
different	  men	  with	   the	   same	  name	  and	  patronymic,	   both	   from	  Macedon	  and	  both	  
significant	  enough	  figures	  to	  inspire	  inscriptions	  recording	  their	  visits	  could	  both	  have	  
been	  in	  Boeotia	  at	  the	  same	  time.515	  
	  
If	  one	  assumes	  then	  that	  it	  was	  Alexander’s	  uncle	  referred	  to	  at	  Lebedaea	  and	  
Oropus,	  an	  issue	  arises.	  Although	  it	  is	  not	  certain	  that	  Amyntas	  actually	  enjoyed	  any	  
time	  as	  king	  with	  Philip	  as	  his	  regent	  before	  the	  latter	  usurped	  permanent	  control	  of	  
the	  throne	  his	  doing	  so	  is	  the	  only	  time	  he	  could	  have	  legitimately	  used	  the	  title	  ‘King	  
of	  the	  Macedonians’.	  Although	  his	  exact	  age	  upon	  the	  death	  of	  his	  father,	  Perdiccas	  
III,	   in	   359,	   is	   unknown,	   it	   seems	   certain	   that	   he	   was	   only	   a	   child.	   Perdiccas	   was	  
presumably	  a	  minor	   in	  369/8,	  as	  Ptolemy	  Alorites	  began	  ruling	  as	  regent	   for	  him	   in	  
that	  year.516	  Assuming	  Perdiccas	  would	  have	  been	  seen	  to	  come	  of	  age	  at	  around	  20,	  
he	  would	  presumably	  have	  been	  at	  most	  23	  when	  he	  eventually	  became	  king	  some	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time	  in	  366/5.	  There	  is	  no	  sign	  that	  he	  was	  married	  prior	  to	  assuming	  the	  throne,	  so	  
even	  if	  a	  union	  was	  affected	  immediately,	  the	  resultant	  child	  Amyntas	  could	  not	  have	  
been	   more	   than	   eight	   upon	   his	   father’s	   death.517	   In	   such	   circumstances	   the	   boy	  
would	  surely	  not	  have	  been	  travelling	  through	  Greece,	  and	  so	  the	  question	  arises	  of	  
when	   he	   did	   so.	   More	   significantly,	   it	   must	   be	   asked	   why	   he	   would	   have	   been	  
claiming	  to	  be	  the	  ‘King	  of	  the	  Macedonians’,	  as	  whenever	  it	  occurred	  it	  would	  have	  
been	  treasonous.	  
	  
A	   clue	   can	   be	   found	   at	   Oropus.	   An	   inscription	   similar	   to	   that	   referring	   to	  
Amyntas	   Perdicca	   details	   an	   identical	   grant	   of	   proxeny	   at	   the	   same	   time	   to	   one	  
‘Amyntas	  Antiochou	  the	  Macedonian’.518	  It	  would	  thus	  seem	  that	  both	  men	  were	  in	  
Greece	   at	   the	   same	   time,	   and	   apparently	   receiving	   welcome	   in	   the	   same	   places.	  
Given	   that	   Antiochou	   fled	   Macedon	   for	   fear	   of	   Alexander,	   the	   assumption	   would	  
surely	  be	  that	  this	  was	  the	  treason	  for	  he	  fled	  and	  Perdicca	  was	  executed.519	  Support	  
can	  be	  found	  for	  such	  a	  theory.	  	  
	  
Firstly,	   there	   is	   the	   matter	   of	   one	   Aristomedes	   of	   Pherae.	   Like	   Amyntas	  
Antiochou,	   he	   is	   recorded	   as	   fleeing	   the	   Macedonian	   court	   soon	   after	   Philip’s	  
death.520	   Alone	   this	  would	   not	   necessarily	   connect	   him	  with	   the	   Amyntae;	   various	  
others	   surely	   abandoned	   the	   court	   at	   that	   time.	   However,	   a	   third	   inscription	   from	  
Oropus,521	  although	  apparently	  connected	  to	  a	  votive	  offering	  rather	  than	  an	  oracle	  
consultation,522	   indicates	  Aristomedes’	  presence	  at	  Oropus	  at	   the	  same	  time	  as	   the	  
two	  Amyntae: 	  
	  
	   	   	   [᾿Αϱισ]τομ[ήδ]ης	  Με	  [–	  –]	  [Φ]εϱαîος	  ΆμΦια[ϱάωι]	  
	  
	   	   	   [Aris]tom[ed]es	  Me	  …	  [Ph]eraios	  Amphia[raoi]	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That	  a	  man	  who	  fled	  from	  Alexander	  was	  also	  present	  at	  Oropus	  at	  the	  same	  time	  as	  
one	   who	   did	   the	   same	   and	   one	   who	   was	   executed	   for	   treason	   is	   surely	   no	  
coincidence.	  
	  
Secondly,	  and	  most	  significantly,	  there	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  Amyntas	  Perdicca	  was	  
the	  uncle	  of	  Alexander.523	  Whether	  Philip	  began	  ruling	  as	  king	  directly	  after	  Perdiccas	  
III’s	  death	  in	  359	  or	  following	  a	  period	  as	  regent	  for	  Amyntas,	  the	  fact	  remains	  that	  as	  
Perdiccas’	  son,	  Amyntas	  had	  a	  strong	  claim	  to	  the	  throne.	   Indeed,	  he	  had	  a	  right	  to	  
feel	  aggrieved	  at	  his	   situation,	  as	   if	  he	  had	   initially	  been	  king,	  Philip	  had	  essentially	  
deposed	   him.	   In	   such	   circumstances	   one	   could	   suppose	   firstly	   that	   Amyntas	  might	  
have	  been	  drawn	  to	  the	  possibility	  of	  ruling	  Macedon,	  and	  secondly	  that	  as	  a	  result	  
he	  could	  have	  been	  the	  figurehead	  of	  a	  movement	  to	  prevent	  Alexander	  from	  doing	  
so.524	  In	  essence,	  though	  it	  seems	  highly	  unlikely	  that	  the	  Lyncestian	  brothers	  would	  
have	  sought	  to	  overthrow	  Philip	  and	  replace	  him	  themselves,	  Amyntas’	  involvement	  
would	   offer	   a	   chance	   to	   install	   a	   man	   who	   could	   consequently	   grant	   Lyncestis	  
independence	  and	  be	  an	  acceptable	  successor	  to	  Philip.525	  
	  
Although	   the	   suggested	   dates	   for	   the	   inscriptions	   of	   the	   middle	   or	   third	  
quarter	  of	  the	  fourth	  century	  allow	  for	  this	  theory,	  they	  also	  permit	  the	  conspiracy	  to	  
have	   occurred	   at	   the	   start	   of	   Philip’s	   reign,	   when	   the	   attempts	   of	   Pausanias	   and	  
Argeus	  took	  place.	  However,	  even	  without	  including	  the	  already-­‐considered	  issue	  of	  
Amyntas	   Perdiccas’	   youth,	   there	   are	   several	   reasons	   why	   this	   latter	   possibility	   is	  
unlikely.	   Firstly,	   it	   would	   be	   strange	   for	   such	   a	   conspiracy	   to	   go	   completely	  
unmentioned	   by	   the	   sources,	   especially	   as	   the	   attempts	   of	   others	   receive	  
considerable	   attention.526	   	   Also,	   as	   the	   execution	   of	   one	   of	   his	   half-­‐brothers	   and	  
pursuit	   of	   two	   others	   to	  Olynthus	   shows,527	   Philip	  was	   apparently	   not	   prepared	   to	  
tolerate	   even	   the	   possibility	   of	   conspiracies	   against	   him	   forming	   around	   potential	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alternative	   rulers.	   As	   has	   been	   seen	   however,	   Amyntas	   was	   apparently	   at	   court	  
throughout	   his	   reign,	   and	   married	   one	   of	   his	   daughters.	   More	   than	   anything	  
however,	  it	  stretches	  credibility	  for	  the	  conspirators	  to	  have	  attempted	  to	  ferment	  an	  
uprising	  or	  around	  359,	  to	  have	  failed,	  yet	  to	  have	  remained	  at	  court	  for	  the	  entirety	  
of	  Philip’s	  reign	  only	  to	  flee	  or	  be	  executed	  at	  the	  start	  of	  Alexander’s	  on	  suspicion	  of	  
posing	  a	  threat	  to	  the	  new	  king.	  
	  
One	  is	   left	  with	  a	  discrepancy	   in	  the	  timing	  of	  the	  Lyncestian	  and	  Amyntae’s	  
treason	  as	  Justin	  states	  that:	  
	  
“[Alexander’s]	  primary	  concern	  was	  for	  his	  father’s	  funeral,	  at	  which	  his	  first	  instruction	  
was	  that	  all	  involved	  in	  the	  assassination	  be	  put	  to	  death	  at	  the	  tomb	  of	  his	  father.”528	  
	  
This	  must	  be	  incorrect	  however,	  as	  the	  inscriptions	  at	  Lebedaea	  and	  Oropus	  indicate	  
that	  the	  Amyntae’s	  activities	  must	  have	  taken	  place	  following	  Philip’s	  death.	  	  
	  
	   It	  would	   seem	   then	   that	  around	   the	   time	  of	  Philip’s	  death,	   two	  men	  by	   the	  
name	  of	  Amyntas	  travelled	  through	  parts	  of	  Boeotia.	  One	  of	  them,	  Amyntas	  Perdicca,	  
the	  son	  of	  Philip’s	  predecessor	  and	  brother,	  Perdiccas	  III,	  is	  recorded	  as	  using	  the	  title	  
‘King	  of	  the	  Macedonians’	  whilst	  in	  Greece.	  This	  suggests	  both	  men	  were	  attempting	  
to	  inspire	  support	  to	  place	  Perdicca	  on	  the	  throne	  in	  place	  of	  Philip’s	  son	  and	  obvious	  
successor	  Alexander.	  This	  endeavour	  was	  clearly	  unsuccessful,	  as	  soon	  after	  Perdicca	  
is	  recorded	  as	  being	  executed,	  and	  his	  companion,	  Amyntas	  Antiochou,	  as	  having	  fled	  
to	   Asia.	   In	   this	   Antiochou	  was	   joined	   by	   one	   Aristomedes	   of	   Pherae,	  most	   likely	   a	  
third	   companion	   in	   the	   conspiracy.	   Assuming	   all	   this,	   one	   must	   return	   to	   the	  
Lyncestian	  brothers,	  because	  although	  it	  would	  seem	  fair	  to	  assume	  that	  collusion	  in	  
the	  activities	  of	   the	  Amyntae	  caused	  their	  execution,	   there	   is	  still	  one	  matter	   to	  be	  




                                         







(iii)	  Alexander	  the	  Lyncestian	  
	  
As	  has	  been	  mentioned,	  Alexander	  reportedly	  survived	  where	  his	  brothers	  did	  
not	   by	   being	   the	   first	   to	   support	   his	   namesake	   immediately	   after	   Philip’s	   death.	  
Curtius	  also	  adds	  that:	  
	  
“moreover,	   the	   pleas	   of	   Lyncestes’	   father-­‐in-­‐law,	   Antipater,	   also	   reduced	   the	   king’s	  
warranted	  anger.”529	  
	  
Arrian,	  Curtius	  and	  Justin	  all	  state	  that	  Alexander	  was	  pardoned	  though	  guilty	  by	  the	  
new	   king.	   However,	   events	   thereafter	   clash	   with	   this	   interpretation.	   According	   to	  
Arrian,	  	  
	  
“The	  king	  afterwards	  showed	  him	  honour	  at	  his	  court,	  sent	  him	  as	  general	  into	  Thrace;	  
and	  when	  Calas,	  the	  commander	  of	  the	  Thessalian	  horse	  was	  sent	  away	  to	  a	  viceroyalty,	  
he	  was	  appointed	  to	  that	  general’s	  command.”530	  
	  
In	   addition	   to	   this	   there	   is	   the	   nature	   of	   Lyncestian	   Alexander’s	   eventual	   loss	   of	  
command	   and	   arrest,	   about	  which	   the	   sources	   disagree,	   and	   his	   execution.	   Arrian	  
alleges	  that:	  
	  
“When	  Amyntas	   [Antiochou]	  deserted	  to	  Darius,	  he	  conveyed	  to	  him	  certain	  messages	  
and	  a	  letter	  from	  this	  Alexander.	  Darius	  then	  sent	  Sisines,	  one	  of	  his	  own	  faithful	  Persian	  
courtiers,	  down	  to	  the	  sea-­‐coast,	  under	  pretence	  of	  going	  to	  Atizyes,	  viceroy	  of	  Phrygia,	  
but	  really	  to	  communicate	  with	  this	  Alexander,	  and	  to	  give	  him	  pledges,	  that	  if	  he	  would	  
kill	   king	  Alexander,	  Darius	  would	   appoint	   him	   king	   of	  Macedonia,	   and	  would	   give	   him	  
1,000	   talents	   of	   gold	   in	   addition	   to	   the	   kingdom.	   But	   Sisines,	   being	   captured	   by	  
Parmenio,	  told	  him	  the	  real	  object	  of	  his	  mission.	  Parmenio	  sent	  him	  immediately	  under	  
guard	  to	  the	  king,	  who	  obtained	  the	  same	  intelligence	  from	  him.”531	  
	  
Arrian	   claims	   that	  Alexander	  was	   consequently	  arrested	  and	   imprisoned	  during	   the	  
winter	   of	   334/3,	   a	   statement	   that	   Justin	   supports.532	   Diodorus	   however	   places	   the	  
arrest	  in	  the	  autumn	  of	  the	  following	  year,	  shortly	  before	  the	  Battle	  of	  Issus,	  and	  also	  
claims	   that	   it	   resulted	   from	  a	  warning	   to	  Alexander	   from	  his	  mother	   to	  beware	  his	  
Lyncestian	  namesake.	  Nowhere	  is	  a	  letter	  from	  Darius	  mentioned.533	  Further	  to	  this,	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Curtius	  states	  that	  Alexander	  was	  not	  executed	  upon	  being	  arrested,	  but	  imprisoned	  
for	   three	   years	   before	   finally	   being	   put	   to	   death	   following	   the	   execution	   of	  
Philotas.534	  As	  Philotas’	  death	  occurred	   in	  autumn	  330,	  Diodorus’	  arrest	  date	  would	  
appear	  to	  be	  correct.	  To	  explain	  the	  difference	  in	  timing,	  Carney	  has	  suggested	  that	  
winter	  334/3	  saw	  Alexander	  relieved	  of	  his	  command,	  but	  he	  was	  not	  arrested	  until	  
333.535	   This	   could	   be	   seen	   to	   explain	   Olympias’	   letter	   to	   her	   son,	   as	  without	   prior	  
suspicions,	  there	  is	  no	  reason	  for	  her	  to	  have	  suspected	  Alexander	  at	  specifically	  this	  
time.	  Diodorus’	  claim	  that	  “there	  were	  many	  other	  plausible	  circumstances	  joining	  to	  
support	  the	  charge,	  so	  the	  Lyncestian	  was	  arrested”	  would	  seem	  to	  refer	  to	  an	  earlier	  
occurrence	  such	  as	  Alexander	  being	  removed	  from	  his	  command.	  
	  
Whatever	  the	  precise	  nature	  or	  timing	  of	  Alexander’s	  eventual	  fall,	   it	  cannot	  
be	   ignored	   that	   despite	   being	   suspected	   of	   treason,	   he	  was	   promoted	   and	   held	   in	  
high	  esteem	  following	  his	  being	  pardoned.	  If	  the	  new	  king	  suspected	  his	  namesake	  of	  
wishing	  to	  overthrow	  him,	  it	  is	  surely	  not	  plausible	  that	  he	  would	  have	  allowed	  this.	  
Carney	  has	  attempted	  to	  point	  to	  “the	  extreme	  caution	  and	  secrecy	  with	  which	  the	  
king	  and	  his	  friends	  proceeded”	  following	  Parmenio’s	  interception	  of	  Diodorus’	  letter	  
as	   indicating	   “fear	   of	   the	   Lyncestian’s	   ability	   to	   cause	   a	   revolt”	   back	   in	   Europe.536	  
However,	   that	  Alexander	  was	   cowed	   into	  promoting	   the	   Lyncestian	  until	   this	   point	  
simply	  does	  not	  work.	  If	  Lyncestian	  Alexander	  held	  so	  much	  potential	  influence,	  why	  
did	   he	  make	  no	  use	  of	   it?	  Also,	   if	   the	   king	  was	   afraid	   his	   namesake’s	   death	  would	  
provoke	   an	   uprising,	   why	   was	   he	   not	   similarly	   apprehensive	   in	   330?	   And	   if	   the	  
Lyncestian’s	  death	  might	  have	  inspired	  rebellion,	  why	  not	  his	  arrest?	  In	  addition,	  the	  
caution	  that	  apparently	  marked	  proceedings	  could	  be	  a	  result	  of	  increased	  caution	  in	  
the	   wake	   of	   Philotas’	   execution.	   Given	   this,	   it	   must	   be	   considered	   that	   Alexander	  
genuinely	  did	  not	  suspect	  his	  namesake	  of	  treason	  at	  the	  start	  of	  his	  reign.	  
	  
Such	   a	   position	   is	   more	   sensible	   than	   one	   might	   initially	   expect.	   The	  
accusations	   in	  the	  sources	  of	  Lyncestian	  Alexander’s	  guilt	  all	  come	  in	  the	  context	  of	  
                                         
534	  Curt.	  7.1.6-­‐7.	  Just	  12.14.1	  mentions	  that	  Alexander	  was	  executed,	  but	  gives	  no	  date.	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  Carney	  1980,	  30-­‐31.	  







his	   being	   relieved	   of	   his	   command	   and/or	   arrested	   following	   the	   interception	   of	  
Darius’	  letter.	  The	  sources	  could	  well	  have	  assumed	  his	  involvement	  in	  336	  based	  on	  
this	   event,	   especially	   given	   the	   fate	   of	   his	   brothers.	   Arrian	   claims	   that	   Amyntas	  
Antiochou	  took	  a	   letter	   to	  Darius	   from	  Alexander.	  However,	  given	  how	   long	   it	   took	  
for	  Darius’	  offer	   to	  be	  sent	   (Antiochus	   fled	   in	  336;	  Darius’	   letter	  was	   intercepted	   in	  
late	  334),	  it	  could	  well	  be	  that	  it	  was	  not	  a	  reply	  at	  all;	  as	  he	  presumed	  Alexander	  to	  
be	  guilty,	  Arrian	   just	  supposed	  it	  was.	  This	  would	  also	  work	  with	  the	   idea	  discussed	  
above	  of	  the	  Lyncestian’s	  fall	  and	  eventual	  arrest	  occurring	  gradually;	  if	  Darius’	  letter	  
represented	   confirmation	   of	   strong	   existing	   suspicions,	   it	   is	   surely	  more	   likely	   that	  
Alexander	  would	  have	  immediately	  arrested	  and	  most	  likely	  executed	  his	  namesake.	  
If	  these	  were	  new	  revelations	  however,	  Alexander	  would	  presumably	  have	  sought	  to	  
investigate	  carefully	  the	  potential	  guilt	  of	  a	  man	  who	  until	  then	  he	  had	  trusted	  as	  a	  
friend.	  
	  
Why	  then	  would	  Darius	  have	  written	  to	  Alexander	  at	  all?	  The	  impetus	  to	  do	  so	  
would	  surely	  have	  come	  from	  Amyntas	  Antiochou,	  even	  if	  he	  had	  not	  brought	  a	  letter	  
from	   Alexander	   with	   him.	   One	   is	   unfortunately	   reduced	   to	   conjecture,	   but	   it	   is	  
possible	   that	  Alexander	  was	  originally	   involved	   in	   some	  way	  with	   the	  conspiracy	  of	  
his	  brothers,	  the	  Amyntae	  and	  Aristomedes	  of	  Pherae.	  For	  whatever	  reason	  however	  
–	   perhaps	   feelings	   of	   loyalty	   to	   one	  who	  was	   his	   friend	   –	   he	   disassociated	   himself	  
from	   this	   early	   on.	   How	   advanced	   the	   group’s	   plans	  were	   is	   largely	   dependent	   on	  
whether	  or	  not	   it	  was	  behind	  Philip’s	  death.	  Assuming	  he	  knew	  something	  of	   their	  
intentions,	   it	   is	   not	   impossible	   that	   even	   though	   innocent,	   Alexander	  made	   such	   a	  
prominent	  display	  of	  loyalty	  in	  part	  to	  distance	  himself	  from	  anything	  that	  he	  knew	  or	  
suspected	  might	  follow	  Philip’s	  death.	  Despite	  this,	  presumably	  due	  to	  his	  increasing	  
concern	   at	   Alexander’s	   success	   in	   Asia,	   Darius	   felt	   it	   worth	   approaching	   the	  













Assuming	   then	   that	   the	   Amyntas	   Perdiccas,	   Amyntas	   Antiochou,	   Heromenes,	  
Arrhabaeus,	   Aristomedes	   and	   at	   some	   stage	   perhaps	   Lyncestian	   Alexander	   were	  
involved	  in	  a	  plot	  to	  replace	  Alexander,	  son	  of	  Philip,	  does	  it	  automatically	  follow	  that	  
they	   were	   behind	   Philip’s	   murder?537	   If	   one	   follows	   the	   above	   interpretation	   of	  
events	   –	   that	   the	   treason	   for	   which	   the	   Lyncestae	   and	   Amyntas	   Perdicca	   were	  
executed	  referred	  to	  attempts	  to	  replace	  Alexander	  with	  Amyntas	  –	  then	  there	  is	  no	  
explicit	  link	  between	  it	  and	  the	  murder.	  Rather,	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  Amyntae	  suggest	  a	  
rushed	  and	  rather	  naïve	  attempt	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  an	  unexpected	  development.	  
The	   group	  were	   clearly	  unhappy	  with	   Lyncestis’	   political	   situation	  under	  Philip,	   but	  
there	  is	  nothing	  to	  indicate	  that	  their	  actions	  following	  his	  death	  had	  been	  carefully	  
calculated	  to	  take	  maximum	  advantage	  of	  his	  expected	  demise.	  
	  
Regarding	   Lyncestian	   Alexander,	   the	   situation	   is	   difficult	   to	   clarify.	   Modern	  
scholarship	   has	   almost	   exclusively	   assumed	   that	   the	   guilt	   or	   innocence	   of	  
Heromenes,	   Arrhabaeus	   and	   Alexander	   must	   be	   decided	   together.	   However,	   the	  
significance	  of	  Alexander	  not	  only	  acquitting	  his	  namesake	  of	  any	  charges	  of	  treason,	  
but	  also	  promoting	  him	  thereafter	  cannot	  be	  underestimated.	  Although	  the	   idea	  of	  
the	   Lyncestian	   being	   innocent	   in	   336	   does	   not	   allow	   the	   strongest	   explanation	   of	  
Darius’	  letter	  in	  334,	  it	  is	  surely	  preferable	  to	  the	  idea	  that	  Alexander	  was	  pressured	  
into	  forgiving	  and	  advancing	  his	  namesake	  by	  fear	  of	  Lyncestian	  rebellion.	  Similarly,	  
the	  extended	  nature	  of	  the	  Lyncestian’s	  fall	  suggests	  the	  circumstances	  that	  brought	  
it	  about	  were	  revelatory,	  not	  confirmation	  of	  existing	  suspicions.	  Altogether,	  it	  must	  
be	  assumed	  that	  though	  guilty	  of	  treason,	  Heromenes,	  Arrhabaeus,	  Aristomedes	  and	  
the	  Amyntae	  were	  not	  behind	  the	  murder	  of	  Philip.	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  Hammond	  1980b,	  171-­‐2.	  argues	  that	  the	  executions	  of	  Amyntas	  Perdicca	  and	  the	  Lyncestian	  brothers	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the	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   of	   unrelated	   conspiracies,	  which	   seemingly	   ignores	   the	   involvement	   of	   Amyntas	  Antiochou	   and	   the	  









(i)	  An	  Assassin’s	  Motives	  
	  
It	  may	  seem	  strange	  to	  discuss	  the	  motives	  of	  Philip’s	  assassin	  after	  those	  of	  
all	   the	   figures	  who	  were	  only	   connected	  with	   the	  murder	   after	   it	   had	   taken	  place.	  
However,	   Pausanias’	  motives	   are	   recorded	   in	   detail	   and	   appear,	   by	   comparison	   to	  
those	  already	  discussed,	  relatively	  simple.	  Pausanias,	  an	  Orestian	  bodyguard	  of	  Philip	  
was	   at	   one	   time	   “beloved	  of	   the	   king	   because	  of	   his	   beauty.”	  However,	   he	  was	   at	  
some	   point	   reportedly	   supplanted	   in	   the	   king’s	   affections	   by	   another	   youth,	   also	  
named	   Pausanias.	   Insanely	   jealous,	   the	   Orestian	   Pausanias	   began	   bullying	   his	  
namesake,	   “address[ing]	   him	   with	   abusive	   language,	   accusing	   him	   of	   being	   a	  
hermaphrodite	   and	   prompt	   to	   accept	   the	   amorous	   advances	   of	   any	  who	  wished.”	  
Eventually	  driven	  to	  despair,	  the	  other	  Pausanias	  informed	  Attalus,	  apparently	  a	  close	  
friend,	  of	  what	  had	  been	  occurring.	  Almost	  immediately	  afterwards	  he	  set	  out	  as	  part	  
of	   Philip’s	   expedition	   against	   the	   Illyrians	   under	   one	   Pleurias.	   During	   the	   battle	   he	  
“stepped	  in	  front	  of	  [Philip]	  and,	  receiving	  on	  his	  body	  all	   the	  blows	  directed	  at	  the	  
king,	  so	  met	  his	  death.”538	  	  
	  
Angered	   by	   his	   friend’s	   treatment	   and	   effective	   suicide,	   Attalus	   invited	   the	  
Orestian	   Pausanias	   to	   dinner	   one	   night,	   got	   him	   heavily	   drunk	   and	   “handed	   his	  
unconscious	   body	   over	   to	   he	   muleteers	   to	   abuse	   in	   drunken	   licentiousness.”539	  
Diodorus	   at	   least	   offers	   this	   version;	   according	   to	   Justin	   Attalus	   had	   previously	  
abused	  Pausanias	  sexually	  when	  the	  latter	  was	  “in	  the	  early	  years	  of	  puberty.”	  Worse	  
still,	  at	   the	  dinner	  Attalus	  “subjected	  [Pausanias]	  not	  only	   to	  his	  own	  carnal	  desires	  
but,	   like	   a	   prostitute,	   to	   those	   of	   his	   fellow	   diners	   as	   well,	   so	   making	   the	   boy	   an	  
object	  of	  ridicule	  amongst	  his	  peers.”540	  
	  
                                         
538	  Diod.	  16.93.3-­‐7.	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Unable	   to	   take	   revenge	   on	   Attalus	   personally	   due	   to	   his	   position	   at	   court,	  
Pausanias	  appealed	   to	  Philip	   to	  punish	  him.	  Although	   the	  king	  “shared	  his	  anger	  at	  
the	  barbarity	  of	  the	  act,”	  Philip	  did	  not	  punish	  Attalus	  due	  to	  their	  relationship,	  and	  
because	   the	   latter’s	   services	   “were	   needed	   urgently.”541	   Instead,	   he	   attempted	   to	  
appease	  Pausanias	  with	  presents	  and	  promotion.	  Unsatisfied	  and	  angered	  however,	  
Pausanias	  murdered	  Philip	  at	  Aegae	  as	  the	  king	  entered	  a	  theatre	  that	  formed	  part	  of	  
a	  procession	   celebrating	  a	   festival	   and	  Alexander	  of	  Orestis’	  marriage	   to	  Philip	   and	  
Olympias’	  daughter	  Cleopatra.	  Having	  stabbed	  Philip,	  Pausanias	  fled	  from	  the	  theatre	  
to	  where	  his	  horses	  were	  waiting	  “at	  the	  edge	  of	  the	  city,”	  but	  caught	  his	   foot	   in	  a	  
vine,	   fell	   and	   was	   captured	   by	   the	   pursuing	   bodyguards,	   who	   killed	   him	  
immediately.542	  
	  
Most	   of	   this	   would	   seem	   to	   be	   fairly	   believable.	   As	   has	   already	   been	  
discussed,543	  Diodorus’	  source	  here	  was	  most	  likely	  Diyllus,	  a	  largely	  reliable	  source,	  
especially	   on	   matters	   of	   Macedonian	   court	   life	   and	   relationships	   between	   men	  
connected	  with	  the	  School	  of	  Pages,	  from	  which	  Pausanias	  undoubtedly	  came.544	  W.	  
Heckel	   has	   stated	   that	   “the	   preamble	   about	   the	   two	   Pausaniases	   has	   a	   suspicious	  
duplicity,”545	   but	   there	   is	   no	   reason	   to	   suspect	   the	   presence	   of	   two	   men	   named	  
Pausanias	  as	  indicating	  a	  confusion	  of	  events	  by	  Diodorus.	  It	  could	  perfectly	  well	  be	  
just	  a	  coincidence.	  	  
	  
The	  campaign	  and	  battle	  against	   the	   Illyrians	   in	  which	   the	  second	  Pausanias	  
reportedly	  “met	  his	  death”	  is	  not	  mentioned	  elsewhere.	  This	  has	  led	  some	  scholars546	  
to	  suspect	  that	  the	  ‘Pleurias’	  mentioned	  was	  a	  misspelling	  by	  Diodorus	  of	  ‘Pleuratus,’	  
an	  Illyrian	  leader	  against	  whom	  Philip	  fought	  in	  345.547	  However,	  if	  Pausanias’	  abuse	  
occurred	   shortly	   before	   this,	   it	  would	  mean	   that	   he	  would	   have	  waited	   nine	   years	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before	   acting	   on	   his	   grievances.548	   It	   is	   hard	   to	   believe	   that	   he	   would	   have	   done	  
nothing	  for	  so	  long,	  yet	  have	  “nursed	  his	  wrath	  implacably”	  the	  whole	  time.549	  In	  fact,	  
Plutarch	   and	   Diodorus	   clearly	   place	   the	   abuse	   of	   Pausanias	   after	   the	   wedding	   of	  
337.550	  Whilst	  there	  is	  no	  reason	  to	  assume	  Cleopatra	  played	  any	  part	  in	  the	  events	  of	  
Philip’s	  death,	  the	  point	  remains	  as	  an	  indication	  of	  the	  timing.	  
	  
E.	  Badian	  and	  P.	  Green	  have	  raised	  the	  point	  that	  Pausanias	  cannot	  have	  been	  
acting	   on	   his	   own	   impulse	   as	   his	   grievance	   was	   against	   Attalus,	   but	   he	   murdered	  
Philip	  as	  revenge	  for	  his	  humiliation.551	  He	  must	  therefore	  have	  been	  persuaded	  by	  
another	  party	  to	  direct	  his	  anger	  against	  Philip,	  whom	  the	  other	  wished	  dead	  for	  their	  
own	  reasons.	  However,	  when	  considering	  this,	  one	  should	  bear	  in	  mind	  the	  opinion	  
of	   the	   one	   surviving	   contemporary	   source,	   Aristotle.	   In	   his	   Politics,	   Alexander’s	  
former	   tutor	   wrote	   that	   attacks	   on	   monarchs	   resulting	   from	   their	   previous	  
outrageous	  treatment	  of	  or	  behaviour	  towards	  their	  attackers	  were	  always	  made	  for	  
reasons	   of	   personal	   revenge,	   not	   ambition.552	   As	   examples	   he	   gives	   Harmodius’	  
attack	  on	  the	  Peisistratids	  for	  their	  treatment	  of	  his	  sister,	  and	  “the	  attack	  on	  Philip	  
by	  Pausanias	  because	  Philip	  allowed	  him	  to	  be	  outrageously	   treated	  by	  Attalus	  and	  
his	  company.”	  This	  is	  of	  great	  significance.	  It	  would	  suggest	  that	  having	  experienced	  
the	   events	   and	   their	   aftermath,	   Aristotle	   accepted	   Pausanias’	   motives,	   when	   they	  
came	  to	  light,	  as	  sufficient	  explanation	  for	  his	  actions,	  and	  presumably	  suspected	  no	  
other	  involvement	  in	  the	  matter.553	  
	  
Aristotle	   could	   be	   suspected	   of	   adapting	   aspects	   of	   his	   account	   to	   suit	  
Alexander,	   as	   the	   Politics	   was	   most	   likely	   produced	   during	   the	   latter’s	   reign.	  
However,	   if	   Aristotle	   felt	   using	   a	   falsified	   example	   of	   Pausanias	   would	   have	  
compromised	  the	  accuracy,	  and	  thus	  the	  reliability	  of	  his	  writing,	  he	  would	  surely	  not	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have	   included	   it.554	   Although	   Philip’s	  murder	  was	   recent,	   other	   examples	   could	   no	  
doubt	  have	  been	  found.	  That	  Philip’s	  death	  was	  included	  therefore	  surely	  means	  that	  
Aristotle	  was	  not	  subject	  to	  any	  pressure	  to	  edit	  his	  work	  in	  favour	  of	  Alexander.	  
	  
Support	  can	  be	  found	  for	  Aristotle’s	  assumption.	  That	  Pausanias	  would	  have	  
become	  embittered	  by	  Philip’s	  failure	  to	  punish	  Attalus	  is	  understandable.	  However,	  
Attalus	   being	  made	   one	   of	   the	   co-­‐commanders	   of	   the	   advance	   party	   sent	   to	   Asia	  
could	  well	  have	  worsened	   the	   situation.555	   To	  Pausanias	   it	   could	  well	  have	   seemed	  
that	   Philip	   was	   not	   only	   failing	   to	   condemn	   Attalus,	   but	   was	   actively	   promoting	  
him.556	   In	   such	   a	   situation	   Philip’s	   attempts	   to	   mollify	   Pausanias	   would	   only	   have	  
angered	  the	  Orestian	  further.	  
	  
As	  has	  been	  outlined,	  the	  actual	  murder	  occurred,	  according	  to	  Diodorus,	  during	  
the	  celebrations	  of	  a	  festival	  and	  the	  marriage	  of	  Cleopatra	  and	  Alexander	  of	  Epirus	  
at	  Aegae.557	  A	  state	  banquet	  and	  night	  of	  drinking	  were	  due	  to	  be	  followed	  by	  games	  
the	  next	  day.	  
	  
“Every	  seat	   in	   the	   theatre	  was	   taken	  when	  Philip	  appeared	  wearing	  a	  white	  cloak,	  and	  by	  
express	  orders	  his	  bodyguard	  held	  away	  from	  him	  and	  followed	  only	  at	  a	  distance,	  since	  he	  
wanted	  to	  show	  publicly	  that	  he	  was	  protected	  by	  the	  goodwill	  of	  all	  the	  Greeks,	  and	  had	  to	  
need	  of	  a	  guard	  of	  spearmen.	  Such	  was	  the	  pinnacle	  of	  success	  that	  he	  had	  attained,	  but	  as	  
the	   praises	   and	   congratulations	   of	   all	   rang	   in	   his	   ear,	   suddenly	  without	  warning	   the	   plot	  
against	  the	  king	  was	  revealed	  as	  death	  struck.”558	  
	  
The	  entire	  procession	  into	  the	  theatre	  would	  have	  been	  carefully	  planned	  some	  time	  
before,	   and	   perhaps	   even	   practiced.	   Philips’	   instructions	   to	   his	   bodyguard	   to	   hang	  
back	   would	   presumably	   have	   been	   given	   at	   such	   a	   time.	   Pausanias’	   acting	   at	   this	  
occasion	  would	  therefore	  surely	  not	  have	  been	  an	  act	  of	  unplanned	  opportunism,	  as	  
he	   would	   have	   been	   able	   to	   recognise	   the	   opportunity	   this	   offered,	   and	   plan	   his	  
actions	  accordingly.559	   This	   is	   supported	  by	  Diodorus	  describing	  elsewhere	  how	   the	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assassin	  had	  horses	  waiting,	  and	  would	  have	  reached	  them	  were	  it	  not	  for	  his	  having	  
caught	  his	  foot	  in	  a	  vine	  and	  fallen.560	  
	  
If	   this	   was	   carefully	   planned,	   then	   the	   choice	   of	   occasion	   must	   be	   examined.	  
Whilst	  the	  situation	  offered	  an	  opportunity	  to	  murder	  Philip,	  Pausanias’	  closeness	  to	  
the	  king	  as	  a	  bodyguard	  would	  surely	  have	  offered	  multiple	  opportunities	  to	  commit	  
the	   murder	   carefully	   and	   quietly	   elsewhere.	   The	   theatre	   must	   have	   chosen	   for	   a	  
reason.	  One	  should	  consider	  the	  idea	  that	  Pausanias	  chose	  the	  public	  occasion	  as	  he	  
felt	   it	   offered	   the	   best	   opportunity	   to	   publicly	   restore	   his	   honour	   before	   the	   very	  
courtiers	  who	  most	   likely	  knew	  of	  his	  humiliation.	  And	   this	   is	  not	  all.	  Philip	  did	  not	  
enter	  the	  theatre	  without	  fanfare:	  
	  
“Along	   with	   lavish	   display	   of	   every	   sort,	   Philip	   included	   in	   the	   procession	   statues	   of	   the	  
twelve	   gods	   wrought	   with	   great	   artistry	   and	   adorned	   with	   a	   dazzling	   show	   of	   wealth	   to	  
strike	  awe	  in	  the	  beholder,	  and	  along	  with	  these	  was	  conducted	  a	  thirteenth	  statue,	  suitable	  
for	  a	  god,	  that	  of	  Philip	  himself,	  so	  that	  the	  king	  exhibited	  himself	  enthroned	  amongst	  the	  
twelve	  gods.”561	  
	  
Philip	   presumably	   aimed	   such	   a	   display,	   like	   the	   entrance	   into	   the	   theatre	  without	  
bodyguards,	  at	  the	  multitude	  of	  Greeks	  present	  at	  Aegae	  for	  the	  celebrations:	  
	  
“Out	   of	   all	   Greece	   he	   summoned	  his	   personal	   guest	   friends	   and	   ordered	  members	   of	   his	  
court	  to	  bring	  along	  as	  many	  as	  they	  could	  of	  their	  acquaintances	  from	  abroad.”562	  
	  
Pausanias’	  demonstration	  would	  thus	  not	  have	  been	  to	  the	  Macedonian	  court,	  but	  to	  
prominent	  citizens	  of	  almost	  every	  city	  in	  Greece.	  
	  
(ii)	  An	  Assassin’s	  Assistance?	  
	  
It	   would	   seem	   then	   that	   a	   case	   can	   be	   made	   for	   Pausanias	   working	   alone,	  
reasonably	   inspired	   by	   his	   own	   grievances.	   However,	   “It	   is	   believed,”	   says	   Justin,	  
“that	   Pausanias	   had	   been	   suborned	   by	   Olympias,	   mother	   of	   Alexander,	   and	   that	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Alexander	  was	  not	  unaware	  of	  the	  plot	  to	  murder	  his	  father.”563	  	  Plutarch	  also	  states	  
that:	  
	  
“It	  is	  said	  that	  when	  Pausanias	  met	  the	  young	  prince	  and	  complained	  to	  him	  of	  the	  injustice	  
he	  had	   suffered,	  Alexander	  quoted	   the	   verse	   from	  Euripides’	   ‘Medea,’	   in	  which	  Medea	   is	  
said	  to	  threaten	  “The	  father,	  bride	  and	  the	  bridegroom	  all	  at	  once.”564	  
	  
Justin	   goes	  on	   to	   claim	   that	  Olympias,	   as	   angered	  by	   Philip’s	   repudiation	  of	   her	   as	  
Pausanias	  was	  by	  Philip’s	  failure	  to	  avenge	  his	  abuse,	  not	  only	  incited	  the	  Orestian	  to	  
murder	  Philip,	  but	  provided	  the	  horses	  for	  his	  escape	  and	  
	  
“…when	   she	  heard	  of	   the	   king’s	   assassination	   she	   came	  quickly	   to	   the	   funeral,	   ostensibly	  
doing	  her	  duty;	  and	  on	  the	  night	  of	  her	  arrival	  she	  set	  a	  golden	  wreath	  on	  Pausanias’	  head	  
while	  he	  still	  hung	  on	  the	  cross,	  something	  which	  no	  one	  else	  but	  she	  could	  have	  done	  while	  
Philip’s	   son	  was	   still	   alive.	  A	   few	  days	   later,	   she	  had	   the	   assassin’s	   body	   taken	  down	  and	  
cremated	  it	  over	  the	  remains	  of	  her	  husband;	  she	  then	  erected	  a	  tomb	  for	  him	  in	  the	  same	  
place	   and,	   by	   inspiring	   superstition	   in	   the	   people,	   saw	   to	   it	   that	   funerary	   offerings	   were	  
made	  to	  him	  every	  year.	  After	  this	  she	  forced	  Cleopatra,	  for	  whom	  Philip	  had	  divorced	  her,	  
to	  hang	  herself,	  having	  first	  murdered	  her	  daughter	   in	  the	  mother’s	  arms;	  and	  it	  was	  with	  
the	  sight	  of	  her	   rival	  hanging	  there	   that	  Olympias	  achieved	  the	  revenge	  which	  she	  herself	  
had	  hastened	  by	  murder.	  Finally	  she	  consecrated	  to	  Apollo	  the	  sword	  with	  which	  the	  king	  
was	  stabbed,	  doing	  so	  under	  the	  Myrtale,	  which	  was	  the	  name	  Olympias	  bore	  as	  a	  little	  girl.	  
All	  this	  was	  done	  so	  openly	  that	  she	  appears	  to	  have	  been	  afraid	  that	  the	  crime	  might	  not	  
be	  clearly	  demonstrated	  as	  her	  work.”565	  
	  
Certain	   aspects	   of	   such	   claims	   can	   be	   immediately	   rejected.	   Plutarch’s	   claim	  must	  
surely	   have	   been	   invented,	   as	   even	   if	   such	   a	   conversation	   were	   to	   have	   occurred	  
between	   Pausanias	   and	   Alexander,	   the	   letter	   would	   hardly	   have	   revealed	   it.566	  
Plutarch	   himself	   appears	   to	   doubt	   the	   veracity	   of	   the	   claim,	   beginning	   as	   he	   does	  
with	  the	  somewhat	  tentative	  “It	  is	  said.”	  That	  Pausanias	  had	  horses	  waiting	  for	  him	  is	  
not	  proof	  of	  his	  having	  had	  assistance	   from	  Olympias	  of	  anyone,	  as	  he	  could	  easily	  
have	  arranged	  them	  himself.567	  As	  for	  Justin’s	  description	  of	  Olympias’	  behaviour,	  it	  is	  
surely	  not	  to	  be	  believed.568	   It	   follows	  the	  already	  discussed	  account	  of	  the	   ill-­‐fated	  
banquet,	   and	   shares	   with	   this	   account	   a	   fiercely	   negative	   depiction	   of	   Olympias.	  
Given	   how	   much	   of	   this	   version	   of	   the	   banquet	   episode	   has	   been	   shown	   to	   be	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unlikely,	   there	   is	   little	   to	   reason	   to	   trust	   Justin	   here.	   That	   Philip’s	   “repudiating”	  
Olympias	   represents	   a	   misunderstanding	   of	   the	   king’s	   polygamy	   has	   already	   been	  
discussed.	  
	  
In	  addition,	  there	  are	  practical	  problems	  with	  Justin’s	  account.	  Olympias	  was	  
supposedly	   able	   to	   receive	   news	  of	   Philip’s	   death	   and	   reach	  Aegae	   in	   time	   for	   the	  
funeral.	  Exactly	  how	  long	  passed	  between	  Philip’s	  murder	  and	  his	  funeral	  is	  unknown,	  
but	  Olympias’	  actions	  concerning	  Pausanias’	  body	  following	  the	  funeral	  suggest	  very	  
much	  that	  she	  was	  within	  a	   few	  days	   travel	  of	  Aegae,	  and	  thus	  within	  Macedon.569	  
Even	  if,	  contrary	  to	  what	  has	  been	  argued,	  Olympias	  wished	  Philip	  dead	  following	  the	  
banquet	  episode,	  for	  her	  to	  have	  been	  anywhere	  in	  Macedon	  would	  surely	  demand	  
some	  degree	  of	  reconciliation	  to	  having	  occurred	  between	  her	  and	  Philip.	  This	  would	  
directly	  undermine	  Justin’s	  claims.	  
	  
There	  is	  also	  the	  fact	  that	  for	  Olympias	  to	  have	  used	  Pausanias	  as	  her	  means	  
of	   murdering	   Philip	   seems	   unnecessarily	   complicated.	   Whilst	   it	   is	   possible	   that	  
Olympias	  might	  have	  learned	  of	  the	  Orestian’s	  grievance,	  for	  her	  to	  involve	  another	  
party	   in	  her	  schemes	  risked	  being	  revealed	  should	  Pausanias	  be	  caught	  and	  confess	  
everything.	  In	  addition,	  if	  Pausanias	  was	  her	  agent,	  why	  would	  she	  encourage	  him	  to	  
kill	  Philip	  in	  such	  an	  open	  and	  risky	  situation	  as	  he	  did?570	  As	  has	  been	  said,	  he	  surely	  
had	   access	   enough	   to	   Philip	   to	   allow	   him	   to	   murder	   the	   king	   more	   quietly	   and	  
carefully;	  to	  reduce	  the	  risk	  of	  failure	  alone,	  this	  is	  surely	  what	  Olympias	  would	  have	  
preferred.	  It	  could	  perhaps	  be	  argued	  that	  Olympias	  talked	  Pausanias	  into	  being	  her	  
assassin	   but	   left	   the	   details	   of	   the	   murder	   to	   him.	   The	   simplest	   response	   to	   this	  
however	   is	   that	   killing	   Philip	   in	   336	   brought	   no	   positives	   for	   Olympias	   or,	   more	  
importantly,	   Alexander.571	   The	   absence	   of	   threats	   to	   the	   latter’s	   position	   of	   heir	  
apparent	  has	  already	  been	  discussed.	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(iii)	  Summary	  of	  Findings	  
	  
It	   would	   thus	   seem	   difficult	   to	   accept	   to	   for	   Olympias	   or	   Alexander’s	  
involvement	   in	  Philip’s	  murder.	  To	  do	  so	  by	  suborning	  an	  aggrieved	  bodyguard	  and	  
encouraging	   him	   to	   commit	   the	   act	   in	   the	   before	   hundreds	   of	  witnesses	   is	   frankly	  
implausible.	   And	   for	   Olympias	   to	   then	   indulge	   in	   bizarre	   public	   celebration	   of	   the	  
murderer’s	  actions	  would	  surely	  be	  lunacy.	  The	  idea	  that	  Pausanias	  worked	  alone	  is	  
fare	  more	  attractive	  however.	  Explanation	  can	  be	  found	  for	  the	  situation	  in	  which	  the	  
assassin	   chose	   to	   kill	   Philip,	   and	   for	   the	   choice	   of	   the	   king	   as	   the	   focus	   of	   his	  
grievances	  rather	  than	  Attalus.	  Although	  Diodorus’	  version	  of	  events	  in	  particular	  has	  
provoked	   confusion,	   an	   acceptable	   timeline	   for	   events	   can	   be	   constructed	   to	  









	   As	  was	   stated	   at	   the	   start	   of	   this	   chapter,	   the	   assassin	   of	   Philip	   II	   is	   not	   in	  
doubt.	   One’s	   answer	   to	   the	   question	   of	   whether	   others	   were	   involved	   with	  
Pausanias	   is	   essentially	   defined	   by	   one’s	   interpretation	   of	   the	   effects	   of	   Philip’s	  
marriage	  to	  Cleopatra,	  in	  particular	  the	  events	  at	  the	  wedding	  banquet.	  
	  
	   The	  findings	  of	  this	  study	  would	  suggest	  that	  although	  Olympias,	  was	  accused	  
of	  involvement	  in	  the	  ancient	  sources,	  almost	  all	  reasons	  for	  them	  to	  have	  been	  so	  
can	   be	   rejected.	   There	   is	   no	   question	   of	   Philip	   having	   “repudiated”	   Olympias,	   no	  
evidence	  can	  be	  found	  for	  her	  being	  jealous	  of	  Cleopatra	  due	  to	  genuine	  attraction	  
to	  Philip,	  and	  there	  is	  no	  firm	  indication	  that	  either	  she	  enjoyed	  a	  prominent	  position	  
at	   court	   as	   a	   result	   of	   being	   Alexander’s	  mother,	   or	   that	   if	   she	   did,	   it	   was	   under	  
threat.	  Dissatisfaction	  or	  offence	  on	  her	  part	  could	  only	  have	  been	  caused,	  it	  would	  
seem,	  by	  Philip’s	  choice	  to	  give	  Cleopatra	  the	  name	  (or	  title)	  of	  Eurydice.	  
	  
	  Similarly,	   the	   idea	  of	   Philip	   changing	  his	  mind	  about	  Alexander	   as	  his	   heir-­‐
apparent	  is	  derived	  from	  Attalus’	  words	  at	  the	  wedding	  banquet,	  and	  Philip’s	  failure	  
to	   censure	   the	   general.	   However,	   such	   an	   assumption	   is	   completely	   contrary	   to	  
everything	   that	   had	   gone	   before	   in	   terms	   of	   Philip’s	   careful	   and	   continuous	  
advancement	  of	  Alexander’s	  career	  and	  upbringing.	  It	  would	  also	  run	  counter	  to	  all	  
common	   sense,	   as	   the	   best	   alternative	   heir	   available	   to	   Philip	   was	   the	   mentally	  
limited	   Arrhidaeus.	   Philip’s	   arranging	   the	   marriages	   of	   Amyntas	   Perdicca	   and	  
Alexander	  of	   Epirus	  point	   to	   an	   acknowledgement	  of	   this,	   as	   indeed	  does	  his	   own	  
union	  to	  Cleopatra.	  	  
	  
There	   is	   no	   need	   to	   view	   the	   departure	   of	   either	   mother	   or	   son	   from	  
Macedon	   following	   the	   events	   at	   the	   banquet	   as	   infuriated	   self-­‐imposed	   exile.	  
Indeed,	   it	   is	   arguably	   more	   appropriate	   to	   view	   them	   as	   pre-­‐arranged	   journeys,	  
made	  with	  Philip’s	  approval.	  Circumstantial	  support	  can	  even	  be	  found	  for	  the	  idea	  







offers	   perhaps	   the	   least	   satisfying	   conclusion	   (largely	   due	   to	   its	   somewhat	   bizarre	  
nature),	   it	  too	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  nothing	  more	  than	  a	  misunderstanding	  by	  a	  youthful	  
and	  naïve	  Alexander,	  who	  acted	  somewhat	  rashly	  in	  the	  circumstances.	  
	  
Regarding	  the	  Lyncestae	  and	  Amyntae,	   it	   is	  crucial	   to	  separate	  the	  question	  
of	  their	  guilt	  from	  the	  question	  of	  their	  involvement	  in	  Philip’s	  death.	  The	  surviving	  
evidence	  would	  appear	  to	  show	  that	  those	  accused	  of	  treason	  were	  guilty	  of	  it,	  and	  
those	  who	  fled	  around	  the	  same	  time	  were	  accomplices.	  The	  case	  of	  Alexander	  the	  
Lyncestian	  is	  difficult,	  and	  although	  one	  cannot	  be	  sure	  either	  way,	  the	  nature	  of	  his	  
eventual	   fall,	  arrest	  and	  execution	  can	  best	  be	  explained	  by	  assuming	   innocence	   in	  
336.	  
	  
The	   events	   of	   the	  murder	   itself	   support	   a	   ‘lone	   gunman’	   idea.	   The	   idea	   of	  
Olympias	   and/or	   Alexander	   approaching	   Pausanias	   is	   surely	   too	   risky	   to	   be	  
realistically	  considered.	  Furthermore,	   the	  circumstances	  of	   the	  murder	  support	   the	  
idea	  of	  personal	  vengeance.	  Pausanias’	  humiliation	  was	  presumably	  known	  to	  some	  
degree	  or	  other	  at	  the	  Macedonian	  court,	  and	  his	  choice	  of	  setting	  surely	  reflects	  a	  
wish	  to	  make	  as	  public	  a	  demonstration	  of	  avenging	  this	  as	  possible.	  	  
	  
The	  above	   interpretation	  brings	   to	  mind	   the	   famous	  adage	   ‘when	  you	  have	  
eliminated	   the	   impossible,	   whatever	   remains,	   however	   improbably,	   must	   be	   the	  
truth.’	   It	   is	   based	   very	   much	   upon	   the	   rejection	   of	   existing	   and	   in	   some	   cases	  
accepted	   ideas	  regarding	  the	   interpretation	  of	  events.	  The	  result	   is	  one	   is	   left	  with	  
Pausanias	   as	   a	   lone	   assassin,	   driven	   by	   personal	   grievance	   and	   uninspired	   by	  
anything	  or	  anyone	  else.	  It	  is	  not	  necessarily	  the	  most	  likely	  of	  conclusions,	  and	  it	  is	  
hardly	  controversial	   to	  expect	  tension	  between	  Philip,	  Alexander,	  and/or	  Olympias.	  
However,	   so	   much	   doubt	   can	   be	   thrown	   on	   the	   alleged	   actions	   and	   events	  
connected	   with	   these	   suspicions,	   one	   is	   forced	   to	   reject	   them;	   what	   is	   left	   must	  















The	  purpose	  of	  this	  study	  was	  to	  determine,	  as	  far	  possible,	  whether	  or	  not	  
the	   modern	   scholar	   can	   hope	   to	   compose	   an	   analytical	   study	   of	   Philip	   II’s	   reign	  
without	   resorting	   to	  overly	   conjecture	  or	   supposition	   to	  prevent	   incoherence.	   This	  
was	   attempted	   through	   three	   case	   studies,	   each	   focusing	   on	   a	   different	   aspect	   of	  
Philip’s	  reign,	  and	  the	  questions	  that	  arose	  in	  each	  case.	  
	  
Perhaps	   inevitably,	   the	  answer	  these	  studies	  suggest	   is	  both	  yes	  and	  no.	  To	  
take	  one	  example:	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Philip’s	  effect	  on	  the	  Macedonian	  military,	  one	  can	  
analyse	  the	  dangers	  faced	  in	  359,	  calculate	  the	  growth	  of	  the	  army	  during	  his	  reign	  
and	  describe	  the	  effect	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  sarissa	  had	  on	  infantry	  formation	  and	  
fighting	   style.	   However,	   the	   conclusion	   reached	   for	   the	   first	   point	   demands	   the	  
rejection	  of	   all	   the	  opinions	  offered	  by	   the	  ancient	   sources.	   It	   is	   not	   impossible	  of	  
course,	  that	  the	  conclusions	  are	  correct	  –	  sources	  often	  have	  agenda,	  or	  are	  poorly	  
informed	  –	  but	   to	   reach	  an	  essentially	  opposite	  conclusion	   from	  the	  same	  body	  of	  
evidence	  does	  not	  inspire	  confidence.	  
	  
One	   can	   find	   a	   similar	   example	   when	   examining	   Philip’s	   interaction	   with	  
Athens.	  The	  most	  plausible	   theory	   regarding	   the	  king’s	   intentions	   in	  346	   is	   that	  he	  
sought	  peace	  with	  Athens	  not	  as	  proof	  of	  a	  plan	  to	  abandon	  his	  alliance	  with	  Thebes,	  
but	   to	  prevent	   the	  Athenians	  obstructing	  his	   intended	   campaign	   against	   their	   ally,	  
the	   Thracian	   king	   Cersebleptes.	   However,	   by	   accepting	   this	   and	   the	   resultant	  
assumption	   that	   Philip	   did	   not	   attempt	   to	   convince	   envoys	   of	   the	   First	   or	   Second	  
Athenian	  envoys	  otherwise,	  one	  is	   left	  struggling	  to	  explore	  why	  Aeschines	  publicly	  
insisted	  that	  the	  king	  was	  on	  the	  verge	  of	  turning	  on	  the	  Thebans,	  re-­‐founding	  two	  
cities	   they	   had	   previously	   destroyed,	   making	   them	   pay	   for	   offences	   committed	  
against	   fellow	   Amphictyones	   and	   allowing	   the	   city	   they	   wished	   destroyed	   for	  








One	  is	   faced	  with	  a	  similar	  problem	  when	   investigating	  Philip’s	  murder.	  The	  
conclusion	   reached	   is	   that	  Pausanias	  was	   indeed	  driven	  by	  his	  own	  grievance,	   and	  
went	   unaided	   in	   his	   efforts	   to	   kill	   Philip	   as	   neither	   Olympias	   nor	   Alexander	   had	  
realistic	   cause	   to	   want	   him	   dead.	   However,	   this	   interpretation	   argues	   for	   the	  
rejection	   of	   a	   considerable	   proportion	   of	   the	   source	   material’s	   claims	   and	  
interpretations.	  
	  
That	  such	  varying	  interpretations	  are	  possible	  is	  indicative	  of	  the	  limits	  of	  the	  
source	   material.	   When	   considering	   the	   Macedonian	   army	   under	   Philip,	   one	   is	  
frequently	  reliant	  on	  Diodorus,	  who	  at	  best	  had	  only	  the	  most	  basic	  grasp	  of	  military	  
matters,	  and	   little	   interest	   in	   them.	  One	  of	   the	  key	  sources	   for	  Olympias,	   Justin,	   is	  
compromised	  by	  his	  original	   sources’	  extreme	  prejudice	  against	  her.	  Perhaps	  most	  
challenging	   of	   all,	   Aeschines	   and	   Demosthenes’	   speeches	   offer	   the	   most	  
comprehensive	   sources	   for	   Philip’s	   involvement	   with	   Greece,	   yet	   at	   times	   flatly	  
contradict	   both	   each	   other	   and	   even	   themselves.	   It	   must	   always	   be	   remembered	  
however,	  as	  was	  also	  stated	  at	  the	  start	  of	  this	  essay,	  that	  the	  work	  of	  the	  ancient	  
scholar	   is	   almost	   always	   what	   is	   suspected,	   and	   most	   likely,	   rather	   than	   what	   is	  
certain	   and	   provable.	   That	   a	   greater	   variety	   of	   theory	  may	   emerge	   for	   aspects	   of	  
Philip’s	  reign	  does	  not	  make	  the	  evidence	  intrinsically	  unreliable,	  and	  certainly	  does	  
not	  mean	   one	   should	   abandon	   all	   efforts	   to	   understand	   it.	   Although	   at	   times	   the	  
details	   are	  unattainable,	  more	  general	  points	  and	   theories	   can	  be	  posited.	  Even	   in	  
extreme	   cases,	   where	   only	   a	   start	   and	   end	   point	   are	   known,	   one	   can	   still	   draw	  
certain	   facts	   about	  what	   happened	   in	   between.	   Thus,	   although	   the	   precise	   timing	  
and	   process	   of	   the	   sarissa’s	   adoption	   by	   the	   Macedonian	   army	   is	   completely	  
unknown,	   one	   can	   still	   say	   with	   confidence	   that	   Philip	   introduced,	   and	   was	  
responsible	  for	  the	  various	  alterations	  to	  arrangement	  of	  the	  forces	  that	  used	  it,	  as	  it	  
was	  not	  in	  use	  at	  the	  start	  of	  his	  reign,	  yet	  was	  the	  basis	  of	  Alexander’s	  infantry.	  
	  
The	   indication	  of	   these	  studies	   then	  would	  seem	  to	  be	  that	   it	   is	  possible	   to	  
conduct	  a	  serious	  analytical	  study	  of	  Philip	  II’s	  reign.	  There	  are	  certainly	  considerable	  







attempt	  a	  longer,	  perhaps	  biographical	  investigation,	  there	  would	  certainly	  be	  parts	  
where	  the	  author	  would	  be	  reduced	  to	  conjecture.	  As	  with	  all	  such	  study	  however,	  
were	   any	   of	   the	   resultant	   findings	   found	   to	   be	   contentious,	   they	  would	   hopefully	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